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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, we study the problem of Secrecy and Resiliency quantification for cyber
physical systems. Secrecy (also known as confidentiality) refers to the ability to withstand
attempts to uncover information/behaviors, whereas resilience (also known as integrity) refers
to the ability to withstand attempts to modify information/behaviors. Thus, former is an
observability related attribute while the latter is an attribute related to controllability. In this
dissertation we are primarily concerned with protecting systems behaviors from being revealed
or altered.
Unlike information, behaviors cannot be encrypted and may instead be protected by pro-
viding covers that generate indistinguishable observations from behaviors needed to be kept
secret. Such a scheme may still leak information about secrets due to statistical difference
between the occurrence probabilities of the secrets and their covers. Jensen-Shannon Diver-
gence (JSD) is a possible means of quantifying statistical difference between two distributions
and can be used to measure such information leak as presented in this dissertation. Using
JSD, we quantify loss of secrecy in stochastic partially-observed discrete event systems in two
settings: (i) the centralized setting, corresponding to a single attacker/observer, and (ii) the
distributed collusive setting, corresponding to multiple attackers/observers, exchanging their
observed information. In the centralized case, an observer structure is formed and used to aide
the computation of JSD, in the limit, as the length of observations approach infinity to quantify
the worst case loss of secrecy. In the distributed collusive case, channel models are introduced
to extend the system model to capture the effect of exchange of observations, that allows the
JSD computation of the centralized case to be applied over the extended model to measure the
distributed secrecy loss.
We also formulate a measure for resiliency for dynamical hybrid systems with focus on power
systems. The resiliency measure, called Level-of-Resilience (LoR), determined by examining:
x(i) the Region-of-Stability-Reduction (RoSR), as the RoS evolves under attack and recovery ac-
tions as captured by a “modal-RoS”, (ii) the eventual Level-of-Performance-Reduction (LoPR),
as measured by percentage of reduction of load served, and (iii) Recovery-Time (RT), which is
the time system takes to detect and recover from an attack or a fault. We illustrate our measure
by comparing resiliency level of two power systems under two different attack scenarios.
The level of resilience of a given system is assessed under various attack scenarios. We
present a model-based approach for generating such attack scenarios. This requires a compre-
hensive description of the system model (describing architecture and connectivity, components
and behaviors, assets, defenses, vulnerabilities, atomic attacks), as well as of security/resiliency
properties being investigated. A state exploration based approach has been proposed to find
all behaviors/paths of the model leading to those reachable states where the specified secu-
rity/resiliency properties are violated. An attack graph is a collection of all paths from initial
states to such reachable violating states. We present a model-based attack graph generation
approach and its implementation.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The dissertation explores the topics of metrics for Secrecy and Resilience in Cyber-Physical-
Systems. Quantifying the ability to hide secrets (sensitive information) from a single ob-
server/collusive observers is a challenge. This dissertation provides a means to quantify this in
terms of a type of distance measure between the distributions of observations arising from a
secret and its cover. Dually, we also identify measures to describe how resilient the system is
against adverse events. Measuring the secrecy and resiliency level may aid system engineers to
revisit the system design for achieving satisfactory metric.
Cryptography is used to protect the content of information (e.g, a message) by making it
undecipherable, however, behaviors (as opposed to information) may not be encrypted, and
may only be protected by partially or fully hiding through creation of ambiguity by provid-
ing covers that generate indistinguishable observations from secrets; for instance, in [Shoukry
et al. (2013)], the attacker can initiate an attack against the Anti-lock Braking System (ABS)
speed sensor used in automobiles. In such attack, the attacker alters the physical environment
surrounding the ABS sensor (i.e., by shielding the sensor from its surrounding) using certain
spoofing electromagnetic device. Doing so, this will allow the attacker to inject his/her own
speed signal, and thus corrupting the actual ABS speed measurement, and gaining an overall
control over the automobile maneuvers. In this scenario, data encryption may not help pro-
tecting the system against this spoofing attack since the measured signal itself is corrupted,
also the behavioral maneuvers of the automobile cannot be encrypted too.
In general, secrecy may arise from partial observability, through the creation of ambigu-
ity about system secret state by producing other state (i.e., cover) under indistinguishable
observation; for instance, an attacker who passively tries to infer the navigation/maneuvers
of an automobile, using a set of sensors deployed in certain places in the road, an ambiguity
2about his/her observation of the automobile track can be generated by having other possible
maneuvers with same sensor observations (act as a cover) from the secret ones. Researchers
in the field of security and privacy have explored many techniques for hiding secrets based on
ambiguation schemes such as, Steganography and Watermarking [Kundur and Ahsan (2003);
Christian S. Collberg (2002)], Network level Anonymization [Ren and Wu (2010)], and Software
Obfuscation [Garg et al. (2013)].
A first part of this dissertation focuses on the confidentiality (secrecy) property for systems
modeled as partially-observed stochastic discrete event systems (stochastic PODES), which
are Markovian generators of arbitrary long sequences with labeled transitions being partially-
observed [Ibrahim et al. (2016a,b)]. Systems receive inputs and produce outputs, and in the
process may leak some undesired information, and this has been formalized and quantified.
A second security aspect of this dissertation is about measuring the resiliency of dynamical
systems. Resiliency can be defined as “ability to withstand adverse events”. Their quantifica-
tion allows system designers to assess system security under attacks. We introduce the notion
of Level-of-Resilience (LoR) as a way to compare the resiliency of different systems, subject
to various attack scenarios [Ibrahim et al. (2016c)]. An adverse event can affect both sys-
tem’s stability and performance, and whose recovery time is also another important metric.
Accordingly, in our present work, we consider size of Region-of-Stability (RoS), the Level-of-
Performance (e.g., load served in case of a power system), and Recovery-Time as part of the
proposed resilience metric. We show these can be computed through power system examples
subjected to a sequence of atomic attacks, and show how one power system topology may be
better over another with respect to the proposed resiliency measure.
The level of resilience of a given system is assessed under various attack scenarios. We
present a model-based approach for generating such attack scenarios (sequence of attack/recovery
actions resulting in system compromise). This requires a comprehensive description of the sys-
tem model, as well as the security/resiliency properties being investigated. A state exploration
based approach has been proposed to find all behaviors/paths of the model leading to those
reachable states where security/resiliency property is violated. An attack graph is a collection
of all paths from initial states to such reachable violating states. Once attack graphs are gen-
3erated for systems, further analysis can be done to compare the resiliency levels against the
attack scenarios within the graph. The framework was already proposed in [Jha et al. (2002);
Sheyner et al. (2002)], we build explicit model for state-space exploration, identifying the ap-
propriate state-variables and transition rules. We also provided an initial implementation of
state exploration based attack graph generation using architectural description tool together
with a back-end model-checker.
1.1 Related Works
Various notions of information secrecy have been explored in literature. For example, [Smith
(2009)] examines non-interference, requiring that secrets (private variables) do not interfere
with or influence the observables (public variables). Non-interference is a logical notion that is
either satisfied or violated, and as such it does not allow the quantification of the degree to which
a system may violate the property. In contrast, for stochastic systems, the mutual information
between the private and public variables can be used to quantify the level of interference, and
hence loss of secrecy [Smith (2009)]. Mutual information is only an average case measure, and
a worst case measure can also be defined, using for example min-entropy [Espinoza and Smith
(2013)]. Extension of the notion of non-interference over behaviors (sequences) was explored
in [Takai and Kumar (2009)], requiring that every secret behavior must be masked by a cover
behavior.
For information leakage over sequences of observations from a stochastic systems, mutual
information can again be used to quantify the level of secrecy loss, and as shown in [Chen
et al. (2015)], it can be related to a certain Jensen-Shannon Divergence (JSD) computation,
and can be used to measure the disparity between the distributions of a secret versus its cover
as a way to quantify the secrecy [Bryans et al. (2011)]. The definition of Sτ -secrecy proposed
by [Ibrahim et al. (2014)] bounds the probability of revealing the secret over the set of all
behaviors. It is shown that Sτ -Secrecy can be viewed as a generalization of the logical secrecy
defined in [Takai and Kumar (2009)], and that it is a variant of the divergence used in [Bryans
et al. (2011)]. The above mentioned secrecy notions (also referred to opacity in literatures),
along with related articles have been reviewed in a recent survey [Jacob et al. (2015)].
4Dually, we also identify measures to describe how resilient the system is against adverse
events, which we illustrate for power systems. Various measures of power system resilience have
been investigated throughout literature. For instance, the average efficiency of the network
[Latora and Marchiori (2001)], adapted to the case of the North American power grid, is used
by [Kinney et al. (2005)] to quantify the performance of grid operations before and after the
occurrence of breakdowns. This measure is based on the most efficient path between the
generation substation i and the distribution substation j, where path efficiency between two
nodes i and j is the harmonic composition of the efficiencies of the component edges. Then,
the damage caused by a failure is defined as the normalized efficiency loss.
The duration of unscheduled outages due to failure of distribution system is also proposed
in [Maliszewski and Perrings (2012)] as a resilience measure. A recent survey [Willis and Loa
(2015)] summarized resilience measures of energy distribution systems. The building blocks of
resilience are: inputs available to support resilience, capacities, which are the ways in which
inputs are organized to support resilience, capabilities of what tasks can be performed, the
performance and outcomes that describe what is produced by an engineered system. These
building blocks address the goal of reducing the damage from disasters.
1.2 Organization of Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Secrecy quantification in stochastic
PODESs in the presence of a single attacker/observer, having partial observability of system
behaviors for revealing sensitive/secret states (reachable by secret I/O behaviors), is introduced
in chapter 2. We employ the JSD based measure of secrecy loss, and propose a method to
compute it in the centerlized setting. The computation of “limiting” JSD measure, quantifying
the worst case statistical difference that is defined over arbitrary long observation sequences,
is presented. The proposed JSD based quantification for secrecy loss is shown to be equivalent
to the mutual information between the distribution over the observations and that over the
possible status of system execution (whether secret or cover).
In chapter 3 we study the secrecy quantification in stochastic PODESs in the distributed
collusive setting, where there exist multiple observers/attackers that have their own personal
5observations, and also collude by exchanging their observations over channels, that introduce
delays that are bounded. To compute JSD measure in this setting, we introduce channel
models and use those to extend the system model as in [Qiu and Kumar (2008)], capturing
own observations as well as the delayed communicated observations. The JSD computation
approach of the centralized setting of chapter 2 is then employed to the extended model to
yield the JSD measure of the distributed collusive setting.
In chapter 4, we present the notion of Level-of-Resilience (LoR) as a way to compare the
resiliency of different systems, subject to various attack scenarios. An adverse event can affect
both system’s stability and performance, and whose recovery time is also another important
metric. Accordingly, we consider size of Region-of-Stability (RoS), the Level-of-Performance
(e.g., load served in case of a power system), and Recovery-Time as part of the proposed
resilience metric.
In chapter 5, we present a model-based approach for generating attack scenarios that can
be used in the resiliency analyses. This requires a comprehensive description of the system
model (describing architecture and connectivity, components and behaviors, assets, defenses,
vulnerabilities, atomic attacks), as well as of security/resiliency properties being investigated.
A state exploration based approach has been proposed to find all behaviors/paths of the model
leading to those reachable states where the specified security/resiliency properties are violated.
An attack graph is a collection of all those paths. We present a model-based attack graph gen-
eration approach and its implementation. In Chapter 6, we summarize the work and conclude
with the discussions of future work.
6CHAPTER 2. QUANTIFICATION OF CENTRALIZED SECRECY IN
STOCHASTIC DISCRETE EVENT SYSTEMS
In this chapter, we study secrecy quantification in stochastic PODESs in the presence of a
single attacker/observer, having partial observability of system behaviors for revealing sensitive
system behaviors. We propose a JSD based quantification to measure the secrecy loss in this
centralized setting as introduced below. The proposed JSD based quantification for secrecy
loss is shown to be equivalent to the mutual information between the distribution over possible
observations and that over possible status of system execution (secret versus cover).
2.1 Notations and Preliminaries
For an event set Σ, define Σ := Σ ∪ {}, where  denotes “no-event”. The set of all
finite length event sequences over Σ, including  is denoted as Σ∗, Σ+ := Σ∗ − {}, and Σn
is the set of event sequences of length n ∈ N. A trace is a member of Σ∗ and a language is
a subset of Σ∗. We use s ≤ t to denote if s ∈ Σ∗ is a prefix of t ∈ Σ∗, and |s| to denote
the length of s or the number of events in s. For L ⊆ Σ∗, its prefix-closure is defined as
pr(L) := {s ∈ Σ∗|∃t ∈ Σ∗ : st ∈ L} and L is said to be prefix-closed (or simply closed) if
pr(L) = L, i.e., whenever L contains a trace, it also contains all the prefixes of that trace. For
s ∈ Σ∗ and L ⊆ Σ∗, L\s := {t ∈ Σ∗|st ∈ L} denotes the set of traces in L after s.
2.1.1 Stochastic PODES.
We can model a stochastic PODES by a stochastic automaton G = (X,Σ, α, x0), where
X is the set of states, Σ is the finite set of events, x0 ∈ X is the initial state, and α :
X × Σ × X → [0, 1] is the probability transition function [Garg et al. (1999)], and ∀x ∈
7X,
∑
σ∈Σ
∑
x′∈X α(x, σ, x
′) = 1. A non-stochastic PODES can be modeled as the same 4-tuple,
but by replacing the transition function with α : X × Σ × X → {0, 1}, and a non-stochastic
DES is deterministic if ∀x ∈ X,σ ∈ Σ,∑x′∈X α(x, σ, x′) ∈ {0, 1}. The transition probability
function α can be generalized to α : X × Σ∗ × X in a natural way: ∀xi, xj ∈ X, s ∈ Σ∗, σ ∈
Σ, α(xi, sσ, xj) =
∑
xk∈X α(xi, s, xk)α(xk, σ, xj), and α(xi, , xj) = 1 if xi = xj and 0 otherwise.
Define the language generated by G as L(G) := {s ∈ Σ∗ | ∃x ∈ X,α(x0, s, x) > 0}. For a
given G, a component C = (XC , αC) of G is a “subgraph” of G, i.e., XC ⊆ X and ∀x, x′ ∈ XC
and σ ∈ Σ, αC(x, σ, x′) = α(x, σ, x′) whenever the latter is positive, and αC(x, σ, x′) = 0
otherwise. C is said to be a strongly connected component (SCC) or irreducible if ∀x, x′ ∈ XC ,
∃s ∈ Σ∗ such that αC(x, s, x′) > 0. A SCC C is said to be closed if for each x ∈ XC ,∑
σ∈Σ
∑
x′∈XC αC(x, σ, x
′) = 1. The states which belong to a closed SCC are recurrent states
and the remaining states (that do not belong to any closed SCC) are transient states. Another
way to identify recurrent versus transient states is to consider the steady-state state distribution
pi∗ as the fixed-point of pi∗ = pi∗Ω, where pi∗ is a row-vector with the same size as X, and Ω is
the transition matrix with ijth entry being the transition probability
∑
σ∈Σ α(i, σ, j). (In case
Ω is periodic with period d 6= 1, we consider the set of fixed-points of pi∗ = pi∗Ωd). Then any
state i is recurrent if and only if there exists a reachable fixed point pi∗ such that the ith entry
of pi∗ is nonzero.
2.1.2 Information Theoretic Notations.
For a probability distribution p over discrete set A, its entropy is defined as H(p) =
−∑a∈A p(a) log p(a). For two probability distributions p and q over A, their Kullback-Leibler
(KL) divergences denoted as DKL(p, q), is defined as DKL(p, q) =
∑
a∈A p(a) log
p(a)
q(a) . Given
λ1 > 0 and λ2 > 0 satisfying λ1 +λ2 = 1, the Jensen-Shannon Divergence (JSD) between p and
q under the weights (λ1, λ2), is defined as D(p, q) = λ1DKL(p, λ1p+λ2q)+λ2DKL(q, λ1p+λ2q),
which is equivalent to D(p, q) = H(λ1p + λ2q) − λ1H(p) − λ2H(q) (for more details, refer to
[Cover and Thomas (2012); Lin (1991)]).
For two probability distributions p over A and q over B, their mutual information is defined
as I(p, q) =
∑
a∈A,b∈B Pr(a, b) log
Pr(a,b)
p(a)q(b) , which can also be equivalently defined as I(p, q) =
8H(p)−H(p|q), where the conditional entropy H(p|q) is given as H(p|q) = −∑b∈B q(b)∑a∈A
Pr(a|b) logPr(a|b).
2.1.3 Secret/non-Secret states
Certain system states may be considered sensitive and hence secret, whereas the remaining
states act as covers for the secrets. Define Xs ⊆ X as the set of secret states (reachable by secret
I/O behaviors) whereas, Xc ⊆ X is the set of cover states (reachable by cover I/O behaviors).
The events in Σ executed by the system are observed by an observer (an attacker or an
adversary) through an observation mask M : Σ→ ∆, where ∆ is the set of observed symbols,
and M() = . (M can be extended to Σ∗ as follows: M() =  and ∀s ∈ Σ∗, σ ∈ Σ,M(sσ) =
M(s)M(σ).) The following section describes the computation of an observer transition struc-
ture for G that can be used to track its evolution over its observed symbols ∆, and also the
associated transition matrices {Θ(δ) | δ ∈ ∆}.
Remark 1. If the desired secrecy property is specified for behaviors (as opposed to states) then a
specification-based model-refinement step can be used to convert it to a state-based specification.
Letting L = L(G) denote the set of all behaviors (traces) of a stochastic PODES G as introduced
in the notation section, suppose K ⊂ L models the secret behaviors (also called a specification),
while the remaining traces in L − K act as its cover. K may be modeled by a deterministic
acceptor R = (Y,Σ, β, y0) such that L(R) = K. By introducing a dump state D in R, and
completing its transition function, we can obtain R = (Y ,Σ, β, y0), where Y = Y ∪ D, and
∀y, y′ ∈ Y , σ ∈ Σ,
β(y, σ, y′) :=
 β(y, σ, y
′) if (y, y′ ∈ Y ) ∧ (β(y, σ, y′) > 0),
1 if [(y = y′ = D) ∨ (y′ = D ∧∑y∈Y β(y, σ, y) = 0)].
Then, the system model can be refined with respect to the specification to identify the secret and
cover behaviors as states in the refined system GR = G||R, and is given by:
9GR = (X × Y ,Σ, γ, (x0, y0)), where ∀(x, y), (x′, y′) ∈ X × Y , σ ∈ Σ, γ is defined as:
γ((x, y), σ, (x′, y′)) :=

α(x, σ, x′) if [(y, y′ ∈ Y ∧ β(y, σ, y′) > 0) ∨ (y = y′ = D)
∨
(
y′ = D ∧∑y∈Y β(y, σ, y) = 0)],
0 otherwise.
2.2 Observer Transition Structure
We describe the computation of an observer transition structure that can be used to
track the evolution of G over its observed symbols ∆, and the associated transition matri-
ces {Θ(δ) | δ ∈ ∆}. Given the system model G (or equivalently the the refined system
model GR as in remark 1), and its observation mask M : Σ → ∆, define the set of traces
originating at x, terminating at x′ and executing a sequence of unobservable events followed
by a single observable event with observation δ as LG(x, δ, x
′) := {s ∈ Σ∗|s = uσ,M(u) =
,M(σ) = δ, γ(x, s, x′) > 0}. Define its probability, α(LG(x, δ, x′)) :=
∑
s∈LG(x,δ,x′) γ(x, s, x
′),
and denote it as θx,δ,x′ . Also, define λij =
∑
σ∈Σuo γ(i, σ, j) as the probability of transitioning
from x to x′ while executing a single unobservable event. Then, letting i = x and j = x′,
θi,δ,j =
∑
k λikθk,δ,j +
∑
σ∈Σ:M(σ)=δ γ(i, σ, j), where the first term on the right hand side (RHS)
corresponds to transitioning in at least two steps (i to intermediate k unobservably, and k to j
with a single observation δ at the end), whereas the second term on RHS corresponds to transi-
tioning in exactly one step [Chen et al. (2015); Ibrahim et al. (2015)]. Thus, for each δ ∈ ∆, all
the probabilities {θi,δ,j |i, j ∈ X} can be found by solving the following matrix equation [Wang
and Ray (2004)]:
Θ(δ) = ΛΘ(δ) + Γ(δ), (2.1)
where Θ(δ),Λ and Γ(δ) are all |X| × |X| square matrices whose ijth elements are given by
θi,δ,j , λij and
∑
σ∈Σ:M(σ)=δ γ(x, σ, x
′), respectively.
Example 1. Fig. 2.1(a) is an example of a stochastic automaton G. The set of states is
X = {0, 1, 2} with initial state x0 = 0, event set Σ = {a, b, c}. A state is depicted as a node,
whereas a transition is depicted as an edge between its origin and termination states, with
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its event name and probability value labeled on the edge. The observation mask M is such
that M(c) =  and for all other events σ ∈ {a, b}, M(σ) = σ. Suppose R is given in Fig.
2.1(b), i.e., K = L(R) = ab∗, L − K = ca∗ ∪ (ca∗b)+ ∪ (ca∗b)+ab∗. Then the refinement GR
automaton is shown in Fig. 2.1(c). Let the state space of GR be indexed as the following order:
{(0, 0), (2, 1), (1, D), (0, D), (2, D)}. Then, by solving (2.1) we get:
Θ(a) =

0 0.5 0.375 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0.75 0 0
0 0 0.375 0 0.5
0 0 0 0 0

Θ(b) =

0 0 0 0.125 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.25 0
0 0 0 0.125 0
0 0 0 0 1

.
2.3 Illustrative Example: AES Side-Channel Attack
We consider a version of cache side-channel attack that can be used to compromise AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard), adopted from [Zhang and ruby B. Lee (2014)]. The difference
in access times of cache hit versus miss may be used to learn the AES key as described below.
AES is a symmetric crypto-system, which processes data blocks of 16, 24, or 32 bytes, using
encryption keys of the same size as data, corresponding to “AES-16”, “AES-24”, or “AES-32”.
In what follows below, we consider AES-16 for illustration purposes. For encryption, the plain-
text block is converted into the cipher-text block, both viewed as 4×4 array of bytes, in several
rounds. The intermediate results of rounds are also of same sizes, and are termed “states”.
(For AES-16, the number of rounds Nr equals 10 [Kak (2015); Daemen and Rijmen (1999)].)
For setting up the keys for the various rounds, a key expansion algorithm is applied to an initial
11
Figure 2.1 (a) Stochastic automaton G, (b) deterministic secret specification R, (c) refinement
GR
key K(0), outputting a linear array of 4-byte words, of length 4Nr, corresponding to the keys
{K(r), r = 1, ..., Nr} for the future rounds.
Starting from a 16-byte plain-text P = (p0, ..., p15), encryption proceeds by computing a
16-byte intermediate state x(r) = (x
(r)
0 , ..., x
(r)
15 ) at each round r. The initial state x
(0) is com-
puted by x
(0)
i = pi ⊕ ki, i = 0, ..., 15, and the next Nr − 1 rounds for r = 0, ..., Nr − 2 are
computed as follows:
(x
(r+1)
0 , x
(r+1)
1 , x
(r+1)
2 , x
(r+1)
3 )← T0[x(r)0 ]⊕ T1[x(r)5 ]⊕ T2[x(r)10 ]⊕ T3[x(r)15 ]⊕K(r+1)0
(x
(r+1)
4 , x
(r+1)
5 , x
(r+1)
6 , x
(r+1)
7 )← T0[x(r)4 ]⊕ T1[x(r)9 ]⊕ T2[x(r)14 ]⊕ T3[x(r)3 ]⊕K(r+1)1
(x
(r+1)
8 , x
(r+1)
9 , x
(r+1)
10 , x
(r+1)
11 )← T0[x(r)8 ]⊕ T1[x(r)13 ]⊕ T2[x(r)2 ]⊕ T3[x(r)7 ]⊕K(r+1)2
(x
(r+1)
12 , x
(r+1)
13 , x
(r+1)
14 , x
(r+1)
15 )← T0[x(r)12 ]⊕ T1[x(r)1 ]⊕ T2[x(r)6 ]⊕ T3[x(r)11 ]⊕K(r+1)3 , (2.2)
where the notation Tn[m] denotes the index-m entry of table Tn that is used to store pre-
computed transformations of states, involving the operations of substitute-bytes, shift-rows,
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and mix-columns. The last round is also computed using (2.2), except that tables T0, ..., T3 are
replaced by tables T
(10)
0 , ..., T
(10)
3 , respectively. (The last round does not need the mix-columns
operation and so uses different tables.)
An attacker may populate a cache line with an initial state xi = pi ⊕ ki, generated using
a known plain-text pi and a known key ki, i = 0, ..., 15. When the host populates the same
cache line with another initial state x′i = p
′
i⊕ k′i, using another plain-text p′i, also known to the
attacker, and a key k′i that is unknown to the attacker, a cache hit, as indicated by a shorter
access time, can indicate xi = x
′
i, implying pi ⊕ ki = p′i ⊕ k′i, from which the attacker can infer
the unknown key, k′i = p
′
i⊕ pi⊕ ki. Thus each cache hit, which may be thought of host’s cache
line interfering with the attacker’s cache line, provides an opportunity for an attacker to infer
one byte of the key used by a host.
To provide additional protection against this vulnerability, the system may introduce ran-
dom evictions of the cache. Figures 2.2(a), and 2.2(b) show the abstracted versions of the
two cache architectures, with no protection and with added protection, respectively, where the
models track the status of an individual cache line. (Similar models track other cache lines.)
The 4 states in Fig. 2.2(a) are: “A” (occupied by the attacker and of low confidentiality),
“H”, “AH” (occupied, respectively, by the host, and the attacker while occupied by the host
in the previous step, both of high confidentiality), or “I’ (invalid—that has no valid contents
from attacker or host, and also of low confidentiality). If the host holds its own data in cache,
its cache access results in a hit (Hhit), but if the attacker evicts the host’s data in the cache
lines by requesting cache access, it results in a miss (Hmiss). The attackers cache hit and miss,
Ahit and Amiss are dually defined. Note that the occurrence of Amiss or Ahit can be used to
infer “H” or “AH” states, using which one byte of the encryption key can be compromised.
However, an attacker can only observe its own cache hits and misses (i.e., Ahit and Amiss are
the only observable events). In Fig. 2.2(b), random cache eviction is introduced by the system
to invalidate the data, denoted by “Inv” event. This introduces ambiguity in the attacker’s
knowledge about the occupancy of the cache, i.e., when it observes a cache miss, it does not
know whether it is due to the processor’s eviction or due to the host’s cache access. Then,
in Fig. 2.2(b), we can view {H,AH} to be the high confidential or “secret” states whereas
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{I, A, I ′} to be the low confidential or “cover” states, which present ambiguity against the
“secret” states.
Figure 2.2 (a) Cache side-channel attack model with no evictions, (b) cache side-channel
attack model with random evictions, (c) observer for the cache side-channel attack
with random evictions
A goal of secrecy or confidentiality is to ensure that with high probability, the secret states
are masked by the cover states under system observations. We present an approach to quantify
the ability to keep the secrets confidential for probabilistic systems. This employs an informa-
tion theoretic approach to measure the amount of information leaked about the secrets into
the observables. The details are provided in the next sections.
2.4 Jensen-Shannon Divergence Based Secrecy Quantification
The statistical difference between the conditional distributions of secrets versus covers over
the system observations of a common length, provides a measure of the amount of secrecy
leaked by a system. A possible way of measuring difference between two distributions is the
JSD (Jensen Shannon Divergence) measure. Here we present a way to compute the JSD mea-
sure for stochastic PODESs.
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Given a length-n observation o ∈ ∆n, let pn(o) denote its probability. Then, since the
occurrences of observations of length n are mutually disjoint,
∑
o∈∆n pn(o) = 1, i.e., pn is a
probability distribution over ∆n. Then its entropy is given as:
H(pn) = −
∑
o∈∆n
pn(o) log pn(o).
Lemma 1. The entropy pn as defined above for length-n observation can be recursively com-
puted as follows:
H(pn) = H(pn−1)−
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)
∑
δ∈∆
Pr(δ|o) logPr(δ|o).
Proof.
H(pn) = −
∑
o∈∆n
pn(o) log pn(o)
= −
∑
o∈∆n−1
∑
δ∈∆
pn(oδ) log pn(oδ)
= −
∑
o∈∆n−1
∑
δ∈∆
pn−1(o)Pr(δ|o) log(pn−1(o)Pr(δ|o))
= −
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)
∑
δ∈∆
Pr(δ|o)(log pn−1(o) + logPr(δ|o))
= −
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)
∑
δ∈∆
Pr(δ|o) logPr(δ|o)
−
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)
∑
δ∈∆
Pr(δ|o) log pn−1(o)
= −
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)
∑
δ∈∆
Pr(δ|o) logPr(δ|o)
−
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o) log pn−1(o)
∑
δ∈∆
Pr(δ|o)
= −
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)
∑
δ∈∆
Pr(δ|o) logPr(δ|o)
−
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o) log pn−1(o)
= −
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)
∑
δ∈∆
Pr(δ|o) logPr(δ|o) +H(pn−1).
Thus Lemma 1 is established.
Define two more probability distributions over ∆n: probability that an observation o ∈ ∆n
is generated by some secret in Xs, denoted p
s
n(o), versus that is generated by some cover in Xc,
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denoted pcn(o). The entropy of p
s
n and p
c
n are given, respectively, by:
H(psn) = −
∑
o∈∆n
psn(o) log p
s
n(o) (2.3)
H(pcn) = −
∑
o∈∆n
pcn(o) log p
c
n(o). (2.4)
The ability of an intruder to identify secret versus cover behaviors based on observations of
length n, depends on the disparity between the two distributions psn versus p
c
n: If p
s
n and p
c
n
are identical, i.e., with “zero disparity”, there is no way to statistically tell apart secrets from
covers, and in that case there is perfect secrecy. However, when psn and p
c
n are different, then
one could characterize the ability of an intruder to discriminate secrets from covers based on
length-n observations, using the JSD between psn and p
c
n, under the weights (λ
s
n, λ
c
n), denoted
D(psn, p
c
n) = λ
s
nDKL(p
s
n, λ
s
np
s
n + λ
c
np
c
n) + λ
c
nDKL(p
c
n, λ
s
np
s
n + λ
c
np
c
n)
= H(λsnp
s
n + λ
c
np
c
n)− λsnH(psn)− λcnH(pcn), (2.5)
where λsn is the probability of secrets and λ
c
n is the probability of covers, respectively, generating
length-n observations. Note that JSD is symmetric in its arguments and bounded by 0 and 1.
The following theorem shows that the JSD measure is indeed a useful measure of information
revealed, as it equals the mutual information between the observations pn and the status
(whether secret or cover) of system executions. This status can be captured by a bi-valued
random variable Λn, defined for each n ∈ N, such that Pr((Λn = 1) ≡ [x ∈ Xs]) = λsn and
Pr((Λn = 0 ≡ [x ∈ Xc])) = λcn.
Theorem 1. The JSD as defined in (2.5) is equivalent to the mutual information of Λn and
pn, i.e.,
D(psn, p
c
n) = I(Λn, pn).
Proof. According to the definition of mutual information, we have
I(Λn, pn) = H(pn)−H(pn|Λn).
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The conditional entropy H(pn|Λn) can be expressed as follows:
H(pn|Λn) = Pr(Λn = 1)H(pn|Λn = 1) + Pr(Λn = 0)H(pn|Λn = 0)
= −λsn
∑
o∈∆n
Pr(o|Λn = 1) logPr(o|Λn = 1)− λcn
∑
o∈∆n
Pr(o|Λn = 0) logPr(o|Λn = 0)
= −λsn
∑
o∈∆n
psn(o) log p
s
n(o)− λcn
∑
o∈∆n
pcn(o) log p
s
n(o)
= λsnH(p
s
n) + λ
c
nH(p
c
n),
where we utilize the fact that Pr(o|Λn = 1) = psn(o) and Pr(o|Λn = 0) = pcn(o). Substituting
H(pn|Λn) into the definition of mutual information I(Λn, pn), and considering relationship in
(2.5), we have
I(Λn, pn) = H(pn)− λsnH(psn)− λcnH(pcn) = D(psn, pcn).
Thus, the proof is completed.
WhenD(psn, p
c
n) = I(Λn, pn) = 0, length-n observations are independent of system execution
status, and thus no secret information can be leaked through length-n observations. On the
other hand, when D(psn, p
c
n) = I(Λn, pn) > 0, the dependence of length-n observations and
system status can be measured by the JSD, D(psn, p
c
n), which in turn quantifies the extent to
which system secrecy can be leaked by length-n observations.
2.5 Recursive Characterization
An intruder is likely to discriminate more if he/she observes for a longer period, and
accordingly, our goal is to evaluate the worst-case loss of secrecy, as obtained in the limit:
limn→∞D(psn, pcn). This worst-case JSD provides an upper bound to quantify the amount of
information leaked about secrets. To compute the worst-case loss of secrecy, we first develop
a recursive computation for D(psn, p
c
n), relating it to distributions of length-(n−1) observations
and divergence of length-1 distributions. For o ∈ ∆∗ and δ ∈ ∆, define the distributions of se-
cret versus cover upon a single observation δ following a history of observation o: ps|o(δ), pc|o(δ).
Further, define λs|o as the probability of secrets and λc|o as the probability of covers, respec-
tively, generating length-1 observations following a history of observation o. Following the
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definition of JSD, we have
D(ps|o, pc|o) = H(λs|ops|o + λc|opc|o)− λs|oH(ps|o)− λc|oH(pc|o). (2.6)
The following lemma characterizes the computation of the length-1 JSD given observation o
Lemma 2. Given observation o, the length-1 JSD between ps|o and pc|o can be computed as:
D(ps|o, pc|o) = H(λs|ops|o + λc|opc|o) + H({λs|o, λc|o}) − H(λs|ops|o) − H(λc|opc|o), (2.7)
Proof. By expanding (2.6), we have
D(ps|o, pc|o) = H(λs|ops|o + λc|opc|o) +
∑
δ∈∆
λs|ops|o(δ) log
λs|ops|o(δ)
λs|o
+
∑
δ∈∆
λc|opc|o(δ) log
λc|opc|o(δ)
λc|o
= H(λs|ops|o + λc|opc|o) +
∑
δ∈∆
λs|ops|o(δ) log λs|ops|o(δ)
+
∑
δ∈∆
λc|opc|o(δ) log λc|opc|o(δ)− λs|o log λs|o
(∑
δ∈∆
ps|o(δ)
)
− λc|o log λc|o
(∑
δ∈∆
pc|o(δ)
)
.
Since
(∑
δ∈∆ p
s|o(δ)
)
=
(∑
δ∈∆ p
c|o(δ)
)
= 1, we have
D(ps|o, pc|o) = H(λs|ops|o + λc|opc|o) +
∑
δ∈∆
λs|ops|o(δ) log λs|ops|o(δ)
+
∑
δ∈∆
λc|opc|o(δ) log λc|opc|o(δ)− λs|o log λs|o − λc|o log λc|o
= H(λs|ops|o + λc|opc|o) +H({λs|o, λc|o})
−H(λs|ops|o)−H(λc|opc|o).
Thus, Lemma 2 is established.
Using the above lemma, we can next provide the following recursive computation for JSD.
Lemma 3. The JSD over the distribution of secret and that of cover under length-n observa-
tions can be recursively computed by:
D(psn, p
c
n) = H({λsn, λcn}) +
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)
[
−H({λs|o, λc|o}) + D(ps|o, pc|o)
]
. (2.8)
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Proof. We first define some notations, for simplicity of presentation, as follows:
p˜sn(o) = λ
s
np
s
n(o)
p˜cn(o) = λ
c
np
c
n(o)
p˜s(δ|o) = λs|ops|o(δ)
p˜c(δ|o) = λc|opc|o(δ)
p(δ|o) := λs|ops|o(δ) + λc|opc|o(δ) = Pr(δ|o).
We start by deriving a recursive computation for H(psn) as defined in (2.3), as follows:
H(psn) = −
∑
o∈∆n
psn(o) log p
s
n(o)
= − 1
λsn
∑
o∈∆n
p˜sn(o) log
p˜sn(o)
λsn
= − 1
λsn
∑
o∈∆n−1
∑
δ∈∆
p˜sn(oδ) log
p˜sn(oδ)
λsn
= − 1
λsn
∑
o∈∆n−1
∑
δ∈∆
pn−1(o)p˜s(δ|o) log pn−1(o)p˜
s(δ|o)
λsn
= − 1
λsn
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)
∑
δ∈∆
p˜s(δ|o)
[
log pn−1(o) + log(ps|o(δ)λs|o)− log λsn
]
= − 1
λsn
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o) log pn−1(o)
∑
δ∈∆
p˜s(δ|o)
− 1
λsn
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)
∑
δ∈∆
p˜s(δ|o) log(ps|o(δ)λs|o)
+
1
λsn
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)
∑
δ∈∆
p˜s(δ|o) log λsn
= − 1
λsn
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o) log pn−1(o)λs|o + log λsn
+
1
λsn
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)H(λs|ops|o).
Similarly, H(pcn) as defined in (2.4) can be recursively characterized as:
H(pcn) = −
1
λcn
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o) log pn−1(o)λc|o + log λcn
+
1
λcn
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)H(λc|opc|o).
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Expand (2.5) using the above recursion and Lemma 1, yielding the follows:
D(psn, p
c
n) = H(pn)− λsnH(psn)− λcnH(pcn)
= H(pn)− λsn log λsn − λcn log λcn +
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o) log pn−1(o)λs|o
−
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)H(λs|ops|o) +
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o) log pn−1(o)λc|o
−
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)H(λc|opc|o)
= H(pn) +H({λsn, λcn}) +
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o) log pn−1(o)
+
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)
[
−H(λs|ops|o)−H(λc|opc|o)
]
= H({λsn, λcn}) +
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)
[
−
∑
δ∈∆
p(δ|o) log p(δ|o)
−H(λs|ops|o)−H(λc|opc|o)
]
= H({λsn, λcn}) +
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)
[
H(λs|sps|s + λc|opc|o)
−H(λs|ops|o)−H(λc|opc|o)
]
Finally, by substituting (2.7) in Lemma 2, we have
D(psn, p
c
n) = H({λsn, λcn}) +
∑
o∈∆n−1
pn−1(o)
[
−H({λs|o, λc|o}) + D(ps|o, pc|o)
]
.
Thus, Lemma 3 is established.
The computation of JSD for a PODES is challenging since a finite-state DES under partial
observations is potentially infinite-state (with the state-space being conditional state distribu-
tions following observations). However, a finite-state observer representation is possible, which
we construct and employ for divergence computation. First we map the JSD computation to a
computation based on the state-distribution following an observation. Each observation o ∈ ∆∗
results in a conditional state distribution pi(o), which can be computed recursively as follows:
for any o ∈ ∆∗, δ ∈ ∆: pi() = pi0 and pi(oδ) = pi(o)×Θ(δ)||pi(o)×Θ(δ)|| [Chen and Kumar (2015)], where
pi0 is the initial state distribution, whereas the computation of transition matrix Θ(δ) is given
in Section 2.2. Let Π denote the set of all such conditional state distributions, and for each
pi ∈ Π and n ∈ N, denote Pn(pi) = Pr(o ∈ ∆n : pi(o) = pi), which is the probability that the set
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of all observations of length n, upon which the conditional state distribution is pi. For a state
distribution pi, define the following notations:
λs|pi :=
∑
δ∈∆
piΘ(δ)Is, λc|pi :=
∑
δ∈∆
piΘ(δ)Ic
ps|pi(δ) :=
piΘ(δ)Is
λs|pi
, pc|pi(δ) :=
piΘ(δ)Ic
λc|pi
,
where Is and Ic denote indicator column vectors of same size as number of states, with binary
entries to identify the secret versus cover states (states reached by traces in K versus L−K).
The length-1 JSD, conditioned upon a current state distribution pi (similar to (2.6)), is given
by:
D(ps|pi, pc|pi) = H(λs|pips|pi + λc|pipc|pi)− λs|piH(ps|pi)− λc|piH(pc|pi).
Following the definitions introduced above, and the recursion result in Lemma 3, the next lemma
can be obtained, which characterizes the recursive computation of JSD based on distributions
over system state space.
Lemma 4. For a stochastic DES G, the JSD over the distribution of secret and that of cover
under length-n observations, as given in (2.5), can be rewritten as:
D(psn, p
c
n) = H({λsn, λcn}) +
∑
pi∈Π
Pn−1(pi)
[
−H({λs|pi, λc|pi}) + D(ps|pi, pc|pi)
]
. (2.9)
In the limit when n → ∞, if the distribution Pn(·) over Π converges to P ∗(·), then
limn→∞D(psn, pcn) exists. See for example [Kaijser (1975)] for a condition under which such
a convergence is guaranteed.
2.6 Observer-based Computation of Worst-case Secrecy Loss
For an observer Obs, the computation of limn→∞D(psn, pcn) using (2.9), requires the com-
putation of limn→∞ Pn−1(pi) which can be accomplished with the help of an observer that we
introduce next. An observer tracks the possible system states following each observation, and
also allows the computation of the corresponding state distribution. We let Obs denote an
observer automaton with state set Z ⊆ 2X , so that each node z ∈ Z of the observer is a subset
of system states, i.e., z ⊆ X, and we use |z| to denote the number of system states in z. Obs
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is initialized at node z0 = {x0}, and there is a transition labeled with δ ∈ ∆ from node z to z′
if and only if every element of z′ is reachable from some elements of z along a trace that ends
in the only observation δ. Associated with this transition is the transition probability matrix
Θz,δ,z′ of size |z| by |z′| (a sub-matrix of Θ(δ) matrix given in Section 2.2), whose ijth element
θi,δ,j is given by the transition probability from ith element x of z to jth element x
′ of z′ while
producing the observation δ, and equals α(LG(x, δ, x
′)).
Example 2. Consider the system, specification and refinement models of Fig. 2.3(a), (b)
and (c), respectively, where M(u) = , M(a) = a and M(b) = b. Then, the corresponding
observer Obs is given in Fig. 2.3(d), where each state in observer is a subset of states of the
refined-system GR, and transitions are on observed events that are labeled by their occurrence
transition probability matrices.
Figure 2.3 (a) System model G, (b) specification for secrets, R, (c) refined system model GR,
(d) observer model
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Associated with each observation o ∈ ∆∗, there is a reachable state distribution pi(o) as
discussed earlier. Let the state z be reached in Obs following observation o. Then obviously
the number of positive elements of pi(o) is the same as the number of elements in z. Then
with a slight abuse of notation, we also use pi(o) to denote the row-vector containing only
positive elements, and of same size as the number of elements in the node reached by o in
Obs. Then pi(o) can also be recursively computed as follows: for any o ∈ ∆∗, δ ∈ ∆: pi() = 1
and pi(oδ) =
pi(o)×Θzo,δ,zoδ
||pi(o)×Θzo,δ,zoδ ||
, where zo and zoδ are the nodes reached in Obs following o and oδ
respectively. Then it can be seen that along any cycle in Obs, the distribution upon completing
the cycle is a function of the distribution upon entering the cycle, through a sequence of
transition matrix-multiplications and their normalization. In case of steady-state, those two
distributions will be the same, namely, a fixed point of that function.
Given the Obs with state space Z for system G with secret Xs, and cover Xc, let Θ˜ be a
(
∑
z |z|) × (
∑
z |z|) square matrix, whose ijth block is the |zi| × |zj | matrix
∑
δ Θzi,δ,zj . The
fix point distribution associated with Θ˜ can be obtained by solving pi∗ = pi∗Θ˜, where pi∗ is a
row vector of size
∑
z |z|. For each zi ∈ Z, let p(zi) be the summation of the ith block of pi∗,
then zi is said to be recurrent if p(zi) > 0. Also note that for each z ∈ Z, exists a sufficiently
large N such that p(z) =
∑
o∈∆N : o reaches z pN (o). In other words, p(z) is the probability of all
sufficiently long observations that reach the observer state z. With a slight abuse of notations,
define λs as the summation of the elements of pi∗ corresponding to secret states, i.e., λs := pi∗Is,
and λc = 1− λs.
For a set of recurrent nodes {z1, z2, . . . , zn} that forms a SCC in Obs, define a set of
distributions {pi∗z1 , pi∗z2 , . . . , pi∗zn} to be a set of steady-state distributions if ∀i, j, δ such that
Θzi,δ,zj is defined, the following holds:
pi∗zj =
pi∗ziΘzi,δ,zj
||pi∗ziΘzi,δ,zj ||
,
i.e., pi∗zi represents a steady-state conditional distribution following a single sufficiently long
observation o, that reaches zi. Note that in this case, any other extension of o that also reaches
zi will induce the same conditional distribution pi
∗
zi . There may exist multiple set of steady-state
distributions for a given set of recurrent nodes, denoted as {{pi∗z1,k, . . . , pi∗zn,k}, k ∈ N}. Then if
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steady-state always exists, for any sufficiently long observation that reaches a recurrent node
z, there exists k ∈ N such that pi(o) = pi∗z,k. Denote p(z, k) := Pr[{o | o reaches z and pi(o) =
pi∗z,k}]. Note that when the set of steady state distributions is a singleton, and hence unique,
p(z, k) = p(z).
Let Isz′ and Icz′ be indicator column vectors with binary entries of size |z′| for identifying,
within z′, the secret and cover states, respectively. For each steady-state distribution pi∗z,k of
each recurrent node z, define:
λs|pi
∗
z,k :=
∑
δ∈∆
pi∗z,kΘz,δ,z′Isz′ , λc|pi
∗
z,k :=
∑
δ∈∆
pi∗z,kΘz,δ,z′Icz′
ps|pi
∗
z,k(δ) :=
pi∗z,kΘz,δ,z′Isz′
λs|pi
∗
z,k
, pc|pi
∗
z,k(δ) :=
pi∗z,kΘz,δ,z′Icz′
λc|pi
∗
z,k
.
In the following, we assume the existence of steady-state:
Assumption 1. Assume that for any sufficiently long observations o1 ≤ o2, if Obs reaches the
same node following o1 and o2, then pi(o1) = pi(o2).
Then following the above definitions and Lemma 4, next theorem provides computation of
limn→∞D(psn, pcn), under Assumption 1.
Theorem 2. Consider a system G with secret Xs, and cover Xc. Then under Assumption 1,
the worst case secrecy loss, i.e., JSD between psn and p
c
n when n→∞, is given by:
lim
n→∞D(p
s
n, p
c
n) = H({λs, λc})+
∑
z:z is recurrent
∑
k∈N
p(z, k)
[
−H({λs|pi∗z,k , λc|pi∗z,k})+D(ps|pi∗z,k , pc|pi∗z,k)
]
.
The next assumption assumes that for each set of recurrent nodes in Obs, there only exists
one set of steady-state distributions.
Assumption 2. For each set of recurrent nodes in Obs, k = 1, i.e., the set of steady-state
distributions is unique, so that p(z, k) = p(z).
Theorem 3. Consider a system G with secret Xs, and cover Xc. Then under Assumptions 1
and 2, the worst case secrecy loss, i.e., JSD between psn and p
c
n when n→∞, is given by:
lim
n→∞D(p
s
n, p
c
n) = H({λs, λc}) +
∑
z:z is recurrent
p(z)
[
−H({λs|pi∗z , λc|pi∗z}) + D(ps|pi∗z , pc|pi∗z )
]
.
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Example 3. We revisit Example 2. Then based on Obs of Fig. 2.3(d), the following compu-
tation illustrates the steps of JSD computation.
1.
∑
z |z| = 8 and so Θ˜ is a 8× 8 matrix given as:
Θ˜ =

0 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.3 0.7 0 0
0 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0.7 0 0 0.3
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

Then, pi∗ =
[
0 0 0 0.75 0 0.07 0.05 0.13
]
. Therefore, p(z0) = p(z1) = 0,
p(z2) = 0.75, p(z3) = 0.12 and p(z4) = 0.13.
2. Here Is =
[
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
]T
, Ic =
[
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
]T
. And so,
λs = 0.2 and λc = 0.8.
3. Here z2, z3 and z4 are recurrent nodes, and each of them forms a SCC. We have pi
∗
z2 =
[1 0], pi∗z4 = [1], and while there are multiple solutions to the equation set pi
∗
z3 =
pi∗z3Θz3,a,z3
pi∗z3Θz3,a,z3
and pi∗z3 =
pi∗z3Θz3,b,z3
pi∗z3Θz3,b,z3
, only pi∗z3 = [0.5833 0.4167] is reachable. Thus, each set of recurrent
nodes is a singleton set, and each with a unique fixed-point distribution. Therefore, for
each recurrent node z, p(z, k) = p(z).
4. Here Isz2 = [0 1]T , Icz2 = [1 0]T , Isz3 = [1 0]T , Icz3 = [0 1]T , Isz4 = [1]T and Icz4 =
[0]T . For z2 and pi
∗
z2, λ
s|pi∗z2 = 0, λc|pi
∗
z2 = 1, pc|pi
∗
z2 (b) =
pi∗z2Θz2,b,z2Icz2
λ
c|pi∗z2
= 1, ps|pi
∗
z2 (a) =
pc|pi
∗
z2 (a) = ps|pi
∗
z2 (b) = 0. For z3 and pi
∗
z3, λ
s|pi∗z3 = 0.5833, λc|pi
∗
z3 = 0.4167, ps|pi
∗
z3 (a) =
pi∗z3Θz3,a,z3Isz3
λ
s|pi∗z3
= 0.3, ps|pi
∗
z3 (b) =
pi∗z3Θz3,b,z3Isz3
λ
s|pi∗z3
= 0.7, pc|pi
∗
z3 (a) =
pi∗z3Θz3,a,z3Icz3
λ
c|pi∗z3
= 0.3,
pc|pi
∗
z3 (b) =
pi∗z3Θz3,b,z3Icz3
λ
c|pi∗z3
= 0.7. For z4 and pi
∗
z4, λ
s|pi∗z4 = 1, λc|pi
∗
z4 = 0, ps|pi
∗
z4 (a) =
pi∗z4Θz4,a,z4Isz4
λ
s|pi∗z4
= 0.3, ps|pi
∗
z4 (b) =
pi∗z4Θz4,b,z4Isz4
λ
s|pi∗z4
= 0.7, pc|pi
∗
z4 (a) = pc|pi
∗
z4 (b) = 0.
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5. Then, we have
lim
n→∞D(p
s
n, p
c
n) = H({λs, λc}) +
∑
z:z is recurrent
p(z)
[
−H({λs|pi∗z , λc|pi∗z}) +D(ps|pi∗z , pc|pi∗z )
]
= 0.6043.
Thus, for the system in Fig. 2.3, the worst case secrecy loss, as measured by the limiting
JSD, is 0.6043.
Application to Cache Side-Channel Attack.
For the cache side-channel attack model of Fig. 2.2(b), the observer model is given in Fig.
2.2(c). It can be computed that p(z1) = 1/6, p(z2) = 5/6, pi
∗
z1 = [1], pi
∗
z2 = [0.6 0.4], λs = 1/3
and λc = 2/3. From which, the limiting divergence limn→∞D(psn, pcn) = 0, meaning that no
amount of secrecy could be leaked through the side-channel if the cache line is periodically
evicted by the processor.
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CHAPTER 3. QUANTIFICATION OF DISTRIBUTED SECRECY IN
STOCHASTIC DISCRETE EVENT SYSTEMS UNDER
BOUNDED-DELAY COMMUNICATIONS
In this chapter, we study the secrecy quantification in stochastic PODESs in the presence
of distributed collusive attackers/observers, each with its own local partial observability, and
where the local observers collude and exchange their observations over communication channels
with bounded delays, to be able to infer more about the system secrets [Ibrahim et al. (2016a)].
3.1 d-Delaying&Masking Communication Channel
Fig. 3.1(a) shows the architecture of a system with distributed observers/attackers, where it
is assumed for simplicity and without loss of any generality that there are two local observers at
two local sites I = {1, 2}. Each site has three modules [Qiu and Kumar (2008)]: (i) observation
mask Mi : Σ → ∆i, where ∆i is the set of locally observed symbols and Mi() =  (Mi can
be extended to Σ∗ as follows: Mi() = , and ∀s ∈ Σ∗, σ ∈ Σ,Mi(sσ) = Mi(s)Mi(σ)), (ii)
communication channels C
(d)
ij , j 6= i, i, j ∈ I, which are lossless and order-preserving, but
introduce delays bounded by d, and (iii) observer Obsi, that tracks the system “information-
state” following the arrival of its local observations and the communicated observations received
from other sites j ∈ I, j 6= i.
The communication channel is a “delay-block” with d-bounded communication delay that
holds the transmitted information in First-In-First-Out (FIFO) manner for at most d delay
steps. Accordingly, since there can be at most d events executed by system G between the
transmission and the reception of a message on a channel, the channel has a maximum queue
length d+1. Also, the channel queue evolves whenever a system event occurs, or a transmitted
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Figure 3.1 (a) Distributed secrecy system architecture to (b) equivalent system architecture
observation is delivered to a destination observer, where such arrival and departure events occur
asynchronously. Accordingly, the d-delaying&masking non-stochastic channel model from site-i
to site-j (i 6= j, i, j ∈ I) is of the form, C(d)ij = (Q(d)ij ,Σ ∪ ∆i, β(d)ij , q0), with the elements as
follows. Q
(d)
ij ⊆ Σ∗ denotes the set of states, which are the event traces executed in the system
but their observed values pending to be delivered at the destination. For q ∈ Q(d)ij , it holds that
|q| ≤ d+ 1. Σ∪∆i is the event set of C(d)ij , where Σ is its set of input events and ∆i is its set of
output events. Without loss of generality, we assume that Σ∩∆i = ∅, and ∆i ∩∆j = ∅, (j 6= i)
(otherwise, we can simply rename some of the symbols). q0 =  is the initial state, whereas the
transition function β
(d)
ij is defined as follows:
1. “Arrival” due to an event execution in the system: ∀q ∈ Q(d)ij , ∀σ ∈ Σ, if |q| ≤ d, then
β
(d)
ij (q, σ) = qσ,
2. “Departure” due to a reception at the destination observer: ∀q ∈ Q(d)ij ,∀δi ∈ ∆i, if
Mi(head(q)) = δi, then β
(d)
ij (q, δi) = q\head(q),
3. Undefined, otherwise,
where head(q) is the first event in trace q, and the after operator “\” in q\head(q) returns the
trace after removing the initial event head(q) from the trace q.
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Example 4. A system model G is shown in Fig. 3.2(a). Suppose the observation masks of
two local sites are defined as follows:
• M1(a) = a′, M1(b) = M1(u) = , and
• M2(b) = b′, M2(a) = M2(u) = .
For delay d = 0, Fig. 3.2(b) shows the model C
(0)
12 , and for delay d = 1, Fig. 3.2(c) and
Fig. 3.2(d) show the models C
(1)
12 and C
(1)
21 , respectively. If we follow the trace bab
′ in C(1)21 ,
the states , b, ba and a are traversed sequentially. This corresponds to the situation in which
site-2 sends out its observation b′ to site-1 following the execution of ba in the system, whereas
the observation of event a is pending to be received at site-1.
Figure 3.2 (a) Stochastic PODES G, (b) C
(0)
12 , (c) C
(1)
12 , (d) C
(1)
21
Next, since the operations of masking and delaying can be interchanged, the behaviors
under the schematic of Fig. 3.1(a) are equivalent to those of Fig. 3.1(b). Then, it is clear that
the distributed setting of Fig. 3.1(a) can be converted to a decentralized setting of Fig. 3.1(b),
having an extended system G(d) and local observers having the extended observation masks
{Mi}, defined below. The extended system is given by G(d) = G‖i,j∈I,i 6=jC(d)ij , whereas the
extended system model Gi at site-i (i ∈ I) includes the system model and only the incoming
channel models: Gi = G‖j∈I−{i}C(d)ji . The extended system Gi “generates” events in Σ ∪j 6=i
∆j , which are observed by site-i observer Obsi through an extended observation mask Mi :
Σ∪j∈I−{i}∆j → ∆ = ∪i∈I∆i. Mi acts the same as Mi for events in Σ, whereas it is an identity
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mask for events in ∆j (j 6= i). Formally, it is defined as follows:
Mi(σ) :=
 Mi(σ), σ ∈ Σ,σ, σ ∈ ∆j (j 6= i). (3.1)
Next, we assign probabilities to transitions in Gi as follows. For each state in Gi, the
transition is either one of the system events, or at most one of channel j (j 6= i) events (either
arrival or departure of that channel). Suppose at a system Gi state, with vector of all incoming
channel lengths ~k, the system event is picked with probability p0~k
, and suppose the channel j
(j 6= i) event can occur with probability pj~k such that, p
0
~k
+
∑
j 6=i p
j
~k
= 1. We also require that
when all channels are empty (~k = ~0), p0~k
= 1 (so no channel output can occur when channels
are empty), when any channel is full (~k =
−−−→
d+ 1), p0~k
= 0 (so no channel input can occur when
any channel is full), and if channel j has higher queue length than channel j′ (~kj ≥ ~k′j), then
it can be expected that pj~k
≥ pj′~k (channel j event is more likely than channel j
′ event when
channel j has more number of pending observations). With this choice of selection probability
of events, extended system model is given by Gi = (X×(Πj 6=iQ(d)ji ),Σ∪j 6=i∆j , γ, (x0, ~q0)), where
∀(x, ~q), (x′, ~q′) ∈ X × (Πj 6=iQ(d)ji ), σ ∈ Σ ∪j 6=i ∆j ,
γ((x, ~q), σ, (x′, ~q′)) =
 α(x, σ, x
′)× p0~k if σ ∈ Σ,
pj~k
if σ ∈ ∪j 6=i∆j ,
and otherwise, γ((x, ~q), σ, (x′, ~q′)) = 0.
The computation of an observer transition structure for Gi and the associated transition
matrices {Θ(δ) | δ ∈ ∆}, is exactly the same as in the centralized setting, as is described in
Section 2.2.
Example 5. Continuing Example 4, suppose the delay bound d = 1, so there are three pos-
sibilities for the length of the only channel, ~k = {0, 1, 2}. Let p00 = 1, p01 = 0.5, p02 = 0
(implying p20 = 1 − p00 = 0, p21 = 1 − p01 = 0.5, p22 = 1 − p02 = 1). Fig. 3.3(a) shows the
extended system model G1 at site-1. Following remark 1, suppose R is given in Fig. 3.3(b),
i.e., K = L(R) = a+ ∪ ba∗. The extended plant model at site-1 can be refined with respect
to the specification to identify the secret and cover behaviors as states in the refined plant,
and is given by GR1 = G||C(d)21 ||R. Then, the refinement GR1 is shown in Fig. 3.3(c). So for
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example, at the initial state (0, , 0), the channel is empty, and no channel events occur at this
state (p20 = 0 while p
0
0 = 1). Then, for any system event σ ∈ Σ, γ((0, , 0), u, (2, u,D)) =
α(0, u, 2) × p00 = 0.7 × 1 = 0.7, γ((0, , 0), b, (1, b, 1)) = α(0, b, 1) × p00 = 0.2 × 1 = 0.2, and
γ((0, , 0), a, (1, a, 1)) = α(0, a, 1) × p00 = 0.1 × 1 = 0.1. Whereas, at state (2, u,D), there is
observation u queued up in the channel. Thus, either the system can execute a new event b ∈ Σ,
with probability γ((2, u,D), b, (3, ub,D)) = α(2, b, 3)×p01 = 1×p01 = 0.5, or a channel event can
occur, with probability γ((2, u,D), , (2, ,D)) = p21 = 0.5. The remaining state transitions can
be computed similarly. The models G2 and GR2 at site-2 can be generated in a manner similar
to G1 and GR1 , respectively.
Figure 3.3 (a) Extended system model G1 at site-1, (b) specification for secrets, R, (c) refined
system model GR1
3.2 Jensen-Shannon Divergence-based Distributed Secrecy Quantification
In chapter 2, we presented a way to compute JSD-based measure of secrecy loss for stochastic
PODES when there is a single observer. To compute the secrecy loss in the distributed setting,
resulting from the aggregated observations at any site-i (i ∈ I), which include it’s own im-
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mediate observations and the delayed communicated observations from other distributed sites,
the JSD computation can be carried out over the extended system model Gi, following the
method introduced in Sect. 2.6. The example below illustrates the extended observer structure
and the corresponding JSD based secrecy loss computation in a distributed collusive setting,
respectively.
Example 6. Consider the refined extended system model of Fig. 3.3(c) at site-1, where
M1(a) = a′, M1(b) = M1(u) = , while the extended mask function is the identity func-
tion over the received observations, ∆2 = {b′}. Then, Fig. 3.4(a) shows the extended observer
Obs1.
Then, based on Obs1, the following computation illustrates the steps of JSD computation at
site-1.
1.
∑
z |z| = 14 and so Θ˜ is a 14× 14 matrix with entries:
Θ˜(1, 2) = Θ˜(1, 3) = Θ˜(1, 5) = 0.1, Θ˜(1, 4) = Θ˜(1, 6) = 0.35, Θ˜(2, 7) = Θ˜(2, 8) = Θ˜(7, 7) =
Θ˜(7, 8) = Θ˜(8, 7) = Θ˜(8, 8) = Θ˜(9, 11) = Θ˜(9, 12) = Θ˜(10, 13) = Θ˜(10, 14) = Θ˜(11, 11) =
Θ˜(11, 12) = Θ˜(12, 11) = Θ˜(12, 12) = Θ˜(13, 13) = Θ˜(13, 14) = Θ˜(14, 13) = Θ˜(14, 14) =
0.5, Θ˜(3, 9) = Θ˜(4, 10) = Θ˜(5, 9) = Θ˜(6, 10) = 1 and zeros elsewhere.
Then, pi∗ =
[
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.05 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.35 0.35 ]. Therefore,
p(z0) = p(z1) = p(z2) = 0, p(z3) = 0.1, p(z4) = 0, and p(z5) = 0.9.
2. Here Is =
[
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
]T
,
Ic =
[
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
]T
. And so λs = 0.3 and λc = 0.7.
3. Here z3, and z5 are recurrent nodes, and each of them forms a SCC. We have pi
∗
z3 =
[0.5 0.5], and while there are multiple solutions to the equation set pi∗z5 =
pi∗z5Θz5,a′,z5
||pi∗z5Θz5,a′,z5 ||
, only
pi∗z5 = [0.11 0.11 0.39 0.39] is reachable. Thus, each set of recurrent nodes is a singleton
set, and each with a unique fixed-point distribution. Therefore, for each recurrent node z,
p(z, k) = p(z).
4. Here Isz3 = [1 1]T , Icz3 = [0 0]T , Isz5 = [1 1 0 0]T , Icz5 = [0 0 1 1]T . For z3 and
pi∗z3, λ
s|pi∗z3 = 1, λc|pi
∗
z3 = 0, ps|pi
∗
z3 (a′) =
pi∗z3Θz3,a′,z3Isz3
λ
s|pi∗z3
= 1, ps|pi
∗
z3 (b′) = pc|pi
∗
z3 (b′) =
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pc|pi
∗
z3 (a′) = 0. For z5 and pi∗z5, λ
s|pi∗z5 = 0.22, λc|pi
∗
z5 = 0.78, ps|pi
∗
z5 (a′) =
pi∗z5Θz5,a′,z5Isz5
λ
s|pi∗z5
= 1,
pc|pi
∗
z5 (a′) =
pi∗z5Θz5,a′,z5Icz5
λ
c|pi∗z5
= 1, ps|pi
∗
z5 (b′) = pc|pi
∗
z5 (b′) = 0.
5. Then, we have
lim
n→∞D1(p
s
n, p
c
n) = H({λs, λc}) +
∑
z:z is recurrent
p(z)
[
−H({λs|pi∗z , λc|pi∗z}) +D1(ps|pi∗z , pc|pi∗z )
]
= 0.197.
Note this happens to be the same as JSD measure of secrecy loss at site-2.
In contrast, when there is no collusion among observers (so there is no communication among
the two sites), Fig. 3.4(b) and Fig. 3.4(c) show, respectively, the refined system GR (no
incoming channels and so identical refined model at all sites) and the corresponding site-1
observer structure. The JSD value, computed in same manner as above but with respect to the
observer structure of Fig. 3.4(c), is simply Zero, i.e., no amount of secrets is revealed under
no collusion. This is because for every observation, the probability of it coming from secrets in
K vs from covers in L−K is exactly the same.
Figure 3.4 (a) Observer Obs1 for the system of Fig. 3.3(c), (b) Model G
R for system of Fig.
3.2(a) under no collusion, (c) Observer under no collusion
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CHAPTER 4. A RESILIENCY MEASURE AND ITS EXAMINATION
VIA POWER SYSTEMS
The discussion in this chapter is directed towards Power Systems to make those more
concrete, but the concepts examined and the measure proposed apply generally to any cyber-
physical-system.
4.1 Power System Dynamics and Transient Stability to Large Disturbances
A power system consists of generator (PV) buses, for which generator real power and voltage
magnitude are specified, load (PQ) buses, for which real and reactive load powers are specified,
and occasionally a slack bus, for which the voltage magnitude and phase are specified (typically
zero phase is used, making this bus as a reference). The dynamics at a generator can be modeled
by a pair of differential equations that are referred to as the swing equations [Pai (1989)]. The
swing equations for generator i in an interconnected power system are expressed as:
δ˙i = ωi (4.1)
Miω˙i = −Diωi + Pm,i − Pe,i i = 1, ...n, (4.2)
where the electrical power of generator i satisfies:
Pe,i =
n∑
j=1
|Ei| × |Ej | × [Gij cos(δi − δj) +Bij sin(δi − δj)],
In (4.1), (4.2), Mi is inertia constant; Di is damping constant, Pm,i is mechanical power input;
Pe,i is the electrical power output; δi is angle of internal complex voltage of i
th machine; and ωi
is rotor angle velocity of the ith machine with respect to the reference frequency of the power
system ωr. In (4.3), Ei is i
th machine’s internal complex voltage; Gij = Gji ≥ 0 is the Kron-
reduced equivalent conductance between generator i and generator j; Bij = Bji > 0 is the Kron-
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reduced equivalent susceptance between generator i and generator j, and Yij = Gij+
√−1Bij is
the Kron-reduced equivalent admittance between generator i and generator j (the ijth element
of Kron-reduced equivalent admittance matrix YI of size |n| × |n|). The solution of (4.1)-(4.3)
in steady state yields the so called power flow solutions that yield the magnitude and phase
angle of the voltage at each bus, and the power flowing in each line.
Protective relays can be placed throughout the system to detect large disturbances and
to trigger the opening of circuit breakers to isolate the power system [Varaiya et al. (1985)].
Therefore, the power system can be considered as going through changes in configuration
in three stages, from pre-fault, faulted, to post-fault systems. Accordingly, the underlying
dynamical system can be described by a set of three differential equations:
~˙x(t) = fI(~x(t)), −∞ < t < tf (4.3)
~˙x(t) = fF (~x(t)), tf ≤ t < tc (4.4)
~˙x(t) = fP (~x(t)), tc ≤ t <∞, (4.5)
where ~x(t) is a vector of state variables of the system at time t, fI is initial pre-fault flow, fF
is flow under fault, and fP is post-fault flow. The pre-fault system is at a known initial stable
steady state equilibrium. A large disturbance/fault occurs at time tf , and then, the system is
in the faulted condition before it is cleared at time tc by the protective system operation. The
critical clearing time, denoted as t∗c , is the largest value of tc, so, the trajectory for (4.5) with
initial condition ~x(tc) will converge to a stable equilibrium point of (4.5).
For the sake of illustration, we consider a pair of power systems with identical buses,
generators and loads but with different topologies, as shown in Fig. 4.1. For the 1st power
system, PS1, bus 1 is the slack bus, buses 2 and 3 are the generator buses, and buses 4, 5,
and 6 are the load buses. The machine, load and line data, generation schedule, and reactive
power limits for the regulated buses, along with power flow solution data for PS1 are shown
in Tables 4.1-4.5. The 2nd power system, PS2, has same generation and loads as PS1, but
with different topology, where line L16 appears as line L45. PS2 data are also given in Tables
4.1-4.6. We show that while the two systems are served by the same generators, and serve the
same set of loads, they have different resiliency to the same attacks owing to their topological
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Figure 4.1 (a) System PS1, and (b) System PS2
difference. Here, we provide the modeling data for the power systems PS1 and PS2 that we
use as running examples. The corresponding Matlab code is provided in Appendix A.
Table 4.1 Machine data for both PS1 and PS2
Gen. Ra(PU) Xd(PU) M(sec
2/rad) D(sec/rad)
1 0 0.2 0.106 0.12
2 0 0.15 0.021 0.12
3 0 0.25 0.027 0.12
Table 4.2 Generation schedule for both PS1 and PS2
Bus No. Voltage(Mag.) Generation(MW) Qmin.(Mvar) Qmax.(Mvar)
1 1.06 0
2 1.04 150 0 140
3 1.03 100 0 90
4.2 Modal-Region-of-Stability and Level-of-Resilience
For a nonlinear autonomous system, the stability region is defined as the set of all initial
points from which the autonomous system eventually converges to a stable-equilibrium-point
(SEP) [Khalil (2002)]. For the simplicity of discussion, we assume that the system is lossless,
so the transfer admittance is purely imaginary [Liu and Thorp (1997)]. Equation (4.3) then
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Table 4.3 Load data for both PS1 and PS2
Bus No. Load(MW) Load(Mvar)
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 100 70
5 90 30
6 160 110
Table 4.4 Line data for PS1 (and PS2 with reordering)
Bus No. Bus No. R(PU) X(PU) (1/2B)(PU)
1 4 0 0.225 0.0065
1 5 0 0.105 0.0045
1 6 0 0.215 0.0055
2 4 0 0.035 0.0000
3 5 0 0.042 0.0000
4 6 0 0.125 0.0035
5 6 0 0.175 0.0300
simplifies to:
Pe,i =
n∑
j=1
|Ei| × |Ej | × [Bijsin(δi − δj)]. (4.6)
Define an energy function V (~δ, ~ω), where ~δ = [δ1, . . . , δn]
T and ~ω = [ω1, . . . , ωn]
T , as follows:
V (~δ, ~ω) = VK(~ω) + VP (~δ), (4.7)
where,
VK(~ω) =
1
2
n∑
i=1
Miω
2
i (4.8)
VP (~δ) = −
n∑
i=1
Pm,iδi −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=i
|Ei| × |Ej | × [Bij cos(δi − δj)].
(4.9)
Table 4.5 Power flow solution for PS1
Bus No. Voltage (Mag.) Angle (Degree) Load(MW) Load(Mvar) Generation(Mw) Generation(Mvar)
1 1.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 100.000 116.170
2 1.040 1.217 0.000 0.000 150.000 97.704
3 1.030 0.412 0.000 0.000 100.000 27.919
4 1.008 -1.653 100.000 70.000 0.000 0.000
5 1.019 -1.881 90.000 30.000 0.000 0.000
6 0.960 -6.368 160.000 110.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 4.6 Power flow solution for PS2
Bus No. Voltage (Mag.) Angle (Degree) Load(MW) Load(Mvar) Generation(Mw) Generation(Mvar)
1 1.060 0.000 0.000 0.000 100.000 82.304
2 1.040 -2.391 0.000 0.000 150.000 125.447
3 1.030 -0.370 0.000 0.000 100.000 26.545
4 0.977 -6.511 100.000 70.000 0.000 0.000
5 1.020 -2.661 90.000 30.000 0.000 0.000
6 0.999 -5.287 160.000 110.000 0.000 0.000
Note that VK(~ω) is kinetic energy of the generators and VP (~δ) is the potential energy of the
system, that is stored in the inductive lines of the power grid network.
Using the potential energy function, the swing equations (4.1), (4.2) can be rewritten as
follows:
δ˙i = ωi (4.10)
ω˙i =
1
Mi
[−Diωi − ∂VP
∂δi
(~δ)]. (4.11)
A point (~δe, 0) is an equilibrium of (4.10) and (4.11) if and only if (∂VP /∂~δ)(~δ
e) = 0. Since
~ωe = 0, the energy function at the equilibrium is of form: V (~δe, ~ωe) = VP (~δ
e) [Pai (1989)].
Then, the stability region of a power system can be equivalently studied in the ~δ subspace.
Theorem 4 (Thomas and Thorp (1985)). Consider the reduced-order gradient system:
~˙δ = −∂VP
∂~δ
(~δ). (4.12)
The stability boundary of (4.12) is the potential energy boundary surface of (4.10), (4.11).
For RoS computation, given a SEP ~xe of a system, we propagate in time the boundary of
the backward reachable set of ~xe, i.e., the set of states starting from where trajectories can
reach the SEP, by solving the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) PDE:
φT~x f(~x) + φt = 0. (4.13)
This PDE describes the propagation of the backward reachable set boundary, specified by
φ(~x, t) = 0, as a function of time, in which φT~x = [
∂φ
∂x1
, ..., ∂φ∂xn ], and with terminal conditions:
φ(~x, 0) = ||~x− ~xe|| = 0.
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The backward reachable set of the SEP ~xe (computed using the toolbox of level set methods
[Mitchell (2004)]) is always contained in the region of stability of the SEP ~xe, and as t goes
to infinity, the backward reachable set approaches the true region of stability. Fig. 4.2 shows
the propagation of the backward reachable set boundary of pre-fault system for PS1 and its
convergence to the RoS, which is as described in Theorem 4.
Figure 4.2 PS1 pre-fault RoS computation using backward reachable set
A Modal-Region-of-Stability “modal-RoS” is a graphical representation that captures the
evolution of RoS through the changes of systems modes of configurations under a sequence of
fault and recovery actions. We denote a modal-RoS for a given sequence of fault and recovery
actions as: RoSI → RoSP1 → ... → RoSPm, where I is the initial pre-fault configuration
mode, “→” designates mode change, P1, ..., Pm are the new post-fault configuration modes as
a sequence of m fault and recovery actions take place sequentially in time. Fig. 4.4(a) shows
RoS evolution for PS1 from its pre-fault mode I; its state trajectory when fault is applied at
line L15 causing RoS to be lost is shown in Fig. 4.4(b); post-fault Region-of-Stability RoSP1
in Fig. 4.4(c); and post-fault state trajectory within RoSP1 when clearance is applied within
critical time in Fig. 4.4(d). Then, repeating this process for a sequence of fault and recovery
actions, a modal-RoS can be generated. Fig. 4.3 shows an attack scenario A1 in which three
lines are faulted in the sequence: L15 → L46 → L56, along with recovery actions with certain
clearance times. Accordingly, the modal-RoS : RoSI → RoSP1 → RoSP2, is shown in Fig. 4.5,
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where P1 is post-fault mode after clearing line L15 fault, and P2 is post-fault mode after line
L46 fault is cleared. Note the RoS is lost after the final L56 fault, and so modal-RoS terminates
at this fault.
Figure 4.3 PS1 topology evolution under A1 (transition label F denotes fault, whereas C
denotes its clearance)
Level-of-Resilience (LoR) is determined by comparing the reduction in size of RoS, denoted
as RoSR, and also the reduction in performance (LoPR), as measured along the various modes
of the modal-RoS. (For the moment, we ignore Recovery Time since this is the same for the
two power systems.)
For a given attack scenario, we compute the LoR as follows. First for the initial pre-fault
mode I, compute the RoS of its SEP ~xeI . For any perturbation/low level disturbance (e.g.,
transient change in load) that does not switch the mode, the perturbed state must be within
the RoS of the pre-fault system for the system to remain stable (state trajectory still converge
to ~xeI). When a fault/severe disturbance occurs affecting the system structure, a new Kron-
reduced equivalent admittance matrix YF corresponding to faulted mode is generated; the
system may become unstable without any recovery action rendering the RoS to be an empty
40
Figure 4.4 PS1 RoS evolution (a) pre-fault RoSI , (b) state trajectory when fault occurs at
line L15, (c) RoSP1 for mode P1 after fault is cleared, (d) post-fault state trajectory
within RoSP1 when fault is cleared within critical time
set. The fault can be cleared by isolating the faulted line using circuit breakers. If the fault is
not cleared within a critical time window (t∗c), then overall system might no longer be stable.
When fault is cleared within the critical time, a new Kron reduced admittance matrix YP is
obtained, corresponding to post-fault mode P . The system will stabilize to a new equilibrium
point ~xeP of mode P only if the forward reachable state trajectory under fault starting from
pre-fault ~xeI , i.e., Reach
+
f (~x
e
I) is within the RoS of ~x
e
P . This is captured by the requirement:
tc such that Reach
+
f (~x
e
I , tc) ∈ RoS(~xeP ).
Such pre-fault and post-fault RoSs can continue to be sequenced for any subsequent at-
tacks to yield a sequence of RoSs, a modal-RoS. Associated with each modal-RoS is a Level-of-
Performance-Reduction (LoPR), measured as the percentage of reduction of load served along
the various modes of the modal-RoS. Using the size of RoS and the associated LoPR for the
eventual mode, as defined next, we can measure and compare Level-of-Resilience (LoR). An-
other aspect of resiliency metric is Recovery-Time (RT), which is the time system takes to
detect and recover from an attack or a fault.
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Figure 4.5 PS1 modal-RoS under A1
Definition 1. Given a modal-RoS: RoSI → RoSP1 → ... → RoSPm, the percentage of RoS-
Reduction, RoSR, is given by,
RoSR =
DI −DPm
DI
%, (4.14)
where for a given RoS boundary Ω in n-dimensional space with equilibrium ~xe, D can be
computed as the shortest Euclidean distance between Ω and ~xe:
D = min~q∈Ω||~q − ~xe|| = min~q∈Ω
√√√√ n∑
k=1
(qk − xek)2. (4.15)
Associated with each modal-RoS is a Level-of-Performance-Reduction (LoPR), measured as
the percentage of reduction of load served along the various modes of the modal-RoS.
Definition 2. Given a modal-RoS: RoSI → RoSP1 → ... → RoSPm, Level-of-Performance-
Reduction, LoPR, is defined as percentage of reduction of load served under a given attack
scenario:
LoPR =
∑
loads in mode I preal −
∑
loads in mode Pm preal∑
loads in mode I preal
%.
Definition 3. Given two systems PS1, PS2, and an attack scenario A, LoR(PS1, A) >
LoR(PS2, A) if: [RoSR(PS1, A) < RoSR(PS2, A)]
∨ [[RoSR(PS1, A) = RoSR(PS2, A)] ∧[LoPR(PS1, A) < LoPR(PS2, A)]]
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∨ [[RoSR(PS1, A) = RoSR(PS2, A)] ∧[LoPR(PS1, A) = LoPR(PS2, A)] ∧[RT (PS1, A) <
RT (PS2, A)]].
In power systems, local controls are used for detection and clearance of faults, and so RT
is typically independent of system topology and hence not included in Definition 3, but could
be included for general dynamical systems.
Remark 2. Definition 3 compares Level-of-Resilience under a given attack scenario. This can
be generalized to the case over all possible attack-scenarios by considering the worst-case or
average-case values. This requires enumerating all attack-scenarios, which can be an outcome
of model based generation of attack sequences as discussed in next chapter.
4.3 Experimental Comparison of LoR
In this section, we simulate two different attack scenarios for two different power systems
PS1 (Fig. 4.1(a)) and PS2 (Fig. 4.1(b)), with same generators and loads, but with different
topology, and for each scenario we evaluate and compare their LoR. Consider the first attack
scenario A1, in which three lines are faulted in the sequence: L15 → L46 → L56, and cleared
with certain clearance times by the simultaneous opening of breakers at both ends of this line.
Note that If we apply a third fault at line L56 near bus 5 at time 21 sec, for PS1 then, regardless
of the clearance time, machine 3 no longer runs in synchronism (i.e., its relative angle diverges).
Fig. 4.6 shows the corresponding relative angles under A1. Fig. 4.5 shows the evolution of
RoS for PS1, yielding a modal-RoS as discussed earlier.
We simulate the same attack sequence A1 for the second power system, PS2, shown in Fig.
4.1(b). Note that applying a third fault at line L56 at time 21 sec causes machine 2 to fall
out of synchronism, regardless of the clearance time. Fig. 4.7 shows the system relative angles
with respect to time. Fig. 4.8 shows the RoS evolution for PS2, yielding its own modal-RoS.
For PS1 (respectively, PS2), the protective relay elements across machine 3 (respectively,
machine 2) would interpret the loss of synchronizing condition as an abnormal operating con-
dition and trip machine 3 (respectively, machine 2) [Thompson (2012)], ensuring its protec-
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Figure 4.6 PS1 relative angles under A1
tion. In the end, PS1 has Level-of-Performance-Reduction, LoPR = 25.71%, while for PS2,
LoPR = 45.71%.
Figure 4.7 PS2 relative angles under A1
For comparing LoR of PS1 and PS2, under attack scenario A1, Table 4.7 shows the nearest
distance from equilibrium to boundary associated with each RoS, as well as RoSR. PS2 has
higher RoSR (15.018%) as opposed to PS1 (4.507%). Also, LoPR(PS1, A1) < LoPR(PS2, A1).
Hence, LoR(PS1, A1) > LoR(PS2, A1). Thus, PS1 is more resilient than PS2 to A1.
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Figure 4.8 PS2 modal-RoS under A1
Table 4.7 Size of each RoS (rad) and RoSR(%) under A1
A1 : DI DP (L15) DP (L46) RoSR
PS1 2.840 2.712 2.712 4.507
PS2 2.710 2.374 2.303 15.018
Similarly, under another attack scenario, A2 : L56 → L14 → L46, modal-RoS for PS1
(respectively, PS2) are shown in Fig. 4.9 (respectively, Fig. 4.10).
Table 4.8 shows the nearest distance between equilibrium and boundary associated with each
RoS, as well as RoSR. PS2 has higher RoSR (0.996%) as opposed to PS1 (−0.634%). Also,
for PS1, LoPR = 28.57%, while for PS2, LoPR = 45.71%, so LoR(PS1, A2) > LoR(PS2, A2),
implying that topology PS1 is more resilient as compared to PS2, under both the attack
scenarios.
Table 4.8 Size of each RoS (rad) and RoSR(%) under A2
A2 : DI DP (L56) DP (L14) RoSR
PS1 2.840 2.878 2.858 -0.634
PS2 2.710 2.776 2.683 0.996
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Figure 4.9 PS1 modal-RoS under A2
Figure 4.10 PS2 modal-RoS under A2
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CHAPTER 5. MODEL-BASED GENERATION OF ATTACK
SEQUENCES
In the previous chapter, we introduced the level of resilience of a given system, assessed
under various attack scenarios. In this chapter we present a model-based approach for gen-
erating such attack scenarios. This requires a comprehensive description of the system model
(describing architecture and connectivity, components and behaviors, assets, defenses, vulnera-
bilities, atomic attacks), as well as of security/resiliency properties being investigated. A state
exploration based approach has been proposed to find all behaviors/paths of the model leading
to those reachable states where the specified security/resiliency properties are violated. An
attack graph is a collection of all paths from initial states to such reachable violating states.
Once attack graphs are generated for systems, further analysis can be done to compare the
resiliency levels against the attack scenarios within the graph. Each path in the graph is a sin-
gle attack scenario (sequence of attack/recovery actions resulting in system compromise), and
has an associated (LoR). Then, by enumerating against all possible attack scenarios, we can
compare their worst case or average LoR. In the following sections, we present a model-based
attack graph generation approach and its implementation.
5.1 System Description for Network Example
As a concrete example, we adapt the network system from [Jha et al. (2002); Sheyner et al.
(2002)] shown in Fig. 5.1. There are three hosts: 0, where attacker is located, whereas 1 and
2 are two target hosts. Also, there exists a firewall separating the targets from the rest of the
internet. Host 1 is running ftp, and sshd, while Host 2 is running database and ftp. An IDS
monitors the network traffic between the target hosts and the outside world.
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There are 4 possible atomic attacks:
1. sshd buffer overflow (sbo): This attack immediately gives a root shell on the victim
machine to the remote user. This attack has both stealthy and detectable variants.
2. ftp rhosts (ftpr): Using an ftp vulnerability, the attacker creates an .rhosts file in the ftp
home directory, creating a remote login trust relationship between its machine and the
target machine. This attack is stealthy.
3. remote login (rlog): Using an existing remote login trust relationship between two ma-
chines, the attacker logs into from one machine to another and gets a user shell without
supplying a password. This attack is detectable provided there is an IDS assigned to it.
4. local buffer overflow (lbo): Exploiting a buffer overflow vulnerability on a setuid root file
gives attacker root access on a local machine. This attack is stealthy.
Figure 5.1 Network example
For a detectable atomic attack with an IDS assigned, the IDS triggers an alarm upon the detec-
tion; if an attack is stealthy, the IDS misses it. The hosts are subject to three vulnerabilities:
1. wdir: a writable ftp home directory (this vulnerability is exploitable by ftp rhosts attack)
2. fshell: an executable command shell assigned to the ftp user name (this vulnerability is
also exploitable by ftp rhosts attack)
3. xterm: the xterm executable is vulnerable to the local buffer overflow attack.
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The firewall does not place any access control restrictions on the flow of network traffic. The
traffic flow between (0; 1) and between (0; 2) are monitored by a network-based IDS, whereas
the flow between (1; 2) is not monitored.
5.1.1 Formal System Description for Network Example
We can formally specify the system as follows:
1. Set of hosts H = 0, 1, 2; variable i ∈ {0, 1, 2} (static)
2. System connectivity, C ⊆ H ×H; Boolean cij = 1 iff host i connected to host j (static)
3. System services S; Boolean si = 1 iff service s ∈ {ftp, sshd, data} is running on host i
(dynamic)
4. System vulnerabilities V ; Boolean vi = 1 iff vulnerability v ∈ {dir, fshell, xterm} exists
on host i (static)
5. Attack instances AI ⊆ A × H × H; labeled aij ≡ attack a from source i to target
j, a ∈ {sbo, ftpr, rlog, lbo}, sbo:= sshd buffer overflow, ftpr:=ftp rhosts, rlog:=remote
login, lbo:=local buffer overflow
6. Trust relation T ⊆ H ×H; Boolean tij = 1 iff i is trusted by j (dynamic)
7. Attacker level of privilege L on host i; variable li ∈ {none, user, root} (dynamic)
8. Intrusion detection system IDS : A×H ×H → {0, 1}; Boolean ids(aij) = 1 iff attack a
from source i to target j is detectable (static).
9. A global Boolean dg tracks whether an IDS alarm has been triggered for any previously
executed atomic attack (dynamic).
10. Attack pre-conditions:
• Pre(sboij) ≡ cij = 1 ∧ (li ≥ user) ∧ (lj < root) ∧ (sshdj = 1)
• Pre(ftprij) ≡ cij = 1 ∧ (li ≥ user) ∧ (∃k ∈ H : tkj = 0) ∧ (ftpj = 1) ∧ (wdirj =
1 ∧ fshellj = 1)
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• Pre(rlogij) ≡ cij = 1 ∧ (li ≥ user) ∧ (lj = none) ∧ (tij = 1)
• Pre(lboij) ≡ cij = 1 ∧ (lj = user) ∧ (xtermj = 1)
11. Attack post-conditions:
• Post(sboij) ≡ (lj = root) ∧ (sshdj = 0) ∧ ((i = dg = 0)⇒ (dg = 0)(dg = 1))
• Post(ftprij) ≡ (∀k ∈ H : tkj = 1)
• Post(rlogij) ≡ (lj = user) ∧ (i = 0⇒ dg = 1)
• Post(lboij) ≡ (lj = root)
12. Initial States: l0 = root ∧ (l1 = l2 = none) ∧ (∀ij ∈ H ×H : tij = 0) ∧ (ftp1 = ftp2 =
sshd1 = data2 = 1) ∧ dg = 0.
13. The security property P is that the attacker on host 2 has privilege level below root or
gets detected. This can then be described by a Computational Tree Logic (CTL):
P ≡ AG(l2 < root ∨ dg = 1) ≡ AG(¬(l2 = root ∧ dg = 0)).
5.1.2 Formal System Model for Network Example
A finite state model M of this example is shown in parts in Fig. 5.2, where each state
corresponds to values of dynamic variables, namely, privilege level, trust levels, services running,
and attack detectability status, whereas each state transition corresponds to a single atomic
attack. The model M depicts their evolution under the sequence of atomic attacks. A typical
transition from state s1 to state s2 corresponds to an atomic attack whose preconditions are
satisfied in s1 and whose post-conditions hold in state s2.
5.1.3 Model-based Attack Graph Generation for Network Example
An attack graph is a subgraph of the system model, consisting of all paths from the initial
state leading to a final reachable state where the security property of interest is violated. Fig.
5.3 shows the attack graph, a subgraph of the model M of Fig. 5.2.
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Figure 5.2 Network state model M
5.2 Initial work towards Implementation of Automated Attack Graph
Generation
For implementation of automated attack graph generation, we have started to explore Ar-
chitecture Analysis and Design Language (AADL) [SEI (2004)] for system and property de-
scription.
Fig. 5.4 shows a conceptual architecture of the main components and their interactions.
An architecture model defined in AADL describes the system components and their inter-
faces/connections within the Open-source AADL tool environment (Osate2) [Carnegie-Mellon-
University (2016)]. Osate2 is an upgraded Eclipse [Eclipse-Foundation (2004)] based platform,
an open source development platform for building, deploying and managing Java, C/C++, and
Personal Home Page(PHP ) applications. Osate2 extends the Eclipse platform with textual
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Figure 5.3 Network example attack graph
and graphical editors for AADL, and support for Extensible Markup Language (XML) based
interchange formate [(W3C) (2004)] for AADL, based on its Meta model specification. Osate2
also supports AADL plug-ins [Feiler and Gluch (2012)].
Within an AADL architecture level model, extensions can be provided through Annexes
[Feiler and Gluch (2012)]. An Annex sub-language can provide new categories of model elements
such as behaviors and properties of the components. We use AADL Annex AGREE (Assume
Guarantee Reasoning Environment) plug-in [Rockwell-Collins and Uof-Minnesota (2016a)], an
assume-guarantee-style compositional reasoner that supports behavior and property description
and provides AADL to Luster translation. AGREE relies on model-checking tool JKind
[Sheeran et al. (2000)]- a k-induction bounded model checker for the verification of Luster
model. The k-induction in turn uses a back-end Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT ) solver
Z3 [Rockwell-Collins and Uof-Minnesota (2016b)]. A verified property is guaranteed to be true
for all runs of the system. A falsified property is reported with an explicit counterexample
demonstrating the property violation.
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Figure 5.4 Conceptual architecture for generating an attack scenario
For our networked system application of Section 5.1, we are able to use the AADL/AGREE
tool to generate one instance of an attack scenario, i.e., counter example CE1 := sbo01− >
ftpr02− > rlog12− > lbo02 resulting in the violation of the security property P . By en-
coding this discovered counter example CE1 in disjunct with the property P being checked,
namely P ∨ CE1, a next counterexample satisfies ¬(P ∨ CE1) = ¬P ∧ ¬CE1, i.e., which
is a counterexample of P and is different from CE1. This yielded a new counterexample
CE2 := sbo01− > ftpr12− > rlog12− > lbo02. By repeating this process multiple (but finitely
in number) CEs can be found, yielding the entire “attack graph” for our application example.
The corresponding AADL/AGREE code is provided in Appendix B.
Here, we present some tools summarized in [Feiler and Gluch (2012)] that support the
creation, analysis and validation of AADL models. The META tool-set [Rockwell-Collins
(2012)] extends OSATE and includes SysML-AADL translator, a static model verification tool
(Lute), and a compositional verification tool (AGREE ). The tool-set (TASTE ) [ESA (2016)]
provides a set of graphical editors for creating the software/hardware architectures, and the
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deployment of the software on the hardware. These editors provide a simplified user interface,
eliminating the need to learn the textual syntax of AADL.
For dependability analysis, fault and fault propagation information can be added into an
AADL model through the Error Model Annex [AS5506/1 (2006); Feiler and Rugina (2007)].
Error state machines, and error propagations can be introduced with component specifica-
tions to perform safety and reliability analyses, such as Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA),
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), and Mean Time To Failure (MTTF ) analysis, as
demonstrated in [Redman et al. (2010); Feiler et al. (2010)].
The Behavior Annex [AS5506/2 (2011)] can be deployed as a way of adding behavioral
specifications to components, it can be interfaced with various model checking tools via a
common interchange format language for model checkers called FIACRE designed both as
the target language of model transformation engines from various models such as SDL, UML,
AADL, and as the source language of compilers into the targeted verification tool-boxes, namely
CADP and Tina, which can be generated from AADL models with behavior specifications
[Berthomieu et al. (2008)]
The Hybrid Annex [Ahmad et al. (2014)] defines an annex sub-language of AADL to allow
continuous behavior specifications (e.g., power system dynamics) to be attached to AADL
components. The BLESS Plug-in [Larson et al. (2012)] for OSATE, supports system modeling
in AADL. The BLESS Annex is an extension to the Behavior Annex, to specify assertions,
including time-related assertions, about system behavior and to verify them with a theorem
prover.
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CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
6.1 Summary of Dissertation
In this dissertation, we studied sececy and resiliency quentification for cyber-physical sys-
tems. The main contributions of this dissertation are summarized as follows.
1. An information theoretic measure of secrecy loss in systems modeled as partially-observed
stochastic discrete event systems (stochastic PODES) in centralized setting, in the pres-
ence of a single attacker was presented. The statistical difference, in the form of the
Jensen-Shannon Divergence, between the influence of secrets versus covers on the obser-
vations, is employed to quantify the loss of secrecy. We further showed that the proposed
JSD measure for secrecy loss is equivalent to the mutual information between the dis-
tribution over possible observations and that over possible system status (secret versus
cover).
2. The computation of the worst-case loss of secrecy as obtained in limit over longer and
longer observations was proposed. This computation required developing a recursion re-
lating JSD over length-n sequences to distributions over length-(n-1) sequences through
the 1-step dynamics of underlying system model. We also presented an observer-based
approach and used to aide the computation of JSD in the limit. Illustrative examples,
including one with side channel attack, were provided to demonstrate the proposed com-
putation approach.
3. We extended information theoretic measure for secrecy loss quantification in PODESs to
the distributed collusive setting, in the presence of multiple attackers/observers exchang-
ing their observations, respectively. Channel models are introduced to extend the system
55
model to capture the effect of exchange of observations, and the JSD computation of
the centralized case is applied over the extended model to arrive at the measure for se-
crecy loss. Illustrative examples, were provided to demonstrate the proposed computation
approach.
4. We proposed a measure for comparing Level-of-Resilience (LoR) for power systems. This
measure is based on comparing systems characteristics: percentage of Region-of-stability-
Reduction (RoSR), percentage of Level-of-Performance-Reduction (LoPR), and the sys-
tem recovery-time, under the given attack scenarios. The system state trajectories and
RoS evolution are tracked and captured in form of modal-RoS. Examples were illustrated
to compare the LoR of two different power system topologies under two different attack
scenarios. While the results were employed for power systems, they more generally apply
to any hybrid dynamical system with both continuous and discrete dynamics, where the
discrete state changes (i.e., mode switches) are caused by attack and/or recovery actions.
A note about recovery time, within which a recovery action can be taken, is that for
power systems it corresponds to the time taken to detect and clear faults, which does not
vary dramatically from one system topology to another, and so not considered explicitly
in the resiliency comparison measure of our example. For general hybrid dynamical sys-
tems, however, recovery time can also be included in the comparison measure. The work
presented here provides a framework to do so.
5. The level of resilience of a given system is assessed under various attack scenarios. We
presented a model-based approach for generating such attack scenarios in automated
fashion. This requires a comprehensive description of the system model as well as of
security/resiliency properties being investigated. A state exploration based approach has
been proposed to find all behaviors/paths of the model leading to those reachable states
where the specified security/resiliency properties are violated. Using the AADL/AGREE
tool, we demonstrated how this may be accomplished for a networked system application.
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6.2 Future Work
1. We have studied the quantification of Centralized/Distributed Secrecy of a given stochas-
tic discrete event system. Now when there is flexibility to exercise control in order to
meet some desired secrecy level, designing such control strategies remains a future re-
search direction.
2. Developing a software tool for JSD computation, and performing application studies is
also a future possible direction: knowing the JSD value can help an engineer to perform
secrecy analysis of a system, and revisit the system design for achieving satisfactory
metric.
3. For the general adoption of the proposed measure for comparing Level-of-Resilience
(LoR), one must further provide computationally efficient tool for LoR comparison, and
this can be a subject of further study. For example, one could consider a simplified metric
for measuring level of stability such as stability margin, which is easier to compute than
region-of-stability.
4. Having proposed ways to measure how secure and resilient a given system is against
passive/active attacks, we may next look for ways to enhance these properties, by first
identifying the system weaknesses. Conducting a vulnerability assessment (VA) is a key
step, that includes the process of identifying, quantifying, and prioritizing (or ranking)
the vulnerabilities in a system. A potential new research direction can be to survey
the existing VA methods and tools and propose new features/extensions/applications
to expose vulnerabilities, so as to make fixes to enhance secrecy/resiliency. For in-
stance, vulnerability identification can be done using various static analysis techniques
such as static code analysis ranging from scanning the source text for simple patterns,
to data flow analysis, to advanced model checking, and dynamic analysis such as fault
injection/fuzzing. The severity of exploiting these vulnerabilities can be further quan-
tified and prioritized. Examples of some well known projects/database libraries of sys-
tem vulnerabilities/weaknesses are CCE [MITRE (2014)], CAPEC [MITRE (2015a)],
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CVE [MITRE (2015b)], CWE [MITRE (2015c)], PLOVER [Christey (2006)], OWASP
[OWASP-Foundation (2015)], and WASC [WASC (2005)]. Consider for example the vul-
nerability assessment for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
The vulnerability tests can be performed on Modbus (an application layer protocol used
in SCADA networks) to discover weaknesses/vulnerabilities associated with the lack of
encryption or any other security measures in such a protocol [Zhu et al. (2011)].
5. Using the AADL/AGREE tool, we were able to generate multiple (but finitely in num-
ber) attack scenarios. Future work will involve the automatic generation of the entire
“attack graph”. AGREE limits model-checker to JKind which can model-check only
the invariant properties (that hold in all states), and so one should also look for tools
other than AGREE that interface AADL with different model-checkers. For example,
one may consider the tool COMPASS [Bozzano et al. (2009)] that interfaces AADL to
NuSMV .
6. In our work, we focused on the attack scenarios that are discrete in nature, e.g., the
attack/recovery actions applied for power systems. Future work may also involve con-
tinuous attack actions. For instance, attacker may continuously vary the temperature
magnitude, or a magnetic field. Such more general attack scenarios can be investigated
in the future.
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APPENDIX A. MATLAB CODE FOR POWER SYSTEM EXAMPLE
OF CHAPTER 4
Here, we provide the Matlab source code adapted from [Saadat (1999)], and modified to
simulate a sequence of attack/fault and recovery actions of attack scenario A1, for two differ-
ent power systems PS1 (Fig. 4.1(a)), and PS2 (Fig. 4.1(b)), to compare their LoR. In this
attack scenario, three lines are faulted in the sequence: L15 → L46 → L56, and cleared within
certain clearance times by the simultaneous opening of breakers at both ends of these lines. We
also provide a modified Matlab code used for generating the modal RoS. This code is adapted
from [Jin et al. (2010)] tool, which generates the RoS for dynamical systems based on level
set reachability analysis. This tool is a modified version of the tool-box of Level Set Methods
[Mitchell (2004)].
%Program “trstab” is used in conjunction with the power flow program “lfnewton”.
%Power flow program provides the power, voltage magnitude and phase
%angle at each bus. Also, the load admittances are returned in a
%matrix named “yload”. In addition to the required power flow data,
%transient reactance, and inertia constant of each machine must be
%specified. This is defined in a matrix named “gendata”. Each row
%contains the bus number to which a generator is connected, armature
%resistance, transient reactance, and the machine inertia constant.
%Program “trstab” obtains the pre-fault bus admittance matrix including
%the load admittances. Voltage behind transient reactants are also obtained.
%The reduced admittance matrix before, during, and after fault are found.
%Machine equations are expressed in state variable form and the MATLAB
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%ode23 is used to solve the multi-machine equations. The phase angle
%difference of each machine with respect to the slack bus is plotted.
%The simulation can be repeated for a different fault clearance time, or
%a different fault location.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
We run the main program “trstab” for PS1 (respectively, PS2) three times, to simulate the
attack sequence L15 → L46 → L56, with clearance times: 3, 2.9, and 1.1sec, and collect the
data for relative rotor angle responses.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%
CHP11EX7 %the system data in pre-fault mode, comment this function when running “re-
moveL1L5” mode, and “removeL1L5L4L6” mode separately.
%removeL1L5%uncomment this function to insert new system data after removing line1-line5,
then rerun “trstab”.
%removeL1L5L4L6 %uncomment this function to insert new system data after removing line1-
line5, and line4-line6, then rerun “trstab”.
global Pm f H E Y th ngg
f=60;
ngr=gendata(:,1);
ngg=length(gendata(:,1));
for k=1:ngg
zdd(ngr(k))=gendata(k, 2)+j*gendata(k,3);
H(k)=gendata(k,4);
end
%%%Ep, and Pm are assumed constant, and equal to the pre-fault mode generated values, the
following commands are commented when running“trstab” against L46 → L56 attacks/faults.
for k=1:ngg
I=conj(S(ngr(k)))/conj(V(ngr(k)));
Ep(k) = V(ngr(k))+zdd(ngr(k))*I;
Px(k)=real(S(ngr(k)));
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end
E=abs(Ep); d0=angle(Ep);
%%%%%%%%%%%%
%the following values for Ep, and Pm are obtained from the pre-fault mode, uncomment them
when running “trstab” against L46 → L56 attacks/faults.
%Ep=[1.2930 1.2006 1.1243];
%Pm=[-0.2123 0.0787 0.1335];
%E=Ep;
%d0=[ 0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 ];%the rotor angle data is obtained from the first run of “trstab”
against the first fault L15.
%the second fault in the sequence is applied with an initial point being the post fault L15 data.
%d0=[0.1233 0.1817 0.2614]; %the rotor angle data is obtained from the second run of “trstab”
against the second fault L46.
%the third fault in the sequence is applied with an initial point being the post fault L46 data.
%%%%%%%%%%%%
for k=1:ngg
nl(nbr+k) = nbus+k;
nr(nbr+k) = gendata(k, 1);
R(nbr+k) = real(zdd(ngr(k)));
X(nbr+k) = imag(zdd(ngr(k)));
Bc(nbr+k) = 0;
a(nbr+k) = 1.0;
yload(nbus+k)=0;
end
nbr1=nbr; nbus1=nbus;
nbrt=nbr+ngg;
nbust=nbus+ngg;
linedata=[nl, nr, R, X, -j*Bc, a];
[Y bus, Y bf ]=ybusbf(linedata, yload, nbus1,nbust);
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fprintf(’n Pre-fault reduced bus admittance matrix n’)
Ybf
Y=abs(Ybf); th=angle(Ybf);
%%%%%%%%%%%%
%comment the following commands when running “trstab” against L46 → L56 attacks/faults
Pm=zeros(1, ngg);
disp([′G(i)E′′(i)d0(i)Pm(i)′])
for ii = 1:ngg
for jj = 1:ngg
Pm(ii) = Pm(ii) + E(ii)*E(jj)*imag(Ybf(ii, jj))*sin(d0(ii)-d0(jj));
end,
fprintf(’ %g’, ngr(ii)), fprintf(’ %8.4f’,E(ii)), fprintf(’ %8.4f’, 180/pi*d0(ii))
fprintf(’ %8.4f n’,Pm(ii))
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%
respfl=’y’;
t3 = 0;
w3=zeros(1, length(d0));
x3 = [d0, w3];
tol=0.0001;
tspan=[t3, 1];
[t3, xm] =ode23(’pfpek’, tspan, x3);
while respfl ==’y’ | respfl==’Y’
nf=input(’Enter faulted bus No. − > ’);
fprintf(’n Faulted reduced bus admittance matrix n’)
Ydf=ybusdf(Ybus, nbus1, nbust, nf)
[Y af ]=YBUSAF(linedata, yload, nbus1,nbust, nbrt);
fprintf(’n Postfault reduced bus admittance matrix n’)
Yaf
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resptc=’y’;
while resptc ==’y’ | resptc==’Y’
tc=input(’Enter clearing time of fault in sec. tc = ’);
tf=input(’Enter final simulation time in sec. tf = ’);
clear t x del
% during fault response
t0 = 1;
w0=zeros(1, length(d0));
x0 = [d0, w0];
tol=0.0001;
Y=abs(Ydf); th=angle(Ydf);
tspan=[t0, tc];
[t1, xf ] =ode23(’dfpek’, tspan, x0);
%after fault response x0c =xf(length(xf), :);
Y=abs(Yaf); th=angle(Yaf);
tspan = [tc, tf ]; [t2, xc] =ode23(’afpek’, tspan, x0c);
t =[t3; t1; t2]; x =[xm;xf ;xc]; fprintf(’n Fault is cleared at %4.3f Sec. n’, tc)
for k=1:nbus
if kb(k)==1
ms=k; else, end
end
fprintf(’n Phase angle difference of each machine n’)
fprintf(’with respect to the slack in rad.n’)
fprintf(’ t - sec’)
kk=0;
for k=1:ngg
if k
sim =ms
kk=kk+1;
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del(:,kk)=(x(:,k)-x(:,ms));
fprintf(’ d(%g,’,ngr(k)), fprintf(’%g)’, ngr(ms))
else, end
end
fprintf(’ n’)
disp([t, del])
h=figure; figure(h)
plot(t, del,’linewidth’,3)
legend(’del21’,’del31’)
xlabel(’t, sec’), ylabel(’Delta, rad’), grid
resp=0;
while strcmp(resp, ’n’)∼ =1 & strcmp(resp, ’N’)∼ =1 & strcmp(resp, ’y’)∼ =1 & strcmp(resp,
’Y’)∼ =1
resp=input(’Another clearing time of fault? Enter ”y” or ”n” within quotes − > ’);
if strcmp(resp, ’n’)∼ =1 & strcmp(resp, ’N’)∼=1 & strcmp(resp, ’y’)∼ =1 & strcmp(resp,
’Y’)∼ =1
fprintf(’n Incorrect reply, try again nn’), end
end
resptc=resp;
end
resp2=0;
while strcmp(resp2, ’n’)∼ =1 & strcmp(resp2, ’N’)∼ =1 & strcmp(resp2, ’y’)∼ =1 & str-
cmp(resp2, ’Y’)∼ =1
resp2=input(’Another fault location: Enter ”y” or ”n” within quotes − > ’);
if strcmp(resp2, ’n’)∼ =1 & strcmp(resp2, ’N’)∼ =1 & strcmp(resp2, ’y’)∼ =1 & strcmp(resp2,
’Y’)∼ =1
fprintf(’n Incorrect reply, try again nn’), end
respf1=resp2;
end
64
if respf1==’n’ | respf1==’N’, return, else, end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
CHP11EX7
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
basemva = 100; accuracy = 0.0001; maxiter = 10;
Busd=[ 1 1 1.06 0.0 00.00 00.00 0.00 00.00 0 0 0
2 2 1.04 0.0 00.00 00.00 150.00 00.00 0 140 0
3 2 1.03 0.0 00.00 00.00 100.00 00.00 0 90 0
4 0 1.0 0.0 100.00 70.00 00.00 00.00 0 0 0
5 0 1.0 0.0 90.00 30.00 00.00 00.00 0 0 0
6 0 1.0 0.0 160.00 110.00 00.00 00.00 0 0 0];
linedata=[1 4 0 0.225 0.0065 1.0
1 5 0 0.105 0.0045 1.0
1 6 0 0.215 0.0055 1.0
2 4 0 0.035 0.0000 1.0
3 5 0 0.042 0.0000 1.0
4 6 0 0.125 0.0035 1.0
5 6 0 0.175 0.0300 1.0];
Lfybus
Lfnewton
Busout
% Gen. Ra Xd’ H
gendata=[ 1 0 0.20 20
2 0 0.15 4
3 0 0.25 5];
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%this program obtains th Bus Admittance Matrix for power flow solution [Saadat (1999)].
Lfybus
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
j=sqrt(-1); i = sqrt(-1);
nl = linedata(:,1); nr = linedata(:,2); R = linedata(:,3);
X = linedata(:,4); Bc = j*linedata(:,5); a = linedata(:, 6);
nbr=length(linedata(:,1)); nbus = max(max(nl), max(nr));
Z = R + j*X; y= ones(nbr,1)./Z;
for n = 1:nbr
if a(n) <= 0 a(n) = 1; else end
Ybus=zeros(nbus,nbus);
for k=1:nbr;
Ybus(nl(k),nr(k))=Ybus(nl(k),nr(k))-y(k)/a(k);
Ybus(nr(k),nl(k))=Ybus(nl(k),nr(k));
end
end
for n=1:nbus
for k=1:nbr
if nl(k)==n
Ybus(n,n) = Ybus(n,n)+y(k)/(a(k)2ˆ) + Bc(k);
elseif nr(k)==n
Ybus(n,n) = Ybus(n,n)+y(k) +Bc(k);
else, end
end
end
clear Pgg
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%power flow solution by Newton-Raphson method [Saadat (1999)].
Lfnewton
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
ns=0; ng=0; Vm=0; delta=0; yload=0; deltad=0;
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nbus = length(Busd(:,1));
for k=1:nbus
n=Busd(k,1);
kb(n)=Busd(k,2); Vm(n)=Busd(k,3); delta(n)=Busd(k, 4);
Pd(n)=Busd(k,5); Qd(n)=Busd(k,6); Pg(n)=Busd(k,7); Qg(n) = Busd(k,8);
Qmin(n)=Busd(k, 9); Qmax(n)=Busd(k, 10);
Qsh(n)=Busd(k, 11);
if Vm(n) <= 0 Vm(n) = 1.0; V(n) = 1 + j*0;
else delta(n) = pi/180*delta(n);
V(n) = Vm(n)*(cos(delta(n)) + j*sin(delta(n)));
P(n)=(Pg(n)-Pd(n))/basemva;
Q(n)=(Qg(n)-Qd(n)+ Qsh(n))/basemva;
S(n) = P(n) + j*Q(n);
end
end
for k=1:nbus
if kb(k) == 1, ns = ns+1; else, end
if kb(k) == 2 ng = ng+1; else, end
ngs(k) = ng;
nss(k) = ns;
end
Ym=abs(Ybus); t = angle(Ybus);
m=2*nbus-ng-2*ns;
maxerror = 1; converge=1;
iter = 0;
clear A DC J DX
while maxerror >= accuracy & iter <= maxiter
for i=1:m
for k=1:m
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A(i,k)=0;
end, end
iter = iter+1;
for n=1:nbus
nn=n-nss(n);
lm=nbus+n-ngs(n)-nss(n)-ns;
J11=0; J22=0; J33=0; J44=0;
for i=1:nbr
if nl(i) == n | nr(i) == n
if nl(i) == n, l = nr(i); end
if nr(i) == n, l = nl(i); end
J11=J11+ Vm(n)*Vm(l)*Ym(n,l)*sin(t(n,l)- delta(n) + delta(l));
J33=J33+ Vm(n)*Vm(l)*Ym(n,l)*cos(t(n,l)- delta(n) + delta(l));
if kb(n)∼=1
J22=J22+ Vm(l)*Ym(n,l)*cos(t(n,l)- delta(n) + delta(l));
J44=J44+ Vm(l)*Ym(n,l)*sin(t(n,l)- delta(n) + delta(l));
else, end
if kb(n) ∼= 1 & kb(l) ∼=1
lk = nbus+l-ngs(l)-nss(l)-ns;
ll = l -nss(l);
A(nn, ll) =-Vm(n)*Vm(l)*Ym(n,l)*sin(t(n,l)- delta(n) + delta(l));
if kb(l) == 0
A(nn, lk) =Vm(n)*Ym(n,l)*cos(t(n,l)- delta(n) + delta(l));end
if kb(n) == 0
A(lm, ll) =-Vm(n)*Vm(l)*Ym(n,l)*cos(t(n,l)- delta(n)+delta(l)); end
if kb(n) == 0 & kb(l) == 0
A(lm, lk) =-Vm(n)*Ym(n,l)*sin(t(n,l)- delta(n) + delta(l));end
else end
else , end
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end
Pk = Vm(n)2ˆ*Ym(n,n)*cos(t(n,n))+J33;
Qk = -Vm(n)2ˆ*Ym(n,n)*sin(t(n,n))-J11;
if kb(n) == 1 P(n)=Pk; Q(n) = Qk; end
if kb(n) == 2 Q(n)=Qk;
if Qmax(n) ∼= 0
Qgc = Q(n)*basemva + Qd(n) - Qsh(n);
if iter <= 7
if iter4 > 2
if Qgc < Qmin(n),
Vm(n) = Vm(n) + 0.01;
elseif Qgc > Qmax(n),
Vm(n) = Vm(n) - 0.01;end
else, end
else,end
else,end
end
if kb(n) ∼= 1
A(nn,nn) = J11;
DC(nn) = P(n)-Pk;
end
if kb(n) == 0
A(nn,lm) = 2*Vm(n)*Ym(n,n)*cos(t(n,n))+J22;
A(lm,nn)= J33;
A(lm,lm) =-2*Vm(n)*Ym(n,n)*sin(t(n,n))-J44;
DC(lm) = Q(n)-Qk;
end
end
DX=A\DC’;
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for n=1:nbus
nn=n-nss(n);
lm=nbus+n-ngs(n)-nss(n)-ns;
if kb(n) ∼= 1
delta(n) = delta(n)+DX(nn); end
if kb(n) == 0
Vm(n)=Vm(n)+DX(lm); end
end
maxerror=max(abs(DC));
if iter == maxiter & maxerror > accuracy
fprintf(’\nWARNING: Iterative solution did not converged after ’)
fprintf(’%g’, iter), fprintf(’ iterations.\n \n’)
fprintf(’Press Enter to terminate the iterations and print the results \n’)
converge = 0; pause, else, end
end
if converge ∼= 1
tech= (’ ITERATIVE SOLUTION DID NOT CONVERGE’); else,
tech=(’ Power Flow Solution by Newton-Raphson Method’);
end
V = Vm.*cos(delta)+j*Vm.*sin(delta);
deltad=180/pi*delta;
i=sqrt(-1);
k=0;
for n = 1:nbus
if kb(n) == 1
k=k+1;
S(n)= P(n)+j*Q(n)
Pg(n) = P(n)*basemva + Pd(n)
Qg(n) = Q(n)*basemva + Qd(n) - Qsh(n);
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Pgg(k)=Pg(n)
Qgg(k)=Qg(n);
elseif kb(n) ==2
k=k+1;
S(n)=P(n)+j*Q(n)
Qg(n) = Q(n)*basemva + Qd(n) - Qsh(n);
Pgg(k)=Pg(n)
Qgg(k)=Qg(n);
end
yload(n) = (Pd(n)- j*Qd(n)+j*Qsh(n))/(basemva*Vm(n)2ˆ);
end
Busd(:,3)=Vm’; Busd(:,4)=deltad’;
Pgt = sum(Pg); Qgt = sum(Qg); Pdt = sum(Pd); Qdt = sum(Qd); Qsht = sum(Qsh);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%this program prints the power flow solution in a tabulated form on the screen [Saadat (1999)].
Busout
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
disp(tech)
fprintf(’ Maximum Power Mismatch = %g \n’, maxerror)
fprintf(’ No. of Iterations = %g \n \n’, iter)
head =[’ Bus Voltage Angle ——Load—— —Generation— Injected’
’ No. Mag. Degree MW Mvar MW Mvar Mvar ’
’ ’];
disp(head)
for n=1:nbus
fprintf(’ %5g’, n), fprintf(’ %7.3f’, Vm(n)),
fprintf(’ %8.3f’, deltad(n)), fprintf(’ %9.3f’, Pd(n)),
fprintf(’ %9.3f’, Qd(n)), fprintf(’ %9.3f’, Pg(n)),
fprintf(%9.3f ’, Qg(n)), fprintf(’ %8.3f \n’, Qsh(n))
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end
fprintf(’ \n’), fprintf(’ Total ’)
fprintf(’ %9.3f’, Pdt), fprintf(’ %9.3f’, Qdt),
fprintf(’ %9.3f’, Pgt), fprintf(’ %9.3f’, Qgt), fprintf(’ %9.3f \n\n’, Qsht)
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%this function forms the bus admittance matrix including load admittances before fault [Saa-
dat (1999)].
ybusbf
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [Y bus, Y bf ] = ybusbf(linedata, yload, nbus1, nbust)
global Pm f H E Y th ngg
Lfybus
for k=1:nbust
Ybus(k,k)=Ybus(k,k)+yload(k);
end
YLL=Ybus(1:nbus1, 1:nbus1);
YGG = Ybus(nbus1+1:nbust, nbus1+1:nbust);
YLG = Ybus(1:nbus1, nbus1+1:nbust);
Ybf=YGG-YLG.’*inv(YLL)*YLG;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%state variable representation of the multi-machine system of pre-fault, during-fault, and post-
fault modes [Saadat (1999)].
pfpek
%dfpek
%afpek
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function xdot = pfpek(t,x)
global Pm f H E Y th ngg
Pe=zeros(1, ngg);
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for ii = 1:ngg
for jj = 1:ngg
Pe(ii) = Pe(ii) + E(ii)*E(jj)*Y(ii, jj)*sin(th(ii, jj))*sin(x(ii)-x(jj));
%we assume that the system is lossless, so the transfer admittance is purely imaginary.
end, end
for k=1:ngg
xdot(k)=x(k+ngg);
xdot(k+ngg)=(pi*f)/H(k)*(Pm(k)-Pe(k)-0.12*x(k+ngg));
end
xdot=xdot’;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%this function forms the bus admittance matrix including load admittances during fault [Saa-
dat (1999)].
ybusdf
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function Ypf=ybusdf(Ybus, nbus1, nbust, nf)
global Pm f H E Y th ngg
nbusf=nbust-1;
Ybus(:,nf:nbusf)=Ybus(:,nf+1:nbust);
Ybus(nf:nbusf,:)=Ybus(nf+1:nbust,:);
YLL=Ybus(1:nbus1-1, 1:nbus1-1)
YGG = Ybus(nbus1:nbusf, nbus1:nbusf)
YLG = Ybus(1:nbus1-1, nbus1:nbusf)
Ypf=YGG-YLG.’*inv(YLL)*YLG;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%this function forms the bus admittance matrix including load admittances after removal of
faulted line [Saadat (1999)].
ybusaf
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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function [Yaf]=ybusaf(linedata, yload, nbus1,nbust, nbrt);
global Pm f H E Y th ngg
nl=linedata(:, 1); nr=linedata(:, 2);
remove = 0;
while remove ∼= 1
fprintf(’\n Fault is cleared by opening a line. The bus to bus nos. of the \n’)
fprintf(’line to be removed must be entered within brackets, e.g. [5, 7] \n’)
fline=input(’Enter the bus to bus Nos. of line to be removed − > ’);
nlf=fline(1); nrf=fline(2);
for k=1:nbrt
if nl(k)==nlf & nr(k)==nrf
remove = 1;
m=k;
else, end
end
if remove ∼= 1
fprintf(’\n The line to be removed does not exist in the line data. try again. \n \n’)
end
end
linedat2(1:m-1,:)= linedata(1:m-1,:);
linedat2(m:nbrt-1,:)=linedata(m+1:nbrt,:);
linedat0=linedata;
linedata=linedat2;
Lfybus
for k=1:nbust
Ybus(k,k)=Ybus(k,k)+yload(k);
end
YLL=Ybus(1:nbus1, 1:nbus1);
YGG = Ybus(nbus1+1:nbust, nbus1+1:nbust);
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YLG = Ybus(1:nbus1, nbus1+1:nbust);
Yaf=YGG-YLG.’*inv(YLL)*YLG;
linedata=linedat0;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
The following modified Matlab code is used to generate the modal-RoS for PS1 (respectively,
PS2) under attack scenario A1, which is adapted from [Jin et al. (2010)] and [Mitchell (2004)].
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
function [data, g, data0] = SingleInfinite(accuracy);
%parameters:
%reach Implicit surface function for unsafe (reach) set in mode 1.
%g Grid structure on which data is computed.
%avoid Implicit surface function for safe to switch set (avoid)
%in mode 1.
%data0 Implicit surface function for target set.
run (’addPathToKernel’);
% Integration Parameters.
Tmax =5.0;
PlotSteps = 15;
T0 = 0;
SingleStep = 0;
tPlot = (Tmax - T0) / (PlotSteps - 1);
Small = 100 * eps;
DissType = ’global’;
% What level set should we view?
level = 0;
fig = figure;
if (nargin <1)
accuracy = ’medium’;
end
75
DisplayType = ’contour’;
g.dim = 2;
g.min = [−10;−10];
g.max = [10; 10];
g.bdry = @addGhostExtrapolate;
g.N = [80; 120];
g = processGrid(g);
%create initial conditions (rectangle).
data = ShapeSphere(g, [0.0560;0.0783], 0.3);%the pre-fault equilibrium point is obtained from
program “trstab”.
data0 = data;
data4 = ShapeSphere(g, [0.0643; 0.1202], .3);%the post-fault L15 equilibrium point is obtained
from Program “trstab”.
data00000=data4;
data2 = ShapeSphere(g, [0.0584;0.1381], .3);%the post-fault L46 equilibrium point is obtained
from Program “trstab”.
data000=data2;
%pre-fault mode dynamics following (4.12).
velocitypre = {1.781184*sin(g.xs{1})+(0.93686*sin(g.xs{1}-g.xs{2}))-0.0787; ...
1.438636* sin(g.xs{2})+(0.9368611*sin(g.xs{2}-g.xs{1}))-0.1335};
%post-fault L15 mode dynamics following (4.12).
velocitypostb15 = {1.9219432*sin(g.xs{1})+(0.801425*sin(g.xs{1}-g.xs{2}))-0.0787; ...
0.74031204* sin(g.xs{2})+(0.8014251*sin(g.xs{2}-g.xs{1}))-0.1335};
%post-fault L46 mode dynamics following (4.12).
velocitypostb46 ={1.78137464*sin(g.xs{1})+(0.3165135048*sin(g.xs{1}-g.xs{2}))-0.0787; ...
0.7870026682* sin(g.xs{2})+(0.3165135048*sin(g.xs{2}-g.xs{1}))-0.1335};
[final, steptime] = findReachSet(g, data0, velocitypre, accuracy, ...
Tmax, tPlot, fig, 1, []);
[final5, steptime] = findReachSet(g, data00000, velocitypostb15, accuracy, ...
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Tmax, tPlot, fig, 1, []);
[final3, steptime] = findReachSet(g, data000, velocitypostb46, accuracy, ...
Tmax, tPlot, fig, 1, []);
%the collected data for the state variables of pre-fault, during-fault, and post-fault modes,
obtained from program “trstab”.
xm =[ 0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0 0 0
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000];
xf =[ 0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0 0 0
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0005
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 -0.0008 0.0007 0.0025
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 -0.0038 0.0035 0.0124
0.1463 0.2025 0.2252 -0.0190 0.0171 0.0608
0.1457 0.2031 0.2271 -0.0470 0.0403 0.1459
0.1439 0.2046 0.2326 -0.0862 0.0675 0.2573
0.1395 0.2077 0.2453 -0.1384 0.0922 0.3947
0.1305 0.2129 0.2704 -0.2018 0.0978 0.5477
0.1209 0.2168 0.2961 -0.2457 0.0797 0.6474
0.1110 0.2192 0.3218 -0.2785 0.0494 0.7201
0.1013 0.2203 0.3466 -0.3033 0.0134 0.7749
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0.0948 0.2203 0.3633 -0.3172 -0.0132 0.8057
0.0879 0.2197 0.3807 -0.3297 -0.0419 0.8337
0.0790 0.2181 0.4031 -0.3434 -0.0800 0.8651
0.0674 0.2146 0.4323 -0.3581 -0.1299 0.8996
0.0528 0.2082 0.4690 -0.3724 -0.1908 0.9349
0.0346 0.1973 0.5148 -0.3859 -0.2612 0.9696
0.0113 0.1795 0.5732 -0.3985 -0.3382 1.0033
-0.0212 0.1489 0.6553 -0.4121 -0.4185 1.0367
-0.0600 0.1073 0.7524 -0.4268 -0.4730 1.0628
-0.0975 0.0654 0.8449 -0.4417 -0.4932 1.0790
-0.1344 0.0248 0.9341 -0.4571 -0.4943 1.0895
-0.1744 -0.0174 1.0281 -0.4738 -0.4871 1.0970
-0.2217 -0.0646 1.1358 -0.4917 -0.4793 1.1026
-0.2774 -0.1178 1.2586 -0.5085 -0.4795 1.1066
-0.3450 -0.1813 1.4037 -0.5224 -0.4928 1.1094
-0.4077 -0.2410 1.5359 -0.5302 -0.5106 1.1108
-0.4797 -0.3114 1.6861 -0.5355 -0.5290 1.1117
-0.5873 -0.4190 1.9085 -0.5411 -0.5427 1.1123
-0.6814 -0.5133 2.1012 -0.5453 -0.5461 1.1125
-0.7320 -0.5639 2.2042 -0.5472 -0.5467 1.1126];
xc =[-0.7320 -0.5639 2.2042 -0.5472 -0.5467 1.1126
-0.7349 -0.5668 2.2099 -0.5311 -0.5191 1.0259
-0.7467 -0.5779 2.2302 -0.4633 -0.4222 0.6892
-0.7575 -0.5876 2.2438 -0.3985 -0.3582 0.4098
-0.7666 -0.5960 2.2512 -0.3391 -0.3211 0.1886
-0.7738 -0.6032 2.2535 -0.2867 -0.3012 0.0180
-0.7790 -0.6089 2.2527 -0.2453 -0.2908 -0.1033
-0.7827 -0.6137 2.2502 -0.2109 -0.2835 -0.1968
-0.7868 -0.6196 2.2448 -0.1679 -0.2736 -0.3069
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-0.7905 -0.6266 2.2350 -0.1171 -0.2563 -0.4313
-0.7933 -0.6341 2.2195 -0.0593 -0.2232 -0.5723
-0.7942 -0.6411 2.1962 0.0052 -0.1619 -0.7386
-0.7932 -0.6449 2.1709 0.0615 -0.0844 -0.8984
-0.7907 -0.6461 2.1430 0.1149 0.0088 -1.0664
-0.7859 -0.6437 2.1045 0.1804 0.1427 -1.2938
-0.7781 -0.6355 2.0533 0.2600 0.3219 -1.5965
-0.7664 -0.6191 1.9855 0.3600 0.5520 -2.0009
-0.7494 -0.5912 1.8943 0.4910 0.8413 -2.5470
-0.7242 -0.5468 1.7674 0.6710 1.2014 -3.2962
-0.6846 -0.4761 1.5784 0.9365 1.6483 -4.3591
-0.6377 -0.3960 1.3655 1.2279 2.0208 -5.4341
-0.5890 -0.3196 1.1555 1.5019 2.2442 -6.3246
-0.5358 -0.2449 0.9376 1.7664 2.3153 -7.0322
-0.4729 -0.1697 0.6957 2.0287 2.1946 -7.5157
-0.4036 -0.1037 0.4498 2.2509 1.8572 -7.6343
-0.3361 -0.0565 0.2317 2.3985 1.3873 -7.3808
-0.2734 -0.0273 0.0483 2.4744 0.8828 -6.8665
-0.2209 -0.0133 -0.0906 2.4919 0.4477 -6.2611
-0.1762 -0.0085 -0.1977 2.4729 0.0914 -5.6396
-0.1483 -0.0087 -0.2593 2.4449 -0.1169 -5.2076
-0.1207 -0.0111 -0.3159 2.4045 -0.3067 -4.7520
-0.0931 -0.0157 -0.3683 2.3508 -0.4779 -4.2675
-0.0643 -0.0226 -0.4181 2.2798 -0.6318 -3.7340
-0.0338 -0.0322 -0.4649 2.1870 -0.7614 -3.1419
-0.0019 -0.0444 -0.5072 2.0679 -0.8548 -2.4890
0.0312 -0.0590 -0.5426 1.9177 -0.8968 -1.7782
0.0648 -0.0753 -0.5682 1.7316 -0.8704 -1.0168
0.0980 -0.0922 -0.5807 1.5044 -0.7583 -0.2152
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0.1290 -0.1071 -0.5762 1.2359 -0.5489 0.5981
0.1517 -0.1158 -0.5571 0.9841 -0.3005 1.2573
0.1675 -0.1190 -0.5296 0.7585 -0.0486 1.7766
0.1774 -0.1181 -0.5003 0.5742 0.1717 2.1561
0.1836 -0.1148 -0.4715 0.4218 0.3605 2.4412
0.1889 -0.1069 -0.4291 0.2292 0.6042 2.7651
0.1912 -0.0921 -0.3710 0.0073 0.8861 3.0870
0.1889 -0.0699 -0.3013 -0.2143 1.1605 3.3484
0.1819 -0.0414 -0.2247 -0.4145 1.3912 3.5214
0.1701 -0.0068 -0.1416 -0.5891 1.5635 3.6024
0.1579 0.0234 -0.0738 -0.7010 1.6446 3.5969
0.1465 0.0490 -0.0187 -0.7725 1.6709 3.5482
0.1305 0.0821 0.0506 -0.8372 1.6516 3.4317
0.1127 0.1156 0.1201 -0.8723 1.5711 3.2512
0.0883 0.1569 0.2063 -0.8697 1.3781 2.9289
0.0624 0.1948 0.2899 -0.8082 1.0791 2.4896
0.0409 0.2208 0.3538 -0.7074 0.7579 2.0335
0.0238 0.2367 0.4016 -0.5844 0.4454 1.5814
0.0110 0.2441 0.4352 -0.4532 0.1650 1.1531
0.0040 0.2454 0.4527 -0.3540 -0.0193 0.8507
-0.0013 0.2435 0.4650 -0.2526 -0.1854 0.5548
-0.0052 0.2383 0.4727 -0.1392 -0.3455 0.2354
-0.0069 0.2276 0.4737 0.0005 -0.5038 -0.1452
-0.0056 0.2156 0.4673 0.1138 -0.5974 -0.4460
-0.0024 0.2033 0.4561 0.2080 -0.6470 -0.6910
0.0006 0.1950 0.4464 0.2637 -0.6619 -0.8341
0.0042 0.1865 0.4349 0.3150 -0.6638 -0.9641
0.0094 0.1766 0.4192 0.3696 -0.6506 -1.1008
0.0172 0.1643 0.3964 0.4291 -0.6115 -1.2462
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0.0279 0.1508 0.3656 0.4845 -0.5372 -1.3754
0.0418 0.1376 0.3266 0.5265 -0.4231 -1.4615
0.0562 0.1280 0.2873 0.5447 -0.2967 -1.4789
0.0700 0.1220 0.2500 0.5427 -0.1727 -1.4373
0.0830 0.1192 0.2163 0.5251 -0.0608 -1.3500
0.0943 0.1189 0.1875 0.4975 0.0318 -1.2335
0.1030 0.1201 0.1664 0.4683 0.0970 -1.1178
0.1140 0.1235 0.1410 0.4198 0.1703 -0.9325
0.1275 0.1309 0.1131 0.3385 0.2397 -0.6316
0.1374 0.1394 0.0971 0.2558 0.2688 -0.3347
0.1439 0.1475 0.0911 0.1799 0.2702 -0.0711
0.1471 0.1530 0.0914 0.1295 0.2609 0.0977
0.1492 0.1581 0.0950 0.0812 0.2455 0.2539
0.1506 0.1642 0.1040 0.0232 0.2201 0.4315
0.1503 0.1705 0.1200 -0.0369 0.1871 0.5989
0.1487 0.1752 0.1377 -0.0817 0.1590 0.7066
0.1448 0.1804 0.1655 -0.1291 0.1260 0.7910
0.1385 0.1851 0.1995 -0.1631 0.0988 0.8021
0.1321 0.1885 0.2289 -0.1753 0.0829 0.7442
0.1267 0.1909 0.2505 -0.1735 0.0738 0.6602
0.1218 0.1929 0.2682 -0.1631 0.0662 0.5573
0.1172 0.1948 0.2830 -0.1450 0.0578 0.4371
0.1129 0.1965 0.2951 -0.1179 0.0462 0.2956
0.1094 0.1978 0.3026 -0.0845 0.0305 0.1496
0.1076 0.1984 0.3051 -0.0576 0.0167 0.0476
0.1067 0.1986 0.3053 -0.0365 0.0050 -0.0252
0.1063 0.1986 0.3046 -0.0210 -0.0040 -0.0749
0.1061 0.1985 0.3032 -0.0058 -0.0131 -0.1207
0.1061 0.1982 0.3006 0.0120 -0.0240 -0.1706
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0.1065 0.1977 0.2972 0.0294 -0.0349 -0.2151
0.1075 0.1967 0.2914 0.0507 -0.0482 -0.2633
0.1092 0.1952 0.2836 0.0716 -0.0607 -0.3024
0.1118 0.1930 0.2734 0.0906 -0.0705 -0.3267
0.1159 0.1900 0.2596 0.1054 -0.0737 -0.3259
0.1206 0.1870 0.2463 0.1089 -0.0656 -0.2934
0.1245 0.1848 0.2364 0.1035 -0.0509 -0.2465
0.1275 0.1835 0.2295 0.0936 -0.0343 -0.1970
0.1299 0.1828 0.2247 0.0817 -0.0178 -0.1488
0.1318 0.1825 0.2217 0.0695 -0.0030 -0.1049
0.1330 0.1826 0.2199 0.0585 0.0090 -0.0689
0.1339 0.1828 0.2190 0.0491 0.0184 -0.0397
0.1349 0.1833 0.2186 0.0364 0.0297 -0.0026
0.1356 0.1842 0.2190 0.0228 0.0402 0.0348
0.1360 0.1852 0.2203 0.0094 0.0487 0.0691
0.1360 0.1867 0.2226 -0.0046 0.0551 0.1022
0.1358 0.1880 0.2252 -0.0147 0.0577 0.1240
0.1352 0.1897 0.2292 -0.0256 0.0578 0.1448
0.1340 0.1919 0.2353 -0.0363 0.0527 0.1596
0.1326 0.1936 0.2409 -0.0415 0.0442 0.1601
0.1312 0.1949 0.2462 -0.0430 0.0341 0.1510
0.1298 0.1959 0.2508 -0.0415 0.0236 0.1346
0.1285 0.1964 0.2547 -0.0378 0.0135 0.1133
0.1275 0.1967 0.2578 -0.0325 0.0046 0.0891
0.1266 0.1967 0.2600 -0.0264 -0.0028 0.0642
0.1260 0.1966 0.2613 -0.0206 -0.0080 0.0424
0.1255 0.1962 0.2622 -0.0128 -0.0130 0.0152
0.1253 0.1959 0.2623 -0.0074 -0.0155 -0.0027
0.1252 0.1956 0.2621 -0.0022 -0.0171 -0.0191
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0.1252 0.1951 0.2614 0.0034 -0.0179 -0.0356
0.1253 0.1947 0.2605 0.0076 -0.0180 -0.0472
0.1256 0.1942 0.2589 0.0128 -0.0172 -0.0602
0.1261 0.1936 0.2566 0.0174 -0.0153 -0.0696
0.1268 0.1931 0.2540 0.0205 -0.0126 -0.0730
0.1277 0.1927 0.2512 0.0218 -0.0095 -0.0704
0.1285 0.1924 0.2485 0.0214 -0.0060 -0.0617
0.1293 0.1922 0.2464 0.0193 -0.0028 -0.0490
0.1300 0.1922 0.2448 0.0162 -0.0000 -0.0346
0.1305 0.1922 0.2438 0.0126 0.0023 -0.0202
0.1309 0.1923 0.2434 0.0090 0.0042 -0.0071
0.1310 0.1924 0.2433 0.0064 0.0053 0.0013
0.1311 0.1925 0.2434 0.0039 0.0062 0.0090
0.1312 0.1927 0.2438 0.0011 0.0071 0.0168
0.1312 0.1929 0.2443 -0.0016 0.0078 0.0237
0.1311 0.1931 0.2449 -0.0035 0.0082 0.0280
0.1310 0.1933 0.2458 -0.0058 0.0084 0.0323
0.1307 0.1937 0.2473 -0.0081 0.0080 0.0348
0.1303 0.1941 0.2489 -0.0092 0.0069 0.0331
0.1299 0.1943 0.2503 -0.0091 0.0053 0.0286
0.1295 0.1945 0.2513 -0.0082 0.0036 0.0225
0.1293 0.1946 0.2519 -0.0069 0.0019 0.0163
0.1291 0.1946 0.2523 -0.0055 0.0004 0.0106
0.1290 0.1946 0.2525 -0.0041 -0.0007 0.0059
0.1289 0.1946 0.2526 -0.0030 -0.0016 0.0021
0.1288 0.1946 0.2526 -0.0019 -0.0023 -0.0014
0.1288 0.1945 0.2526 -0.0008 -0.0029 -0.0045
0.1288 0.1944 0.2524 0.0004 -0.0035 -0.0080
0.1288 0.1943 0.2522 0.0014 -0.0039 -0.0105
83
0.1289 0.1942 0.2519 0.0025 -0.0042 -0.0128
0.1290 0.1941 0.2514 0.0036 -0.0041 -0.0149
0.1292 0.1939 0.2507 0.0044 -0.0037 -0.0155
0.1293 0.1938 0.2502 0.0047 -0.0030 -0.0147
0.1295 0.1937 0.2497 0.0046 -0.0021 -0.0131
0.1296 0.1936 0.2493 0.0042 -0.0013 -0.0110
0.1298 0.1936 0.2490 0.0037 -0.0006 -0.0086
0.1299 0.1936 0.2488 0.0031 0.0001 -0.0063
0.1299 0.1936 0.2486 0.0025 0.0007 -0.0039
0.1300 0.1937 0.2486 0.0017 0.0012 -0.0013
0.1300 0.1937 0.2485 0.0012 0.0015 0.0004
0.1301 0.1937 0.2486 0.0006 0.0018 0.0019
0.1301 0.1938 0.2486 0.0001 0.0019 0.0036
0.1301 0.1938 0.2488 -0.0006 0.0020 0.0051
0.1300 0.1939 0.2490 -0.0011 0.0020 0.0064
0.1300 0.1940 0.2492 -0.0016 0.0019 0.0072
0.1299 0.1940 0.2495 -0.0019 0.0016 0.0073
0.1298 0.1941 0.2498 -0.0020 0.0012 0.0068
0.1298 0.1941 0.2500 -0.0019 0.0008 0.0059
0.1297 0.1942 0.2502 -0.0017 0.0004 0.0046
0.1296 0.1942 0.2504 -0.0014 0.0001 0.0032
0.1296 0.1942 0.2505 -0.0010 -0.0002 0.0017
0.1296 0.1941 0.2505 -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0005
0.1295 0.1941 0.2505 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0005
0.1295 0.1941 0.2505 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0014
0.1295 0.1941 0.2504 0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0022
0.1296 0.1941 0.2503 0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0029
0.1296 0.1940 0.2502 0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0033
0.1296 0.1940 0.2500 0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0033
84
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0029
0.1297 0.1940 0.2498 0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0023
0.1297 0.1939 0.2497 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0016
0.1298 0.1939 0.2497 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0010
0.1298 0.1939 0.2496 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0004
0.1298 0.1940 0.2496 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001
0.1298 0.1940 0.2496 0.0001 0.0003 0.0006
0.1298 0.1940 0.2497 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0011
0.1298 0.1940 0.2497 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0014
0.1298 0.1940 0.2498 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0016
0.1298 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0015
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0004 0.0002 0.0013
0.1297 0.1941 0.2500 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0010
0.1297 0.1941 0.2500 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0007
0.1297 0.1941 0.2500 -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0004
0.1297 0.1941 0.2500 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001
0.1297 0.1940 0.2500 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
0.1297 0.1940 0.2500 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0004
0.1297 0.1940 0.2500 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0007
0.1297 0.1940 0.2500 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0007
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0007
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0006
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0004
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0003
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0003
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0003
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0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0003
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0002
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000];
xmm =[0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
0.1297 0.1940 0.2498 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001
0.1296 0.1939 0.2498 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001
0.1296 0.1939 0.2498 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
0.1296 0.1939 0.2498 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
0.1296 0.1939 0.2498 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
0.1295 0.1939 0.2497 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003];
xff =[0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 0 0 0
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0005
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0008 0.0007 0.0025
0.1297 0.1940 0.2499 -0.0038 0.0034 0.0124
0.1296 0.1941 0.2503 -0.0189 0.0165 0.0608
0.1289 0.1947 0.2524 -0.0483 0.0398 0.1504
0.1269 0.1963 0.2585 -0.0900 0.0677 0.2693
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0.1218 0.1998 0.2734 -0.1474 0.0927 0.4185
0.1142 0.2040 0.2943 -0.1994 0.0980 0.5423
0.1045 0.2080 0.3202 -0.2449 0.0843 0.6440
0.0940 0.2109 0.3476 -0.2812 0.0567 0.7218
0.0834 0.2123 0.3746 -0.3090 0.0218 0.7804
0.0763 0.2125 0.3924 -0.3243 -0.0037 0.8123
0.0689 0.2121 0.4108 -0.3380 -0.0316 0.8411
0.0602 0.2109 0.4325 -0.3518 -0.0656 0.8705
0.0484 0.2080 0.4615 -0.3672 -0.1115 0.9038
0.0334 0.2024 0.4983 -0.3827 -0.1690 0.9382
0.0147 0.1926 0.5442 -0.3973 -0.2370 0.9723
-0.0090 0.1765 0.6020 -0.4107 -0.3132 1.0049
-0.0399 0.1501 0.6778 -0.4234 -0.3929 1.0356
-0.0819 0.1080 0.7803 -0.4371 -0.4631 1.0632
-0.1232 0.0632 0.8800 -0.4503 -0.4963 1.0802
-0.1641 0.0181 0.9774 -0.4641 -0.5055 1.0910
-0.2072 -0.0278 1.0773 -0.4790 -0.5022 1.0983
-0.2561 -0.0778 1.1879 -0.4950 -0.4947 1.1035
-0.3198 -0.1399 1.3275 -0.5125 -0.4912 1.1075
-0.3956 -0.2120 1.4892 -0.5270 -0.5001 1.1099
-0.4665 -0.2796 1.6372 -0.5351 -0.5153 1.1111
-0.5449 -0.3561 1.7993 -0.5403 -0.5318 1.1118
-0.6479 -0.4586 2.0105 -0.5445 -0.5447 1.1122
-0.7005 -0.5113 2.1178 -0.5462 -0.5478 1.1123];
xcc=[ -0.7005 -0.5113 2.1178 -0.5462 -0.5478 1.1123
-0.7036 -0.5145 2.1240 -0.5224 -0.5577 1.0255
-0.7165 -0.5305 2.1471 -0.4177 -0.6056 0.6710
-0.7275 -0.5496 2.1626 -0.3150 -0.6514 0.3628
-0.7353 -0.5687 2.1696 -0.2298 -0.6773 0.1326
87
-0.7392 -0.5816 2.1708 -0.1792 -0.6820 0.0041
-0.7422 -0.5945 2.1698 -0.1331 -0.6751 -0.1092
-0.7442 -0.6068 2.1669 -0.0928 -0.6571 -0.2072
-0.7458 -0.6219 2.1606 -0.0461 -0.6174 -0.3218
-0.7464 -0.6387 2.1495 0.0038 -0.5448 -0.4499
-0.7459 -0.6514 2.1369 0.0416 -0.4634 -0.5551
-0.7445 -0.6611 2.1229 0.0735 -0.3748 -0.6523
-0.7421 -0.6697 2.1036 0.1084 -0.2583 -0.7699
-0.7382 -0.6755 2.0781 0.1462 -0.1178 -0.9101
-0.7330 -0.6768 2.0472 0.1868 0.0330 -1.0708
-0.7277 -0.6743 2.0177 0.2235 0.1580 -1.2194
-0.7199 -0.6670 1.9763 0.2746 0.3068 -1.4241
-0.7066 -0.6500 1.9096 0.3593 0.4969 -1.7502
-0.6863 -0.6210 1.8142 0.4857 0.6975 -2.2079
-0.6515 -0.5726 1.6623 0.6939 0.9223 -2.9102
-0.6019 -0.5108 1.4623 0.9648 1.1327 -3.7617
-0.5471 -0.4500 1.2548 1.2280 1.2948 -4.5283
-0.4787 -0.3817 1.0096 1.5014 1.4280 -5.2381
-0.4050 -0.3149 0.7597 1.7253 1.4979 -5.6950
-0.3239 -0.2476 0.5004 1.8841 1.4943 -5.8255
-0.2330 -0.1791 0.2314 1.9473 1.4031 -5.5093
-0.1567 -0.1262 0.0254 1.9020 1.2709 -4.8751
-0.0974 -0.0876 -0.1192 1.8001 1.1444 -4.1551
-0.0480 -0.0567 -0.2270 1.6659 1.0303 -3.4030
0.0111 -0.0202 -0.3357 1.4354 0.8919 -2.3113
0.0562 0.0085 -0.3977 1.1927 0.7895 -1.3123
0.0870 0.0299 -0.4235 0.9784 0.7224 -0.5206
0.1143 0.0520 -0.4267 0.7320 0.6623 0.3042
0.1310 0.0690 -0.4103 0.5307 0.6208 0.9161
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0.1454 0.0904 -0.3641 0.2719 0.5689 1.6212
0.1510 0.1111 -0.2903 0.0273 0.5099 2.1939
0.1487 0.1274 -0.2101 -0.1529 0.4486 2.5373
0.1416 0.1407 -0.1255 -0.2882 0.3803 2.7225
0.1299 0.1522 -0.0316 -0.3906 0.2972 2.7742
0.1206 0.1582 0.0305 -0.4346 0.2378 2.7320
0.1105 0.1629 0.0910 -0.4603 0.1762 2.6348
0.0972 0.1668 0.1634 -0.4680 0.0977 2.4428
0.0834 0.1685 0.2325 -0.4493 0.0181 2.1736
0.0748 0.1684 0.2734 -0.4241 -0.0310 1.9667
0.0668 0.1673 0.3100 -0.3902 -0.0761 1.7428
0.0577 0.1648 0.3494 -0.3378 -0.1254 1.4463
0.0483 0.1600 0.3887 -0.2596 -0.1741 1.0588
0.0409 0.1533 0.4184 -0.1633 -0.2077 0.6305
0.0370 0.1461 0.4330 -0.0694 -0.2176 0.2469
0.0362 0.1395 0.4356 0.0130 -0.2081 -0.0689
0.0373 0.1345 0.4310 0.0751 -0.1886 -0.2949
0.0402 0.1298 0.4198 0.1371 -0.1562 -0.5099
0.0458 0.1254 0.3994 0.1994 -0.1060 -0.7131
0.0524 0.1230 0.3762 0.2431 -0.0538 -0.8438
0.0591 0.1223 0.3533 0.2713 -0.0059 -0.9180
0.0650 0.1225 0.3336 0.2872 0.0330 -0.9514
0.0704 0.1235 0.3159 0.2961 0.0659 -0.9619
0.0776 0.1255 0.2927 0.3009 0.1058 -0.9507
0.0866 0.1294 0.2647 0.2969 0.1491 -0.9010
0.0977 0.1360 0.2322 0.2777 0.1903 -0.7898
0.1089 0.1448 0.2018 0.2416 0.2155 -0.6187
0.1179 0.1537 0.1804 0.1975 0.2190 -0.4295
0.1246 0.1620 0.1675 0.1511 0.2061 -0.2430
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0.1292 0.1690 0.1618 0.1070 0.1828 -0.0752
0.1314 0.1731 0.1612 0.0787 0.1631 0.0278
0.1330 0.1767 0.1630 0.0516 0.1410 0.1220
0.1340 0.1805 0.1682 0.0206 0.1118 0.2244
0.1342 0.1839 0.1784 -0.0127 0.0755 0.3246
0.1334 0.1858 0.1899 -0.0367 0.0453 0.3872
0.1316 0.1869 0.2049 -0.0573 0.0153 0.4283
0.1292 0.1870 0.2213 -0.0710 -0.0095 0.4395
0.1260 0.1861 0.2397 -0.0779 -0.0297 0.4183
0.1228 0.1846 0.2560 -0.0768 -0.0411 0.3702
0.1200 0.1830 0.2687 -0.0703 -0.0452 0.3101
0.1177 0.1814 0.2786 -0.0602 -0.0448 0.2420
0.1158 0.1799 0.2859 -0.0475 -0.0411 0.1705
0.1143 0.1785 0.2908 -0.0329 -0.0349 0.0981
0.1134 0.1773 0.2931 -0.0174 -0.0272 0.0287
0.1131 0.1767 0.2933 -0.0069 -0.0216 -0.0145
0.1130 0.1762 0.2924 0.0031 -0.0158 -0.0529
0.1132 0.1759 0.2909 0.0114 -0.0108 -0.0826
0.1136 0.1757 0.2880 0.0208 -0.0049 -0.1132
0.1146 0.1757 0.2831 0.0311 0.0023 -0.1423
0.1160 0.1759 0.2771 0.0386 0.0087 -0.1579
0.1182 0.1765 0.2686 0.0435 0.0153 -0.1577
0.1202 0.1773 0.2617 0.0433 0.0192 -0.1416
0.1221 0.1782 0.2561 0.0398 0.0215 -0.1161
0.1236 0.1791 0.2518 0.0340 0.0224 -0.0859
0.1249 0.1800 0.2490 0.0270 0.0221 -0.0546
0.1257 0.1809 0.2475 0.0196 0.0209 -0.0253
0.1263 0.1816 0.2471 0.0127 0.0191 -0.0001
0.1266 0.1821 0.2473 0.0071 0.0171 0.0188
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0.1267 0.1826 0.2482 0.0018 0.0148 0.0353
0.1267 0.1830 0.2495 -0.0031 0.0120 0.0491
0.1266 0.1833 0.2509 -0.0067 0.0095 0.0581
0.1262 0.1836 0.2535 -0.0109 0.0055 0.0665
0.1257 0.1837 0.2561 -0.0134 0.0019 0.0690
0.1254 0.1838 0.2578 -0.0143 -0.0002 0.0681
0.1250 0.1837 0.2595 -0.0147 -0.0022 0.0654
0.1246 0.1837 0.2612 -0.0145 -0.0040 0.0607
0.1241 0.1835 0.2632 -0.0136 -0.0060 0.0521
0.1236 0.1832 0.2652 -0.0115 -0.0076 0.0396
0.1232 0.1828 0.2666 -0.0088 -0.0082 0.0264
0.1229 0.1825 0.2673 -0.0059 -0.0080 0.0138
0.1227 0.1822 0.2676 -0.0032 -0.0072 0.0028
0.1227 0.1820 0.2676 -0.0009 -0.0061 -0.0058
0.1227 0.1819 0.2674 0.0009 -0.0050 -0.0120
0.1227 0.1818 0.2670 0.0022 -0.0040 -0.0164
0.1228 0.1817 0.2664 0.0038 -0.0025 -0.0214
0.1229 0.1816 0.2656 0.0051 -0.0010 -0.0247
0.1231 0.1816 0.2649 0.0059 0.0002 -0.0263
0.1232 0.1816 0.2642 0.0063 0.0012 -0.0267
0.1234 0.1817 0.2635 0.0066 0.0021 -0.0262
0.1237 0.1818 0.2625 0.0065 0.0031 -0.0242
0.1240 0.1819 0.2616 0.0059 0.0038 -0.0202
0.1242 0.1821 0.2608 0.0050 0.0041 -0.0153
0.1244 0.1822 0.2603 0.0039 0.0040 -0.0101
0.1245 0.1824 0.2600 0.0027 0.0036 -0.0052
0.1246 0.1825 0.2599 0.0016 0.0031 -0.0009
0.1246 0.1826 0.2599 0.0007 0.0025 0.0024
0.1246 0.1827 0.2600 -0.0000 0.0020 0.0050
91
0.1246 0.1827 0.2602 -0.0008 0.0014 0.0073
0.1246 0.1828 0.2605 -0.0015 0.0007 0.0092
0.1245 0.1828 0.2609 -0.0021 0.0001 0.0104
0.1244 0.1828 0.2613 -0.0024 -0.0005 0.0109
0.1243 0.1827 0.2617 -0.0026 -0.0010 0.0104
0.1242 0.1827 0.2622 -0.0026 -0.0013 0.0090
0.1241 0.1826 0.2625 -0.0023 -0.0015 0.0072
0.1240 0.1825 0.2628 -0.0020 -0.0015 0.0051
0.1239 0.1825 0.2630 -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0030
0.1239 0.1824 0.2630 -0.0011 -0.0013 0.0011
0.1238 0.1824 0.2630 -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0002
0.1238 0.1824 0.2630 -0.0005 -0.0011 -0.0013
0.1238 0.1823 0.2630 -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0024
0.1238 0.1823 0.2628 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0036
0.1238 0.1823 0.2627 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0043
0.1239 0.1823 0.2624 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0046
0.1239 0.1823 0.2622 0.0008 0.0001 -0.0043
0.1239 0.1823 0.2620 0.0007 0.0002 -0.0037
0.1240 0.1823 0.2619 0.0006 0.0003 -0.0030
0.1240 0.1823 0.2618 0.0004 0.0003 -0.0021
0.1240 0.1823 0.2617 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0013
0.1240 0.1823 0.2617 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0005
0.1240 0.1823 0.2617 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
0.1240 0.1823 0.2617 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0007
0.1240 0.1823 0.2617 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0011
0.1240 0.1823 0.2618 -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0015
0.1239 0.1823 0.2619 -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0015
0.1239 0.1823 0.2619 -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0013
0.1239 0.1823 0.2620 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0011
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0.1238 0.1823 0.2620 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0008
0.1238 0.1822 0.2620 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0005
0.1238 0.1822 0.2621 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0002
0.1238 0.1822 0.2621 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0002
0.1238 0.1822 0.2620 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005
0.1238 0.1822 0.2620 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0007
0.1237 0.1821 0.2619 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0010
0.1237 0.1821 0.2619 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0010
0.1237 0.1821 0.2618 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0009
0.1237 0.1821 0.2618 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0008
0.1237 0.1821 0.2618 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0006
0.1237 0.1821 0.2617 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0004
0.1237 0.1821 0.2617 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003
0.1237 0.1821 0.2617 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001
0.1237 0.1820 0.2617 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0000
0.1236 0.1820 0.2617 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0000
0.1236 0.1820 0.2617 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0000
0.1236 0.1820 0.2617 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001
0.1236 0.1819 0.2617 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002
0.1235 0.1819 0.2617 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
0.1235 0.1819 0.2616 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004
0.1235 0.1819 0.2616 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004
0.1235 0.1819 0.2616 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004
0.1235 0.1818 0.2615 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
0.1234 0.1818 0.2615 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003
0.1234 0.1818 0.2615 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002
0.1234 0.1817 0.2615 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002
0.1233 0.1817 0.2614 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002
0.1233 0.1817 0.2614 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003];
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xmmm =[0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0 0 0
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000];
xfff =[ 0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 0 0 0
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0005
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 -0.0008 0.0007 0.0025
0.1464 0.2024 0.2248 -0.0038 0.0035 0.0124
0.1463 0.2025 0.2252 -0.0190 0.0171 0.0608
0.1457 0.2031 0.2271 -0.0470 0.0403 0.1459
0.1439 0.2046 0.2326 -0.0862 0.0675 0.2573
0.1395 0.2077 0.2453 -0.1384 0.0922 0.3947
0.1305 0.2129 0.2704 -0.2018 0.0978 0.5477
0.1209 0.2168 0.2961 -0.2457 0.0797 0.6474
0.1110 0.2192 0.3218 -0.2785 0.0494 0.7201
0.1013 0.2203 0.3466 -0.3033 0.0134 0.7749
0.0948 0.2203 0.3633 -0.3172 -0.0132 0.8057
0.0879 0.2197 0.3807 -0.3297 -0.0419 0.8337
0.0790 0.2181 0.4031 -0.3434 -0.0800 0.8651
0.0674 0.2146 0.4323 -0.3581 -0.1299 0.8996
0.0528 0.2082 0.4690 -0.3724 -0.1908 0.9349
94
0.0346 0.1973 0.5148 -0.3859 -0.2612 0.9696
0.0113 0.1795 0.5732 -0.3985 -0.3382 1.0033
-0.0212 0.1489 0.6553 -0.4121 -0.4185 1.0367
-0.0600 0.1073 0.7524 -0.4268 -0.4730 1.0628
-0.0975 0.0654 0.8449 -0.4417 -0.4932 1.0790
-0.1344 0.0248 0.9341 -0.4571 -0.4943 1.0895
-0.1744 -0.0174 1.0281 -0.4738 -0.4871 1.0970
-0.2217 -0.0646 1.1358 -0.4917 -0.4793 1.1026
-0.2774 -0.1178 1.2586 -0.5085 -0.4795 1.1066
-0.3450 -0.1813 1.4037 -0.5224 -0.4928 1.1094
-0.4077 -0.2410 1.5359 -0.5302 -0.5106 1.1108
-0.4797 -0.3114 1.6861 -0.5355 -0.5290 1.1117
-0.5877 -0.4194 1.9093 -0.5411 -0.5427 1.1123
-0.6816 -0.5136 2.1016 -0.5453 -0.5461 1.1125
-0.7868 -0.6186 2.3155 -0.5491 -0.5475 1.1126];
xccc =[ -0.7868 -0.6186 2.3155 -0.5491 -0.5475 1.1126
-0.7934 -0.6253 2.3285 -0.5267 -0.5586 1.0328
-0.8070 -0.6411 2.3547 -0.4839 -0.6077 0.9152
-0.8213 -0.6610 2.3820 -0.4473 -0.6923 0.8684
-0.8373 -0.6888 2.4146 -0.4220 -0.8172 0.9176
-0.8586 -0.7353 2.4666 -0.4255 -1.0101 1.1575
-0.8804 -0.7894 2.5325 -0.4793 -1.2133 1.5804
-0.9061 -0.8536 2.6234 -0.5921 -1.4460 2.2133
-0.9389 -0.9304 2.7510 -0.7759 -1.7337 3.0973
-0.9895 -1.0365 2.9564 -1.0845 -2.1473 4.4423
-1.0341 -1.1209 3.1388 -1.3539 -2.4590 5.5276
-1.0894 -1.2165 3.3627 -1.6702 -2.7454 6.6914
-1.1494 -1.3098 3.5996 -1.9812 -2.9035 7.6840
-1.2144 -1.3986 3.8461 -2.2726 -2.8836 8.4144
95
-1.2928 -1.4884 4.1265 -2.5551 -2.6127 8.8194
-1.3663 -1.5547 4.3705 -2.7482 -2.1612 8.7599
-1.4442 -1.6062 4.6071 -2.8763 -1.5441 8.2931
-1.5111 -1.6350 4.7908 -2.9235 -0.9616 7.6180
-1.5685 -1.6489 4.9331 -2.9180 -0.4640 6.8766
-1.6181 -1.6533 5.0446 -2.8789 -0.0587 6.1364
-1.6588 -1.6520 5.1274 -2.8225 0.2427 5.4730
-1.6938 -1.6475 5.1923 -2.7561 0.4718 4.8683
-1.7410 -1.6369 5.2698 -2.6386 0.7260 4.0095
-1.8059 -1.6150 5.3564 -2.4193 0.9481 2.7579
-1.8598 -1.5920 5.4080 -2.1768 0.9943 1.6572
-1.9077 -1.5695 5.4346 -1.9026 0.9028 0.6281
-1.9473 -1.5512 5.4385 -1.6181 0.7070 -0.2741
-1.9781 -1.5391 5.4247 -1.3409 0.4518 -1.0318
-2.0013 -1.5330 5.3989 -1.0807 0.1738 -1.6559
-2.0137 -1.5321 5.3760 -0.9110 -0.0213 -2.0237
-2.0239 -1.5336 5.3488 -0.7420 -0.2228 -2.3619
-2.0328 -1.5382 5.3140 -0.5578 -0.4477 -2.7006
-2.0406 -1.5486 5.2629 -0.3265 -0.7333 -3.0838
-2.0447 -1.5679 5.1925 -0.0586 -1.0606 -3.4692
-2.0426 -1.5979 5.1036 0.2216 -1.3864 -3.8005
-2.0352 -1.6314 5.0170 0.4468 -1.6229 -4.0031
-2.0183 -1.6824 4.8972 0.6938 -1.8288 -4.1296
-1.9869 -1.7548 4.7389 0.9139 -1.8903 -4.0593
-1.9554 -1.8148 4.6101 1.0027 -1.7605 -3.8066
-1.9224 -1.8682 4.4921 1.0033 -1.4880 -3.4013
-1.8924 -1.9088 4.3945 0.9316 -1.1365 -2.9059
-1.8676 -1.9358 4.3196 0.8152 -0.7719 -2.3834
-1.8480 -1.9515 4.2637 0.6743 -0.4263 -1.8610
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-1.8334 -1.9581 4.2245 0.5249 -0.1234 -1.3645
-1.8259 -1.9586 4.2055 0.4216 0.0572 -1.0416
-1.8200 -1.9564 4.1915 0.3161 0.2203 -0.7235
-1.8150 -1.9500 4.1808 0.1794 0.4009 -0.3245
-1.8125 -1.9370 4.1787 0.0097 0.5757 0.1544
-1.8139 -1.9228 4.1865 -0.1271 0.6732 0.5296
-1.8181 -1.9071 4.2021 -0.2493 0.7215 0.8574
-1.8281 -1.8847 4.2347 -0.3924 0.7163 1.2308
-1.8416 -1.8641 4.2759 -0.4992 0.6445 1.4968
-1.8569 -1.8473 4.3210 -0.5690 0.5323 1.6548
-1.8730 -1.8345 4.3673 -0.6075 0.4000 1.7206
-1.8892 -1.8258 4.4126 -0.6197 0.2634 1.7074
-1.9048 -1.8208 4.4550 -0.6103 0.1342 1.6293
-1.9193 -1.8190 4.4929 -0.5845 0.0212 1.5022
-1.9318 -1.8195 4.5243 -0.5489 -0.0686 1.3487
-1.9430 -1.8218 4.5511 -0.5056 -0.1410 1.1729
-1.9596 -1.8285 4.5872 -0.4172 -0.2287 0.8322
-1.9722 -1.8372 4.6096 -0.3228 -0.2727 0.4846
-1.9809 -1.8460 4.6197 -0.2327 -0.2846 0.1666
-1.9851 -1.8519 4.6211 -0.1734 -0.2805 -0.0342
-1.9881 -1.8576 4.6184 -0.1159 -0.2692 -0.2214
-1.9901 -1.8638 4.6107 -0.0533 -0.2501 -0.4152
-1.9906 -1.8712 4.5941 0.0214 -0.2197 -0.6275
-1.9892 -1.8769 4.5749 0.0775 -0.1923 -0.7676
-1.9854 -1.8830 4.5457 0.1353 -0.1603 -0.8815
-1.9789 -1.8889 4.5088 0.1808 -0.1310 -0.9232
-1.9711 -1.8937 4.4721 0.2034 -0.1097 -0.8780
-1.9640 -1.8973 4.4432 0.2053 -0.0955 -0.7822
-1.9575 -1.9002 4.4199 0.1939 -0.0832 -0.6572
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-1.9514 -1.9027 4.4005 0.1711 -0.0693 -0.5058
-1.9458 -1.9049 4.3855 0.1363 -0.0509 -0.3288
-1.9418 -1.9063 4.3771 0.0966 -0.0295 -0.1610
-1.9399 -1.9068 4.3747 0.0677 -0.0131 -0.0534
-1.9389 -1.9069 4.3744 0.0459 -0.0004 0.0210
-1.9383 -1.9068 4.3753 0.0241 0.0125 0.0899
-1.9381 -1.9065 4.3774 0.0036 0.0250 0.1507
-1.9383 -1.9058 4.3812 -0.0209 0.0399 0.2169
-1.9389 -1.9049 4.3863 -0.0435 0.0536 0.2720
-1.9405 -1.9032 4.3946 -0.0701 0.0690 0.3278
-1.9432 -1.9007 4.4058 -0.0949 0.0815 0.3675
-1.9475 -1.8973 4.4211 -0.1158 0.0873 0.3810
-1.9529 -1.8935 4.4376 -0.1246 0.0800 0.3545
-1.9577 -1.8907 4.4504 -0.1209 0.0636 0.3042
-1.9614 -1.8889 4.4593 -0.1109 0.0445 0.2482
-1.9644 -1.8879 4.4656 -0.0978 0.0252 0.1918
-1.9667 -1.8875 4.4698 -0.0837 0.0074 0.1391
-1.9679 -1.8875 4.4717 -0.0746 -0.0029 0.1079
-1.9689 -1.8876 4.4731 -0.0651 -0.0128 0.0769
-1.9700 -1.8879 4.4741 -0.0531 -0.0243 0.0397
-1.9711 -1.8887 4.4745 -0.0373 -0.0377 -0.0065
-1.9718 -1.8897 4.4739 -0.0224 -0.0483 -0.0473
-1.9721 -1.8911 4.4721 -0.0063 -0.0574 -0.0884
-1.9721 -1.8927 4.4692 0.0089 -0.0632 -0.1240
-1.9718 -1.8941 4.4662 0.0196 -0.0652 -0.1470
-1.9710 -1.8962 4.4612 0.0325 -0.0641 -0.1709
-1.9695 -1.8985 4.4543 0.0433 -0.0573 -0.1845
-1.9679 -1.9004 4.4478 0.0486 -0.0474 -0.1831
-1.9662 -1.9018 4.4418 0.0496 -0.0358 -0.1708
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-1.9646 -1.9027 4.4366 0.0474 -0.0240 -0.1506
-1.9632 -1.9033 4.4323 0.0427 -0.0129 -0.1248
-1.9620 -1.9035 4.4289 0.0363 -0.0031 -0.0961
-1.9610 -1.9035 4.4265 0.0291 0.0047 -0.0672
-1.9604 -1.9033 4.4251 0.0218 0.0105 -0.0405
-1.9598 -1.9029 4.4243 0.0131 0.0156 -0.0103
-1.9596 -1.9025 4.4243 0.0072 0.0180 0.0090
-1.9595 -1.9021 4.4247 0.0015 0.0195 0.0266
-1.9596 -1.9017 4.4256 -0.0046 0.0204 0.0443
-1.9597 -1.9012 4.4267 -0.0097 0.0204 0.0580
-1.9601 -1.9006 4.4288 -0.0157 0.0194 0.0724
-1.9608 -1.8999 4.4317 -0.0209 0.0171 0.0819
-1.9617 -1.8993 4.4348 -0.0240 0.0140 0.0841
-1.9626 -1.8988 4.4381 -0.0251 0.0103 0.0789
-1.9637 -1.8985 4.4411 -0.0239 0.0063 0.0669
-1.9645 -1.8983 4.4434 -0.0212 0.0027 0.0514
-1.9652 -1.8983 4.4450 -0.0174 -0.0005 0.0346
-1.9658 -1.8983 4.4459 -0.0131 -0.0031 0.0184
-1.9661 -1.8985 4.4462 -0.0090 -0.0053 0.0040
-1.9663 -1.8986 4.4462 -0.0053 -0.0068 -0.0074
-1.9664 -1.8988 4.4459 -0.0025 -0.0078 -0.0157
-1.9664 -1.8990 4.4453 0.0008 -0.0088 -0.0245
-1.9664 -1.8992 4.4447 0.0033 -0.0094 -0.0304
-1.9662 -1.8995 4.4438 0.0059 -0.0097 -0.0356
-1.9660 -1.8999 4.4423 0.0086 -0.0096 -0.0394
-1.9654 -1.9004 4.4402 0.0105 -0.0083 -0.0389
-1.9650 -1.9007 4.4387 0.0107 -0.0066 -0.0344
-1.9646 -1.9009 4.4374 0.0098 -0.0046 -0.0278
-1.9643 -1.9010 4.4366 0.0084 -0.0026 -0.0207
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-1.9640 -1.9011 4.4360 0.0068 -0.0008 -0.0140
-1.9639 -1.9011 4.4358 0.0056 0.0002 -0.0096
-1.9638 -1.9011 4.4356 0.0044 0.0012 -0.0053
-1.9637 -1.9010 4.4355 0.0030 0.0023 -0.0008
-1.9636 -1.9010 4.4356 0.0015 0.0032 0.0038
-1.9636 -1.9009 4.4357 0.0001 0.0039 0.0077
-1.9636 -1.9008 4.4359 -0.0012 0.0044 0.0110
-1.9637 -1.9007 4.4362 -0.0023 0.0047 0.0136
-1.9638 -1.9005 4.4367 -0.0036 0.0048 0.0162
-1.9640 -1.9003 4.4375 -0.0048 0.0044 0.0178
-1.9642 -1.9002 4.4382 -0.0053 0.0037 0.0175
-1.9644 -1.9000 4.4388 -0.0053 0.0028 0.0159
-1.9645 -1.9000 4.4393 -0.0050 0.0018 0.0136
-1.9647 -1.8999 4.4397 -0.0045 0.0009 0.0109
-1.9648 -1.8999 4.4399 -0.0038 0.0001 0.0081
-1.9649 -1.8999 4.4401 -0.0031 -0.0005 0.0055
-1.9650 -1.8999 4.4402 -0.0023 -0.0011 0.0027
-1.9650 -1.9000 4.4403 -0.0015 -0.0017 -0.0001
-1.9651 -1.9000 4.4402 -0.0008 -0.0020 -0.0022
-1.9651 -1.9001 4.4402 -0.0001 -0.0022 -0.0041
-1.9651 -1.9001 4.4400 0.0006 -0.0023 -0.0058
-1.9650 -1.9002 4.4398 0.0012 -0.0023 -0.0072
-1.9650 -1.9003 4.4395 0.0018 -0.0022 -0.0082
-1.9649 -1.9004 4.4392 0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0085
-1.9648 -1.9004 4.4389 0.0023 -0.0014 -0.0080
-1.9647 -1.9005 4.4386 0.0023 -0.0010 -0.0069
-1.9646 -1.9005 4.4383 0.0020 -0.0006 -0.0055
-1.9646 -1.9005 4.4382 0.0017 -0.0002 -0.0039
-1.9645 -1.9005 4.4381 0.0013 0.0002 -0.0023
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-1.9645 -1.9005 4.4380 0.0008 0.0005 -0.0008
-1.9645 -1.9005 4.4380 0.0005 0.0007 0.0005
-1.9645 -1.9005 4.4380 0.0001 0.0008 0.0014
-1.9645 -1.9005 4.4381 -0.0002 0.0009 0.0023
-1.9645 -1.9004 4.4382 -0.0006 0.0009 0.0032
-1.9645 -1.9004 4.4384 -0.0009 0.0009 0.0038
-1.9646 -1.9003 4.4385 -0.0011 0.0008 0.0038
-1.9646 -1.9003 4.4387 -0.0011 0.0006 0.0035
-1.9646 -1.9003 4.4388 -0.0011 0.0004 0.0029
-1.9647 -1.9003 4.4389 -0.0009 0.0002 0.0022
-1.9647 -1.9003 4.4390 -0.0007 0.0000 0.0014
-1.9647 -1.9003 4.4390 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0007
-1.9648 -1.9003 4.4390 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0001
-1.9648 -1.9003 4.4390 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0005
-1.9648 -1.9003 4.4390 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0010
-1.9648 -1.9003 4.4390 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0014
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4389 0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0018
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4388 0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0018
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0016
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4386 0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0013
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4386 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0009
-1.9646 -1.9004 4.4386 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0006
-1.9646 -1.9004 4.4386 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002
-1.9646 -1.9004 4.4386 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
-1.9646 -1.9004 4.4386 -0.0000 0.0002 0.0004
-1.9646 -1.9004 4.4386 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0007
-1.9646 -1.9004 4.4386 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0008
-1.9646 -1.9004 4.4387 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0008
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0007
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-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0006
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4388 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0004
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4388 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0002
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4388 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4388 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4388 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0003
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0002
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0002
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0002
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
-1.9647 -1.9004 4.4387 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001];
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
figure;
level = [ 0 0 ];
contour(g.xs1, g.xs2, final, level,’b’,’linewidth’,3);
hold on;
contour(g.xs1, g.xs2, final5, level, ’g’,’linewidth’,3);
contour(g.xs1, g.xs2, final3, level, ’y’,’linewidth’,3);
hold on;
plot(xf(:,2)-xf(:,1),xf(:,3)-xf(:,1),’r:’,’linewidth’,3)
hold on;
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plot(xc(:,2)-xc(:,1),xc(:,3)-xc(:,1),’g:’,’linewidth’,3);
hold on;
plot(xm(:,2)-xm(:,1),xm(:,3)-xm(:,1),’b:’)
legend(’pre-fault’,’post-fault(L15), t
∗
c=2.00 sec’, ’post-fault(L46), t
∗
c=1.90 sec’,’during fault’)
hold on;
plot(xmm(:,2)-xmm(:,1),xmm(:,3)-xmm(:,1),’b:’)
hold on;
plot(xff(:,2)-xff(:,1),xff(:,3)-xff(:,1),’r:’,’linewidth’,3)
hold on;
plot(xcc(:,2)-xcc(:,1),xcc(:,3)-xcc(:,1),’y:’,’linewidth’,3);
xlabel(’ delta21’);
ylabel(’ delta31’);
axis equal;
axis(g.axis);
hold on;
axis equal;
plot(0.0560,0.0783, ’bo’);
hold on;
hold on;
plot(0.0643,0.1202, ’g+’);
hold on;
plot(0.0584,0.1381,’ys’);
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APPENDIX B. AADL/AGREE CODE FOR NETWORK EXAMPLE OF
CHAPTER 5
Here, we provide the AADL/AGREE source code for the implementation of the network
example, adapted from [Jha et al. (2002); Sheyner et al. (2002)].
———————————————-
package data types implementation
public
with Base Types;–built in data types package
———————————————-
–8 possible attack data name types from PC 0 to PC 1, and PC 2.
———————————————-
data sbo 01
end sbo 01;
data ftpr 01
end ftpr 01;
data rlog 01
end rlog 01;
data lbo 01
end lbo 01;
data sbo 02
end sbo 02;
data ftpr 02
end ftpr 02;
data rlog 02
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end rlog 02;
data lbo 02
end lbo 02;
———————————————————-
– 8 possible attack data implementation types from PC 0 to PC 1, and PC 2.
——————————————————–
data implementation sbo 01.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end sbo 01.impl;
data implementation ftpr 01.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end ftpr 01.impl;
data implementation rlog 01.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end rlog 01.impl;
data implementation lbo 01.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end lbo 01.impl;
data implementation sbo 02.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end sbo 02.impl;
data implementation ftpr 02.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
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end ftpr 02.impl;
data implementation rlog 02.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end rlog 02.impl;
data implementation lbo 02.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end lbo 02.impl;
———————————————-
–6 possible attack data name types from PC 1 to PC 2, and PC 1.
———————————————
data sbo 12
end sbo 12;
data ftpr 12
end ftpr 12;
data rlog 12
end rlog 12;
data lbo 12
end lbo 12;
data ftpr 11
end ftpr 11;
data lbo 11
end lbo 11;
———————————————————-
–6 possible attack data implementation types from PC 1 to PC 2, and PC 1.
——————————————————–
data implementation sbo 12.impl
subcomponents
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val: data Base Types::boolean;
end sbo 12.impl;
data implementation ftpr 12.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end ftpr 12.impl;
data implementation rlog 12.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end rlog 12.impl;
data implementation lbo 12.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end lbo 12.impl;
data implementation ftpr 11.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end ftpr 11.impl;
data implementation lbo 11.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end lbo 11.impl;
———————————————-
–6 possible attack data name types from PC 2 to PC 1, and PC 2.
———————————————
data sbo 21
end sbo 21;
data ftpr 21
end ftpr 21;
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data rlog 21
end rlog 21;
data lbo 21
end lbo 21;
data ftpr 22
end ftpr 22;
data lbo 22
end lbo 22;
———————————————————-
–6 possible attack data implementation types from PC 2 to PC 1, and PC 2.
——————————————————–
data implementation sbo 21.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end sbo 21.impl;
data implementation ftpr 21.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end ftpr 21.impl;
data implementation rlog 21.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end rlog 21.impl;
data implementation lbo 21.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end lbo 21.impl;
data implementation ftpr 22.impl
subcomponents
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val: data Base Types::boolean;
end ftpr 22.impl;
data implementation lbo 22.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end lbo 22.impl;
———————————————————-
—4 possible Intrusion detection data name types.
———————————————————
data id sbo 01
end id sbo 01;
data id sbo 02
end id sbo 02;
data id rlog 01
end id rlog 01;
data id rlog 02
end id rlog 02;
————————————-
–4 possible Intrusion detection data implementation types.
————————————
data implementation id sbo 01.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end id sbo 01.impl;
data implementation id sbo 02.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end id sbo 02.impl;
data implementation id rlog 01.impl
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subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end id rlog 01.impl;
data implementation id rlog 02.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::boolean;
end id rlog 02.impl;
—————————————————–
—the property of attacker level l 2.
—————————————————-
data l 2 level
end l 2 level;
————————————
–the data implementation type of attacker level l 2.
————————————
data implementation l 2 level.impl
subcomponents
val: data Base Types::integer;
end l 2 level.impl;
—————————————————–
— the property of intrusion detection dg.
—————————————————-
data dg detection
end dg detection;
————————————
–the data implementation type of intrusion detection dg.
————————————
data implementation dg detection.impl
subcomponents
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val: data Base Types::integer;
end dg detection.impl;
end data types implementation;
——————————————————————————————————————–
——————————————————————————————————————–
package system model
public
with data types implementation;–this package defines all used data types/implementations.
–4 main components: PC 0, PC 1,PC 2,ID.
system PC 0 – attacker host.
features
thr sbo 01: out data port data types implementation::sbo 01.impl;
thr ftpr 01: out data port data types implementation::ftpr 01.impl;
thr rlog 01: out data port data types implementation::rlog 01.impl;
thr lbo 01: out data port data types implementation::lbo 01.impl;
thr sbo 02: out data port data types implementation::sbo 02.impl;
thr ftpr 02: out data port data types implementation::ftpr 02.impl;
thr rlog 02: out data port data types implementation::rlog 02.impl;
thr lbo 02: out data port data types implementation::lbo 02.impl;
————————————————————————————————-
————————————————————————————————-
annex agree {**
const l 0:int=2;–attacker level at PC 0 is root(2).
guarantee ”sbo 01 threat”: if (l 0≥1) then (thr sbo 01.val=true or thr sbo 01.val=false) else
thr sbo 01.val=false;
guarantee ”ftpr 01 threat”:if (l 0≥1) then (thr ftpr 01.val=true or thr ftpr 01.val=false) else
thr ftpr 01.val=false;
guarantee ”rlog 01 threat”: if (l 0≥1) then (thr rlog 01.val=true or thr rlog 01.val=false) else
thr rlog 01.val=false;
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guarantee ”sbo 02 threat”:if (l 0≥1) then (thr sbo 02.val=true or thr sbo 02.val=false) else
thr sbo 02.val=false;
guarantee ”ftpr 02 threat”: if (l 0≥1) then (thr ftpr 02.val=true or thr ftpr 02.val=false) else
thr ftpr 02.val=false;
guarantee ”rlog 02 threat”: if (l 0≥1) then (thr rlog 02.val=true or thr rlog 02.val=false) else
thr rlog 02.val=false;
**};
end PC 0;
————————————————————————————————————————–
system PC 1 –host 1.
features
thr sbo 01: in data port data types implementation::sbo 01.impl;
thr ftpr 01: in data port data types implementation::ftpr 01.impl;
thr rlog 01: in data port data types implementation::rlog 01.impl;
thr lbo 01: in data port data types implementation::lbo 01.impl;
thr sbo 12: out data port data types implementation::sbo 12.impl;
thr ftpr 12: out data port data types implementation::ftpr 12.impl;
thr rlog 12: out data port data types implementation::rlog 12.impl;
thr lbo 12: out data port data types implementation::lbo 12.impl;
thr lbo 11:out data port data types implementation::lbo 11.impl;
thr ftpr 11:out data port data types implementation::ftpr 11.impl;
thr sbo 21: in data port data types implementation::sbo 21.impl;
thr ftpr 21: in data port data types implementation::ftpr 21.impl;
thr rlog 21: in data port data types implementation::rlog 21.impl;
thr lbo 21: in data port data types implementation::lbo 21.impl;
id done sbo 01:out data port data types implementation::id sbo 01.impl;
id done rlog 01:out data port data types implementation::id rlog 01.impl;
——————————————————————————————————
——————————————————————————————————
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annex agree{**
eq done sbo 01:bool= (thr sbo 01.val) and (l 1<2) and (sshd 1);
–precondition/attack instance sbo 01.
eq done ftpr 01:bool=(thr ftpr 01.val)and (t 01=false or t 21=false) and ftp 1 and wdir 1 and
fshell 1;
–precondition/attack instance ftpr 01.
eq done rlog 01:bool=(thr rlog 01.val)and (l 1=0) and (t 01);
–precondition/attack instance rlog 01.
eq done lbo 01:bool=(thr lbo 01.val)and (l 1=1)and xterm 1;
–precondition/attack instance lbo 01.
eq done sbo 21:bool=(thr sbo 21.val)and (l 1<2) and (sshd 1);
–precondition/attack instance sbo 21.
eq done ftpr 21:bool=(thr ftpr 21.val)and (t 01=false or t 21=false) and ftp 1 and wdir 1 and
fshell 1;
eq done rlog 21:bool=(thr rlog 21.val)and (l 1=0) and (t 21);
eq done lbo 21:bool=(thr lbo 21.val)and (l 1=1)and xterm 1;
eq done lbo 11:bool=(thr lbo 11.val)and(l 1=1)and xterm 1;
eq done ftpr 11:bool=(thr ftpr 11.val)and(l 1≥1)and (t 01=false or t 21=false) and ftp 1 and
wdir 1 and fshell 1;
—————–define all vulnerabilities, and services of PC 1.
const xterm 1:bool=true; const ftp 1:bool=true;const wdir 1:bool=true;const fshell 1:bool=true;
eq l 1:int=(0− > if pre(done sbo 01) then 2 —the attacker level at PC 1.
else if pre(done rlog 01) then 1
else if pre(done lbo 01) then 2
else if pre(done sbo 21) then 2
else if pre(done rlog 21) then 1
else if pre(done lbo 21)then 2
else if pre(done lbo 11) then 2
else pre(l 1) );
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eq sshd 1:bool=(true− > if pre(done sbo 01) then false —the sshd service at PC 1.
else if pre(done sbo 21)then false
else pre(sshd 1)
);
eq t 01:bool=(false− >if pre(done ftpr 01) then true —PC 1 trusts PC 0.
else if pre(done ftpr 21) then true
else if pre(done ftpr 11) then true
else pre (t 01)
);
eq t 21:bool=(false− >if pre(done ftpr 01) then true —PC 1 trusts PC 2
else if pre(done ftpr 21) then true
else if pre(done ftpr 11) then true
else pre (t 21)
);
guarantee ”sbo 12 threat”:if (l 1≥1) then (thr sbo 12.val=true or thr sbo 12.val=false) else
thr sbo 12.val=false;
guarantee ”ftpr 12 threat”:if (l 1≥1)then (thr ftpr 12.val=true or thr ftpr 12.val=false) else
thr ftpr 12.val=false;
guarantee ”rlog 12 threat”:if (l 1≥1)then (thr rlog 12.val=true or thr rlog 12.val=false) else
thr rlog 12.val=false;
guarantee ”id sbo 01 value”:id done sbo 01.val= done sbo 01;
guarantee ”id rlog 01 value”:id done rlog 01.val= done rlog 01;
**};
end PC 1;
——————————————————————————————————————
system PC 2–host 2.
features
thr lbo 02: in data port data types implementation::lbo 02.impl;
thr sbo 02: in data port data types implementation::sbo 02.impl;
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thr ftpr 02: in data port data types implementation::ftpr 02.impl;
thr rlog 02: in data port data types implementation::rlog 02.impl;
thr sbo 12: in data port data types implementation::sbo 12.impl;
thr ftpr 12: in data port data types implementation::ftpr 12.impl;
thr rlog 12: in data port data types implementation::rlog 12.impl;
thr lbo 12: in data port data types implementation::lbo 12.impl;
thr sbo 21: out data port data types implementation::sbo 21.impl;
thr ftpr 21: out data port data types implementation::ftpr 21.impl;
thr rlog 21: out data port data types implementation::rlog 21.impl;
thr lbo 21: out data port data types implementation::lbo 21.impl;
thr lbo 22:out data port data types implementation::lbo 22.impl;
thr ftpr 22:out data port data types implementation::ftpr 22.impl;
id done sbo 02: out data port data types implementation::id sbo 02.impl;
id done rlog 02: out data port data types implementation::id rlog 02.impl;
test l 2:out data port data types implementation::l 2 level.impl ;
——————————————————————————————————
——————————————————————————————————
annex agree{**
eq done sbo 02:bool=(thr sbo 02.val)and (l 2<2) and sshd 2;
eq done ftpr 02:bool=(thr ftpr 02.val)and (t 02=false or t 12=false) and ftp 2 and wdir 2 and
fshell 2;
eq done rlog 02:bool=(thr rlog 02.val)and (l 2=0) and (t 02);
eq done lbo 02:bool=(thr lbo 02.val)and (l 2=1) and xterm 2;
eq done sbo 12:bool=(thr sbo 12.val)and (l 2<2) and sshd 2;
eq done ftpr 12:bool=(thr ftpr 12.val)and (t 02=false or t 12=false) and ftp 2 and wdir 2 and
fshell 2;
eq done rlog 12:bool=(thr rlog 12.val)and (l 2=0) and (t 12);
eq done lbo 12:bool=(thr lbo 12.val)and (l 2=1)and xterm 2;
eq done lbo 22:bool= (thr lbo 22.val)and(l 2=1)and xterm 2;
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eq done ftpr 22:bool= (thr ftpr 22.val)and(l 2≥1)and (t 02=false or t 12=false) and ftp 2 and
wdir 2 and fshell 2;
const xterm 2:bool=true; const sshd 2:bool=false;
eq l 2:int=(0− > if pre(done sbo 02) then 2
else if pre(done rlog 02) then 1
else if pre(done lbo 02) then 2
else if pre(done sbo 12) then 2
else if pre(done rlog 12) then 1
else if pre(done lbo 12) then 2
else if pre(done lbo 22) then 2
else pre(l 2) );
const ftp 2:bool=true;const wdir 2:bool=true;const fshell 2:bool=true; const data 2:bool=true;
eq t 02:bool=(false− >if pre(done ftpr 02) then true
else if pre(done ftpr 12) then true
else if pre(done ftpr 22) then true
else pre (t 02)
);
eq t 12:bool=(false− >if pre(done ftpr 02) then true
else if pre(done ftpr 12) then true
else if pre(done ftpr 22) then true
else pre (t 12)
);
guarantee ”l 2 value”:test l 2.val= l 2;
guarantee ”sbo 21 threat”:if (l 2≥1) then (thr sbo 21.val=true or thr sbo 21.val=false) else
thr sbo 21.val=false;
guarantee ”ftpr 21 threat”: if (l 2≥1)then (thr ftpr 21.val=true or thr ftpr 21.val=false) else
thr ftpr 21.val=false;
guarantee ”rlog 21 threat”: if (l 2≥1)then (thr rlog 21.val=true or thr rlog 21.val=false) else
thr rlog 21.val=false;
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guarantee ”id sbo 02 value”:id done sbo 02.val= done sbo 02;
guarantee ”id rlog 02 value”:id done rlog 02.val= done rlog 02;
**};
end PC 2;
—————————————————————————————————————–
system ID–the intrusion detection system.
features id done sbo 01:in data port data types implementation::id sbo 01.impl;
id done rlog 01:in data port data types implementation::id rlog 01.impl;
id done sbo 02: in data port data types implementation::id sbo 02.impl;
id done rlog 02: in data port data types implementation::id rlog 02.impl;
test dg:out data port data types implementation::dg detection.impl ;
——————————————————————————————————
——————————————————————————————————
annex agree{**
eq dg:int= 0;guarantee ”dg value”:test dg.val=dg− >if (id done sbo 01.val=true
and (pre(test dg.val)=0))then (test dg.val=0 or test dg.val=1)
else if (id done sbo 02.val=true) and (pre(test dg.val)=0) then (test dg.val=0 or test dg.val=1)
else if (id done rlog 01.val=true) then (test dg.val=1)
else if (id done rlog 02.val=true) then (test dg.val=1)
else (test dg.val=pre(test dg.val));
**};
end ID;
————————————————————-
system Complete
features
test l 2:out data port data types implementation::l 2 level.impl ;
test dg:out data port data types implementation::dg detection.impl ;
thr sbo 01: out data port data types implementation::sbo 01.impl;
thr ftpr 01: out data port data types implementation::ftpr 01.impl;
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thr rlog 01: out data port data types implementation::rlog 01.impl;
thr lbo 01: out data port data types implementation::lbo 01.impl;
thr sbo 02: out data port data types implementation::sbo 02.impl;
thr ftpr 02: out data port data types implementation::ftpr 02.impl;
thr rlog 02: out data port data types implementation::rlog 02.impl;
thr lbo 02: out data port data types implementation::lbo 02.impl;
thr sbo 12: out data port data types implementation::sbo 12.impl;
thr ftpr 12: out data port data types implementation::ftpr 12.impl;
thr rlog 12: out data port data types implementation::rlog 12.impl;
thr lbo 12: out data port data types implementation::lbo 12.impl;
thr lbo 11:out data port data types implementation::lbo 11.impl;
thr ftpr 11: out data port data types implementation::ftpr 11.impl;
thr sbo 21: out data port data types implementation::sbo 21.impl;
thr ftpr 21: out data port data types implementation::ftpr 21.impl;
thr rlog 21: out data port data types implementation::rlog 21.impl;
thr lbo 21: out data port data types implementation::lbo 21.impl;
thr lbo 22:out data port data types implementation::lbo 22.impl;
thr ftpr 22: out data port data types implementation::ftpr 22.impl;
annex agree{**
—we test the following property under the assumption that only one attack instance can occur
at a time.
guarantee ”security property”:(test l 2.val<2 or test dg.val=1);–attacker on host 2 has privi-
lege level below root or gets detected.
—to generate a second attack scenario, we encode the discovered counter example CE1, given
below, in disjunct with the security property P being checked, namely P ∨CE1. This yields a
new counter example.
–The following formula describes the the discovered counter example CE1, uncomment it to
generate a second attack scenario.
– eq CE1:bool=(thr sbo 01.val=false and pre(thr sbo 01.val=false)
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and pre(pre(thr sbo 01.val=false))
and pre(pre(pre(thr sbo 01.val=false))) and pre(pre(pre(pre(thr sbo 01.val=true)))))
–and(thr ftpr 02.val=false and pre(thr ftpr 02.val=false)and pre(pre(thr ftpr 02.val=false)) and
pre(pre(pre(thr ftpr 02.val=true))) and pre(pre(pre(pre(thr ftpr 02.val=false)))))
–and(thr rlog 12.val=false and pre(thr rlog 12.val=false)and pre(pre(thr rlog 12.val=true)) and
pre(pre(pre(thr rlog 12.val=false))) and pre(pre(pre(pre(thr rlog 12.val=false)))))
–and(thr lbo 02.val=false and pre(thr lbo 02.val=true)and pre(pre(thr lbo 02.val=false)) and
pre(pre(pre(thr lbo 02.val=false))) and pre(pre(pre(pre(thr lbo 02.val=false)))));
—to generate a second counter example, the security property is modified as follows (uncom-
ment it):
– guarantee ”security property”:((test l 2.val<2 or test dg.val=1) or CE1 );
assume ”one threat active”:
(thr ftpr 01.val=> (thr ftpr 02.val or thr sbo 01.val or thr rlog 01.val
or thr sbo 02.val or thr rlog 02.val or thr lbo 01.val or thr lbo 02.val or thr sbo 12.val
or thr ftpr 12.val or thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or thr sbo 21.val or thr ftpr 21.val or
thr rlog 21.val or thr lbo 21.val or thr lbo 11.val
or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val) =false)
and (thr sbo 01.val=> (thr ftpr 01.val or thr rlog 01.val or thr sbo 02.val or thr ftpr 02.val
or thr rlog 02.val or thr lbo 01.val or thr lbo 02.val or thr sbo 12.val or thr ftpr 12.val or
thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or thr sbo 21.val
or thr ftpr 21.val or thr rlog 21.val
or thr lbo 21.val or thr lbo 11.val
or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val)=false)
and (thr rlog 01.val=> (thr ftpr 01.val
or thr sbo 01.val or thr sbo 02.val
or thr ftpr 02.val or thr rlog 02.val or thr lbo 01.val or thr lbo 02.val
or thr sbo 12.val or thr ftpr 12.val
or thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or thr sbo 21.val or thr ftpr 21.val
or thr rlog 21.val or thr lbo 21.val
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or thr lbo 11.val or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val)=false)
and (thr sbo 02.val=> (thr rlog 01.val or thr ftpr 01.val or thr sbo 01.val or thr ftpr 02.val
or thr rlog 02.val or thr lbo 01.val or thr lbo 02.val or thr sbo 12.val
or thr ftpr 12.val or thr rlog 12.val
or thr lbo 12.val or thr sbo 21.val or thr ftpr 21.val or thr rlog 21.val
or thr lbo 21.val or thr lbo 11.val
or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val)=false)
and (thr ftpr 02.val => (thr ftpr 01.val
or thr rlog 01.val
or thr sbo 01.val or thr sbo 02.val or thr rlog 02.val or thr lbo 01.val or thr lbo 02.val
or thr sbo 12.val
or thr ftpr 12.val or thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or thr sbo 21.val or thr ftpr 21.va
l or thr rlog 21.val or thr lbo 21.val or thr lbo 11.val or thr lbo 22.val
or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val)=false)
and (thr rlog 02.val=> (thr rlog 01.val or thr ftpr 01.val
or thr sbo 01.val or thr sbo 02.val or thr ftpr 02.val or thr lbo 01.val or thr lbo 02.val
or thr sbo 12.val or thr ftpr 12.val or thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or thr sbo 21.val or
thr ftpr 21.val or thr rlog 21.val
or thr lbo 21.val or thr lbo 11.val or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val)=false)
and (thr lbo 01.val=> (thr rlog 01.val or thr ftpr 01.val or thr sbo 01.val
or thr sbo 02.val or thr ftpr 02.val or thr rlog 02.val or thr lbo 02.val or thr sbo 12.val or
thr ftpr 12.val
or thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or thr sbo 21.val or thr ftpr 21.val or thr rlog 21.val or
thr lbo 21.val
or thr lbo 11.val or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val)=false)
and (thr lbo 02.val=> (thr rlog 01.val or thr ftpr 01.val or thr sbo 01.val or thr sbo 02.val
or thr ftpr 02.val or thr rlog 02.val or thr lbo 01.val or thr sbo 12.val or thr ftpr 12.val or
thr rlog 12.val
or thr lbo 12.val or thr sbo 21.val or thr ftpr 21.val or thr rlog 21.val or thr lbo 21.val or
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thr lbo 11.val
or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val)=false)
and (thr sbo 12.val => (thr ftpr 12.val or thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val
or thr ftpr 01.val
or thr ftpr 02.val or thr sbo 01.val or thr rlog 01.val or thr sbo 02.val or thr rlog 02.val
or thr lbo 01.val
or thr lbo 02.val or thr sbo 21.val or thr ftpr 21.val or thr rlog 21.val or thr lbo 21.val
or thr lbo 11.val
or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val)=false)
and (thr ftpr 12.val=>(thr sbo 12.val or thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or thr ftpr 01.val
or thr ftpr 02.val or thr sbo 01.val or thr rlog 01.val or thr sbo 02.val
or thr rlog 02.val or thr lbo 01.val
or thr lbo 02.val or thr sbo 21.val or thr ftpr 21.val or thr rlog 21.val or thr lbo 21.val or
thr lbo 11.val
or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val)=false)
and (thr rlog 12.val=>(thr ftpr 12.val or thr sbo 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or thr ftpr 01.val
or thr ftpr 02.val or thr sbo 01.val or thr rlog 01.val or thr sbo 02.val or thr rlog 02.val or
thr lbo 01.val
or thr lbo 02.val or thr sbo 21.val or thr ftpr 21.val or thr rlog 21.val or thr lbo 21.val or
thr lbo 11.val
or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val)=false)
and (thr lbo 12.val=>(thr ftpr 12.val or thr rlog 12.val or thr sbo 12.val or thr ftpr 01.val
or thr ftpr 02.val or thr sbo 01.val or thr rlog 01.val or thr sbo 02.val or thr rlog 02.val or
thr lbo 01.val
or thr lbo 02.val or thr sbo 21.val or thr ftpr 21.val or thr rlog 21.val or thr lbo 21.val or
thr lbo 11.val
or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val)=false)
and (thr sbo 21.val =>(thr ftpr 21.val or thr rlog 21.val or thr lbo 21.val or thr ftpr 01.val
or thr ftpr 02.val or thr sbo 01.val or thr rlog 01.val or thr sbo 02.val or thr rlog 02.val or
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thr lbo 01.val or thr lbo 02.val
or thr sbo 12.val or thr ftpr 12.val or thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or thr lbo 11.val
or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val)=false)
and (thr ftpr 21.val=>(thr sbo 21.val or thr rlog 21.val or thr lbo 21.val or thr ftpr 01.val
or thr ftpr 02.val or thr sbo 01.val or thr rlog 01.val or thr sbo 02.val or thr rlog 02.val or
thr lbo 01.val or thr lbo 02.val
or thr sbo 12.val or thr ftpr 12.val or thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or thr lbo 11.val
or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val)=false)
and (thr rlog 21.val=>(thr ftpr 21.val or thr sbo 21.val or thr lbo 21.val or thr ftpr 01.val
or thr ftpr 02.val or thr sbo 01.val or thr rlog 01.val or thr sbo 02.val or thr rlog 02.val or
thr lbo 01.val or thr lbo 02.val
or thr sbo 12.val or thr ftpr 12.val or thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or thr lbo 11.val or
thr lbo 22.val
or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val)=false)
and (thr lbo 21.val=>(thr ftpr 21.val or thr rlog 21.val or thr sbo 21.val or thr ftpr 01.val
or thr ftpr 02.val or thr sbo 01.val or thr rlog 01.val or thr sbo 02.val or thr rlog 02.val or
thr lbo 01.val
or thr lbo 02.val or thr sbo 12.val or thr ftpr 12.val or thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or
thr lbo 11.val
or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val)=false)
and (thr lbo 11.val=> (thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val or thr ftpr 01.val or
thr ftpr 02.val
or thr sbo 01.val or thr rlog 01.val or thr sbo 02.val or thr rlog 02.val or thr lbo 01.val or
thr lbo 02.val
or thr sbo 12.val or thr ftpr 12.val or thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or thr sbo 21.val or
thr ftpr 21.val
or thr rlog 21.val or thr lbo 21.val)=false)
and (thr lbo 22.val=> (thr lbo 11.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 22.val or thr ftpr 01.val or
thr ftpr 02.val
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or thr sbo 01.val or thr rlog 01.val or thr sbo 02.val or thr rlog 02.val or thr lbo 01.val or
thr lbo 02.val
or thr sbo 12.val or thr ftpr 12.val or thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or thr sbo 21.val or
thr ftpr 21.val
or thr rlog 21.val or thr lbo 21.val)=false)
and (thr ftpr 11.val=> (thr lbo 11.val or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 22.val or thr ftpr 01.val or
thr ftpr 02.val
or thr sbo 01.val or thr rlog 01.val or thr sbo 02.val or thr rlog 02.val or thr lbo 01.val or
thr lbo 02.val
or thr sbo 12.val or thr ftpr 12.val or thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or thr sbo 21.val or
thr ftpr 21.val
or thr rlog 21.val or thr lbo 21.val)=false)
and (thr ftpr 22.val=> (thr lbo 11.val or thr lbo 22.val or thr ftpr 11.val or thr ftpr 01.val or
thr ftpr 02.val
or thr sbo 01.val or thr rlog 01.val or thr sbo 02.val or thr rlog 02.val or thr lbo 01.val or
thr lbo 02.val
or thr sbo 12.val or thr ftpr 12.val or thr rlog 12.val or thr lbo 12.val or thr sbo 21.val or
thr ftpr 21.val
or thr rlog 21.val or thr lbo 21.val)=false) ;
**};
end Complete;
system implementation Complete.Impl
subcomponents
A sub : system PC 0 ;
H1 sub : system PC 1 ;
H2 sub : system PC 2;
Int det: system ID;
connections
test l 2 output: port H2 sub.test l 2− >test l 2
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{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
test dg output: port Int det.test dg− >test dg
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
pc1 id sbo 01:port H1 sub.id done sbo 01− >Int det.id done sbo 01
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
pc2 id sbo 02:port H2 sub.id done sbo 02− >Int det.id done sbo 02
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
pc1 id rlog 01:port H1 sub.id done rlog 01− >Int det.id done rlog 01
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
pc2 id rlog 02:port H2 sub.id done rlog 02− >Int det.id done rlog 02
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
sbo 01 T : port A sub.thr sbo 01− > H1 sub.thr sbo 01
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
ftpr 01 T : port A sub.thr ftpr 01− > H1 sub.thr ftpr 01
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
rlog 01 T : port A sub.thr rlog 01− > H1 sub.thr rlog 01
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
lbo 01 T: port A sub.thr lbo 01− > H1 sub.thr lbo 01
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
sbo 02 T : port A sub.thr sbo 02− > H2 sub.thr sbo 02
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
ftpr 02 T : port A sub.thr ftpr 02− > H2 sub.thr ftpr 02
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
rlog 02 T : port A sub.thr rlog 02− > H2 sub.thr rlog 02
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
lbo 02 T: port A sub.thr lbo 02− > H2 sub.thr lbo 02
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
sbo 12 T : port H1 sub.thr sbo 12− > H2 sub.thr sbo 12
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
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ftpr 12 T : port H1 sub.thr ftpr 12− > H2 sub.thr ftpr 12
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
rlog 12 T : port H1 sub.thr rlog 12− > H2 sub.thr rlog 12
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
lbo 12 T: port H1 sub.thr lbo 12− > H2 sub.thr lbo 12
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
sbo 21 T : port H2 sub.thr sbo 21− > H1 sub.thr sbo 21
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
ftpr 21 T : port H2 sub.thr ftpr 21− > H1 sub.thr ftpr 21
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
rlog 21 T : port H2 sub.thr rlog 21− > H1 sub.thr rlog 21
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
lbo 21 T: port H2 sub.thr lbo 21− > H1 sub.thr lbo 21
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
sbo 01:port A sub.thr sbo 01− >thr sbo 01
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
ftpr 01:port A sub.thr ftpr 01− >thr ftpr 01
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
rlog 01:port A sub.thr rlog 01− >thr rlog 01
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
lbo 01: port A sub.thr lbo 01− >thr lbo 01
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
sbo 02:port A sub.thr sbo 02− >thr sbo 02
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
ftpr 02:port A sub.thr ftpr 02− >thr ftpr 02
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
rlog 02:port A sub.thr rlog 02− >thr rlog 02
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
lbo 02: port A sub.thr lbo 02− >thr lbo 02
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{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
sbo 12:port H1 sub.thr sbo 12− >thr sbo 12
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
ftpr 12:port H1 sub.thr ftpr 12− >thr ftpr 12
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
rlog 12:port H1 sub.thr rlog 12− >thr rlog 12
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
lbo 12:port H1 sub.thr lbo 12− >thr lbo 12
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
sbo 21:port H2 sub.thr sbo 21− >thr sbo 21
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
ftpr 21:port H2 sub.thr ftpr 21− >thr ftpr 21
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
rlog 21:port H2 sub.thr rlog 21− >thr rlog 21
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
lbo 21:port H2 sub.thr lbo 21− >thr lbo 21
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
lbo 11:port H1 sub.thr lbo 11− > thr lbo 11
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
ftpr 11: port H1 sub.thr ftpr 11− >thr ftpr 11
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
lbo 22:port H2 sub.thr lbo 22− > thr lbo 22
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
ftpr 22: port H2 sub.thr ftpr 22− >thr ftpr 22
{Communication Properties :: Timing => immediate; };
end Complete.Impl;
end system model;
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